

THE
MILITARY STRENGTH
OF
TURKEY.

FROM MSS. ENTITLED
“THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNDER ABDUL
MEDJID,”

WRITTEN IN 1852.

BY
DAVID URQUHART.



LONDON:
EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1869.

HALF-A-CROWN.

THE NUMBERS OF THE
DIPLOMATIC REVIEW

For January and February, 1869,

Give the explanation of the recent decision of the Sublime
Porte which has altered the Political relations of Europe.

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MILITARY STRATEGY

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THE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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INTRODUCTION.

ON THE DELUSION OF THE POWER OF RUSSIA.*

POWER is relative. The assumption of Russia's power is relatively to that of Turkey. It is assumed that Russia has more power to attack her neighbour than Turkey has to defend herself.

This Russian power is, then, vaguely transferred to Europe and Asia, and she is looked at as terrible to the world. Yet no one pretends that she is stronger than Europe or than Asia. What is felt is that Russia being more powerful than Turkey, and subjugating her, will acquire in Constantinople an aggressive power sufficient to endanger the East and the West.

It is this sequence which has established the maxim on which all the Governments of Europe have uniformly acted since the fatal year 1827: that Turkey must be "constrained to make concessions to diminish the amount of future sacrifices," in other words, they "seek to disarm Turkey in the interest of her defence."

The combination directed under this inspiration has disturbed the internal state of Turkey, and tends to realise the very danger the apprehension of which has given rise to it. The danger has no existence save in the false belief and in the erroneous inference. Turkey is not weaker than Russia, and but for the interference

* From the "Diplomatic Review," September, 1867.

of Europe it would be Russia, not Turkey, that would at this moment not only be heard of as in danger, but that really would be so.

Not one of the European Governments has ever set itself to examine the case. Each man cast accidentally into office in each of them, has contented himself with accepting from his predecessor both maxim and practice. There never has appeared a serious and methodical inquiry into the relative military power of the two Empires. Yet such inquiry is the very first step to be taken in order that any correct judgment should be formed in respect either to whether the world is in danger, or as to the means of averting it.

Such an investigation does, however, exist. It was undertaken long ago. It was prepared for publication in 1852, in view of the coming war; but its publication was superseded by the immediate occupations imposed on the author by the war itself. It is contained in a MS. work on the "Ottoman Empire under Sultan ABDUL MEDJID, by Mr. URQUHART. The chapters on the "Army," and the "Frontier Provinces," have been placed at our disposal, and are now printed without the alteration of a word.

The war of 1853, thus anticipated in 1852, confirms, in every respect, the anticipation of the author. Russia did enter the Principalities without a Declaration of War; England did prevent the Turks from sending a force to oppose her. It was thus that she was able to remain there unmolested for three months, and to transfer the conflict from the Pruth to the Danube.

The MS. is also printed without addition, because it is equally applicable at the present moment. Two great changes are indeed in progress, but they have not as yet been effected; the one is the construction of railroads across the Steppe; the other is the construction and preparation of a virtually Russian Army Administration and Commissariat on the Danube under the name of an "Independent Roumania."

To the Editor of THE DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.

September 20, 1867.

SIR,—I have been no less surprised than delighted to see in your columns the first of a series of chapters on “The Military Strength of Turkey.”

I read that MS. in 1853, and by means of it I was prepared for what to the public appeared the incredible results of every conflict between the Russians and the Turks, as also for the political consequences that ensued, in the direct teeth of the military operations.

With a more than ordinary experience of the East, and as a military man, I do not shrink from saying that it is to this unprofessional observer that I am indebted for the understanding of this, the most grave of the problems, perhaps, ever presented for solution.

We, who protest against the subserviency of the Cabinets of Europe to Russia, would have no right to speak, and could have no claim to be heard, were it true, as the world believes, that Russia is relatively strong and Turkey relatively weak. But if it is exactly the reverse, then are our words the only true ones.

... Could Russia, by her own means, achieve her ends, then, to use her own words on one occasion, “Europe would only have heard of the event when too late.”

The case submitted in these chapters, is the elaborate, the comprehensive, and the irrefragable evidence of the military superiority of Turkey over Russia. It is thus the vindication of Russia from the folly of which she otherwise would be guilty.

It has been to me a subject of never-failing regret, that this work has lain for so many years idle, in the dark; and yet it now appears to me that it may have been providentially reserved. Had it been said, in 1853, that is, before the war, that the Turkish regular troops would “always beat in the field twice the number of Russians,” all military men would have set down the writer as a person utterly incompetent to entertain or to express any opinion upon military matters.

It is very different now. The campaigns of 1853-4 have justified that prevision, and now amongst military men the question of a comparison to be instituted between the relative merits of the two systems and qualifications of the two people does present itself, and constantly presents itself.

Had the work appeared during Lord PALMERSTON’s life, it would have fallen utterly dead with regard to any convictions that might have resulted from it, as affecting the conduct of Great Britain in the East.

There is a third and last consideration, which is, perhaps, not the least important. The Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople has just published a work containing the exposition of the whole course of those fatal negotiations which, beginning in 1821 out of Russia’s insurrectionary operations in Greece, have involved the Governments

of Europe in an inextricable chaos. This authoritative work must produce an effect, and this effect must principally result in this question—what is the relative material strength of the two Empires? To this question the four volumes of Baron PROKESCH, though himself a military man, give no reply. While, therefore, the work of M. PROKESCH gives a value to that of Mr. URQUHART which otherwise it would not possess, so also does the work of Mr. URQUHART afford to that of M. PROKESCH a confirmation which it absolutely requires.

There is a singular coincidence between these two works; they both appear in 1867; they were both prepared for the press in 1853. The delay, in the one case, arose from the war itself, which left to the author not a moment of rest. The delay, in the other, arose from the intrigues of Russia at Vienna, by means of which the printed sheets were, up to the beginning of this year, consigned to darkness in the cellars of the Police Office at Vienna.

I cannot close this letter without pointing out that, while Mr. URQUHART is considered, in England, as a man standing alone, the case is exactly the reverse. The Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, the former English Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord PONSONBY, and the former Envoy in Persia, Sir JOHN MACNEIL, agree with Mr. URQUHART in the essential points of difference between him and the nation. I might extend the catalogue, not only amongst the dead, but the living.

In 1853, a lawyer, who had happened to be frequently present at the conversations of those who were struggling to avert the war of 1854, having been asked his opinion on the political crisis, replied, "I find that all those who have a right to speak are of one mind, but, unfortunately, the British nation is of another."

S. E. ROLLAND.

Military Strength of Turkey.

FRONTIER PROVINCES.

CHAPTER I.

THE STEPPES.

THE first consideration in a European war is the army; the second is the structure of the country; and, last of all, come the dispositions of the populations. In the present case, this order has to be reversed. The first matter is the dispositions of the people; next come the physical difficulties; and, last of all, as regards the defensive forces, the army itself.

From the Scythian invasion of DARIUS, down to the march of DIEBITCH across the Balkan, every event bears testimony to the importance of the geographical features of the scene of the coming contest between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires.

Notwithstanding the decline of Ottoman power, the Turkish frontiers extend to the north and west, nearly to the point which they attained under SULEYMAN THE GREAT.

Notwithstanding the enormous accession to the power of Russia by the incorporation of Poland, of the Cossack communities, the khanships of Cazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea, the Czars have only been able to reach the Pruth; the field of future contest consequently remains the same as that upon which the first defeats of PETER were incurred, and the first victories of Munich and Suvaroff achieved.

The area included in that theatre is gigantic, embracing both sides of the Euxine, and ranging from east and west twelve hundred miles. The varieties of its nature are not less remark-

able than the rapidity of its changes with the seasons. An army encamped in swamps may, in a week or a fortnight, be exposed to perish from drought, and two armies encamped in sight of each other may be, the one in the enjoyment of healthful breezes, the other afflicted with pestilential miasma. A knowledge of local circumstances, and an appreciation of times and seasons, thus rise superior to all considerations of discipline and of strategy.

After the war of 1812, a French military writer of authority says:—

“Moldavia and Wallachia are no longer for the Turks anything more than a domain of ostentation. They can no longer defend them.

“The only means of preventing or retarding their fall is to withdraw behind the Danube, sacrificing a portion of their territory to preserve the rest.”

“The repose of Europe,” he adds, “requires this arrangement for its security, which is, in consequence, compromised by the ineffectual efforts of Turkey to retain a dominion which is escaping from its hands.”*

I shall endeavour to establish that the defence of Turkey and the peace of Europe depend on their retention, that they are no “domain of ostentation,” and that by withdrawing behind the Danube the Turks would inevitably sacrifice those other domains, which they are held securely to possess. Russia’s Cabinet has revealed in its policy of more than a century that it firmly holds the same opinion. I will even go further, and assert that the defence of Turkey lies beyond the Danubian provinces, and in the very dominions of Russia herself. The acquisition of Bessarabia, a fertile, well-wooded, well-watered, mountainous, and healthy region, does, indeed, furnish her an important station on the borders of the Pruth. The resources of that district are, however, slender in proportion to the efforts to be made; and to reach that advanced station she has to cross a vast extent of wild and depopulated country, which exhausts her resources and decimates her armies before they can even gain sight of the territory of their foes.

This band, chiefly composed of acquisitions made at the expense of the Cossacks and the Khans of the Crimea since 1735, covers a surface of 150,000 square miles, with an average breadth of 250. It stretches from Galicia away eastward to the Ural, and is known under the name of Steppe.

* Beaujour’s “Voyages Militaires,” vol. ii. p. 552. A Government organ recently made use of this passage in insinuating the necessity of abandoning these provinces to Russia.

The Western or Polish portion is known as the Ukraine*—a term signifying, march or frontier; in consequence of its having been, for centuries, the scene of border wars between the Poles, the Muscovites, the Tartars, and the Turks. It is destitute of mountains and even of hills, though it is not absolutely flat; there are no forests, and no trees, so that it is destitute of fuel; there are no wells, and no streams, so that it is destitute of water, save where the rivers from the interior pass. During the long winter, it is covered with a sheet of snow; in summer, it is a burnt-up waste, so that, with a short interval, it is destitute of provender and forage. From all these causes, it is bare of population; it is consequently destitute of all resource whatever by which an army in its passage could be supplied, or assistance afforded to its movements. There is no shelter where it rests, no roads where it passes, no bridges or causeways, and no stones to make them: everything must be transported. Russian armies, unlike all other invading forces, are vast and unwieldy masses, so that the difficulties presented to the movement of such an army, in its own territory, are infinitely greater than those to be encountered by enemies invading it.

In winter the traveller, wrapped in furs and gliding on a sledge, easily traverses the steppes; but at that season they are impassable for armies, and it lasts the third of the year. In March the thaw commences; and for six weeks the communications are then interrupted even between the cities and the neighbouring farms, the lowlands being flooded, and the ice insecure, so that neither can the sledge, the carriage, nor the boat be used. As the ice and snow disappear, under a tropical sun, vegetation springs up, but the stagnant waters soon give forth poisonous exhalations; the excessive sultriness joined to the sudden change exhausts animal strength, and exposes the body to the fatal effects of those vapours. Intermittent and typhoid fevers break out, which are generally fatal for inhabitants of the northern districts.†

* Speaking of the Steppes of the Ukraine, Hell says: "There are, here and there, a few depressions where the grass retains its verdure during a part of the year, and some stunted trees spread their meagre branches over a less unkindly soil than that of the Steppes; but these are unusual circumstances, and one must often travel hundreds of miles to find a single shrub."—P. 38.

† A recent traveller thus describes the Steppes in the summer season.—"The reflected glare of the sun, the absence of any breath of wind, made this day's journey one of the most oppressive we encountered. It took us four hours to get over nine versts (less than six English miles). Though I wore a thick veil and blue spectacles, my eyelids were so swollen that I could hardly open them. Nothing can be more saddening to the imagination than the lifeless aspect and uniform hues of these endless plains. One is surprised to meet in them from time to time some miserable Cossack villages, and cannot tell how the inhabitants can exist amidst such desolation. This sad sterility is the work of man rather than of nature. The present system

There is, however, a bright interval of from six weeks to two months, after which the land begins to lose its verdure, and in a short time assumes the aspect of the deserts of Arabia.

The spring is therefore the moment favourable for passage, but it is difficult for Russia to profit by it. Coming from the north, she has to advance in an opposite ratio to the season, and even in so far as she is able to profit by the favourable moment, her troops will then arrive upon the Danube only to be exposed at that season to still more deleterious influences of climate than in the Steppes themselves. In fact, every movement which involves the crossing of the Steppes places her between two horns of a dilemma—snow and ague.

Yet in former times this country was the field of great military expeditions, carried on by populations wholly destitute of the science and resources of a great empire; and it may be suspected that the difficulties I have described are overstated, and the picture overdrawn. But we have to take into account the difference of circumstances, both as regards the nature of the forces engaged, and the change which the country has undergone.

Then armies were composed of cavalry; unretarded by the slow movements of infantry, unencumbered with artillery or baggage, they could easily sweep in four days across a region through which a modern Russian army has to toil for a month. The suddenness of their approach, the expanse of their radiation, deprived the inhabitants of the means of escape or the time for concealment. The supplementary horses augmented their speed, facilitated the transport of provision, or themselves supplied, in case of necessity, food. On the east of the Caspian, the Tartars can supply themselves in deserts which to the Russians have proved utterly impracticable.

The Russians do not understand the horse; their cavalry is drawn entirely from Malo-Russia; the very Cossack organisation, which has been of such great moment in the wars of Europe as well as of Asia, has rather been employed of necessity than cultivated by system; the efforts of the Government have all tended to impair its strength, and have ended by alienating its affections. The change in the country has been depopulation. It is the policy of a weaker State to interpose wastes between itself and a more powerful neighbour. This service Russia is in her own territory performing for Turkey: it results from permanent causes over which the Government has no control. A more saddening contrast it would be difficult to find between the Steppes of the Don, the Volga, the Black Sea, and the Caspian,

of government of the Cossacks is an insuperable bar to agricultural improvement, and, so long as it exists, the land must remain uncultivated."—Hill's Travels in the Steppes, p. 155.

under the Golden Horde and under NICHOLAS. Then they were covered with forests, with flocks and herds, habitations and men. Russia has driven out the people where she has conquered the land. There have been sudden flights, gradual migrations, and systematic decay.

In one day (January 5, 1771) Russia lost half a million of subjects!

Fifty thousand Cossacks have silently passed into Turkey; they are daily passing to the Circassians. The inhabitants of the Crimea have dwindled to one-tenth. Astrakhan, that flourishing capital of the Moguls, with its magnificent position, counts throughout its territory but eleven agriculturists and thirty nomades to the square mile.

In the eastern districts of Poland, nearly half a million of peasants have, by the consequences of confiscation, been added to the number of Imperial serfs or to the military colonies, and the culture of wheat has been prohibited by ukase.

Since the events of Galicia, the Government has arrived at fomenting dissensions between the serfs and the nobles, the immediate effect of which is the discouragement of agriculture, so that analogous causes are in operation along the whole of this region from the East to the West.

A test of the progress of depopulation is to be found in the disappearance of timber, marked by the sinking of the streams. Formerly it was customary to shoot the falls of the Dnieper, which is no longer practicable. The German colonists of Sarepta had established, fifty years ago, saw and other mills on the Sarpa, and these have been abandoned through want of water.

The German colonists settled below the falls of the Dnieper can no longer use the river in its lower course for the transport of their produce to the sea, but have to send it by land to Azof.

In Russia proper, the population and culture are rapidly extending, and no doubt the Russian Government has believed that the substitution of a Russian for a Tartar population would be followed by similar effects in the South; but an agricultural people is not fitted to turn the Steppes to account; a nomade people can alone do so.* Besides, with these Russians, serfage, conscription, and military colonies have been introduced. No restraint is further opposed to the systematic corruption of the administration, against which *tribes* might rise up, before which a disunited people must succumb.

* "Here, as everywhere, the Russian population, in taking the place of the Tartars, have destroyed the agricultural population of the country."—*Steppes of the Caspian*, page 182.

But besides the horse, there was another animal the peculiar property of the Tartar, which, if not of equal importance for warlike operations, was far more so for rendering prosperous the Steppes. VOLNEY concludes his eloquent description of the camel with these words: "Without it the peninsula of Arabia "would be untenable by man." In like manner might the inhabitant of the North describe it as equally adapted to resist the severities of winter, and to gather its economic subsistence from beneath the snow. How essential is it not, then, for a country which passes from the extreme points of northern to those of southern latitude, and unites the rigours of Siberia to those of Arabia Deserta. I shall now endeavour to describe what the animal is, which the Russians have exterminated.

A camel can carry seven hundred pounds weight, at the rate of twenty-five miles a day; he gives no trouble for his management, one man sufficing to look after a dozen. He requires no shoeing, currying, or stabling; he is content with a little muddy water, and finds his food as he journeys along, by means of his long neck, in the shrubs and thorns which these countries generally afford, and which no other animal will touch. Anything that is green suffices for him, be it horny, nitrous, or saline. If no food is to be found, even of such a description, he does without it. One foodless bivouac thus passed, you come to a second; and again the camel passes the heat of the day and anguish of the night without meal or drink. Again the third day you try him, and still his patience holds, and still his life and his still undiminished power to prosecute his journey. This may go on for a week; one week may become two; it will be the third before his willing spirit and enduring flesh at length give in.

The only cost for these animals is at their birth, and the necessary attendance during their long adolescence; for this they make up by their long service. A camel will wear the pack-saddle for half a century. In case of necessity, they are slaughtered for food, the hump and the flat foot being great delicacies. Like the cow, they yield milk; like the sheep, wool; and while excelling the ox in laborious patience, they outstrip in speed the horse.*

The Tartar is no less remarkable for his aptitude to use the camel than the horse; and, in fact, extensive regions of Tartary would otherwise be untenable and impassable. The Russian, if he neglects the horse, extinguishes the camel. Wherever the

* Huc states (vol. i. p. 206) that the camels carrying the Chinese messengers across Tartary are expected to travel eighty miles per diem. Abbas Pasha ran for a bet one of his best camels against time. It performed one hundred and seventeen miles between sunrise and sunset; it did not, however survive.

agricultural Russian peasant has taken the place of the Tartar nomade, the camel has disappeared ; and thus countries formerly flourishing have been converted into a desert. The Russian Government has at times appreciated the value of the animal, but not to propagate and preserve it. In 1796, it collected from the Crimea, at a high price,* all that could be found, amounting to a thousand, which were sacrificed in the Persian War. The passage of the Balkan, in 1829, was owing, in a great measure, to the forethought of Marshal DIEBITCH, who had a great number brought from the banks of the Volga.

But the camel presented an element for the operations of war itself, no less than for the transport of stores and the sustenance of population. No sooner had NAPOLEON set foot in Egypt and beheld that animal, than he incorporated it in his warlike system. He instituted a Dromedary Corps, each carrying two men, to dismount and fight on foot, and able to accomplish distances of twenty-five and thirty leagues without stopping. Such was precisely the fashion in which the Arabs appeared in the army of XERXES.

Thus a Government, which, in its intercourse with Europe, displays so wonderful an aptitude for profiting by occasions, appears in its internal management distinguished by an equal incapacity to utilise resources. It is not even that it does not combine and create, but it disperses and destroys ; and this disposition of the mind has to be taken into account in estimating the obstacles, the result of its past improvidence, which are opposed to the achievement of its future progress.

In reference to transport across the Steppes, there remains one matter still to be dealt with. The rivers of Russia flow through its rich and fertile provinces southwards ; it may therefore be supposed that by this means the transport of provisions and stores may be easily effected. But this is not the case. The Dnieper is out of the question, the navigation being, as above stated, interrupted even below the cataracts. There remains but the Don, which, at about 250 miles from Azof, communicates, by a land portage of thirty-five miles, with the Volga at Tzaritzin, and to which point there is water communication from the centre of the provinces of Muscovy Proper. In the spring, transport is thus readily effected down to the Black Sea ; but the stores only then arrive at Azof, and are exposed to all the incidents of a difficult voyage, in time of war, to the coast of Roumely. The river transport occupies two months, and can only commence with the breaking up of the ice ten degrees to the northward of the field of operations. These rivers are there-

* Varying from 22*l.* 10*s.* to 33*l.* 15*s.*

fore unavailable except for supplies at the end of the campaign, if, indeed, preparations have not commenced at the beginning of the previous year. It therefore follows that the whole of this immense transport will have to be effected by oxen waggons across the Steppes, the force to be so supplied being no less than a couple of hundred thousand men. This will account for the statement of Pozzo di Borgo in reference to the War of 1828, that Russia had been employed for two years in preparation for it, and that it was necessary, to bring about a favourable termination of it, that she should call up the whole of her resources.*

The difficulties on that occasion were greater than on former ones, in consequence of the depopulation to which I have adverted. These difficulties are still greater at present than they were in 1828.

The Steppes may therefore be considered as a breakwater placed in advance of the Ottoman Empire on the west, as the Caucasus on the east.

* "It was the Russian Empire, *after two years of observation and preparation*, which put itself in motion against the Turkish Empire, *reduced to the Mussulman population of Europe*. . . . The patriotism, the position, and the resources of the Empire are equal to all. Let them be evoked, let them be exerted with order and capacity, and the policy of Europe will cease to offer problems for our solution. . . . This campaign has become indispensable, in my opinion, because the first has not produced its effect. We will undertake it, then, with the chances that it offers to us; *and these chances will be less dangerous in proportion as our efforts will be great and terrible*. . . . Here, M. le Comte, you have the tribute of my zeal, and my feeble conceptions upon the grave questions which occupy the Imperial Cabinet. In examining them, I have not disguised the difficulties which we have still to overcome; but I have also sought out the means we possess of triumphing over them. The events of the past campaign, far from discouraging us, will have given us the experience which we had not. If unforeseen obstacles have existed, the Emperor knows them to surmount them; and I see, in the very necessity in which we are placed of conquering, a principle of activity and energy which will preserve to the Empire and its glorious Chief, in the sphere which is their own, that supremacy from which it belongs to no human power to make them descend."—*Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode, Nov. 28, 1828.*

CHAPTER II.

THE PROVINCES OF THE DANUBE.

MOLDAVIA stretches from the junction of the Pruth and the Danube two hundred and fifty miles north-west to the limits of Galicia. It is defended along its whole length by the Pruth; it is defended by the Sereth, both of which present a rapid course and high defensive banks; parallel to both runs the lofty chain of the Carpathians, with Transylvania close in the rear. It was on this field that the Poles experienced those defeats which ended by placing Podolia for a time under the sway of the Ottomans, and detached from Poland the Cossacks of the Ukraine. It was here that were dissipated the illusions of PETER respecting the approaching fall of the Ottoman Empire, and where he himself only escaped the fate of CHARLES XII. by the cunning of a woman and the corruption of a Vizier. On both of these signal occasions the Turks had ceased to retain that military power and character which had made them formidable; nor were they commanded by Generals of distinction. Their superiority over the Poles and the Russians is attributable to local advantages, whether as regards defencibleness of position or facilities of supply. From that time Russia applied herself to obtain at Constantinople a modification of their connexion with the Porte of the highest importance, to which I shall subsequently refer.

The Poles and the Russians experienced, at that time, obstacles not only at the entrance into Moldavia; others not less formidable defended Wallachia.

The Carpathians bound Moldavia to the south and west, narrowing, at their southern extremity, the plain in the line of Foxani where it joins Wallachia, to some thirty or forty miles.

To the eastward the Danube and its various estuaries and marshes bar the passage, so that the entrance of an invading army must be across this opening, where the defenders can rally themselves, and which the assailants can reach only with considerable loss. If there met, they are at a distance from their resources, whilst their antagonists have Wallachia in their rear, and can obtain from it unlimited supplies.

The season for this operation must be the spring; the one army approaching from the south and deriving thence its supplies, and the other from the north: the former are, so to say, constantly under the weather, and the latter have always the wind aft. The one moving before the other anticipates the unhealthy season; the other marches into it.

We are putting the case of a war in which Turkey defends the Provinces, and that by means of a regular army, in numbers sufficient to cope with the Russians in the field. In that case, the Turks, if driven from the line of Foxani, would not retreat to the Danube, but maintain themselves in Wallachia. For I assume that they would not expose themselves to the chances of a great pitched battle; they would retire slowly with undiminished strength, devastating the country behind them, and driving before them the populations and herds towards the strong mountain positions of the West. The Russians would then be delayed until the warm summer weather set in; they would find no subsistence, no means of transport. It would be impossible for them to advance upon the Danube, leaving the Turks in the rear, and, therefore the campaign would consist in a wholly novel operation, that of attack upon the dispersed Turkish bodies among the Carpathians, aided by the population, who, if for no other reason, would fight to prevent their country from continuing to be the field of war.

We must, therefore, take the case of the Russian force in the middle of an oval basin, surrounded on the one side by mountains and on the other by the Danube; with the Turks in force in the mountains on one side, and on the other along the Danube.

As presented on the map, nothing can appear more easy than the passage of these Provinces. You perceive an immense alluvial basin, the largest in Europe, except Hungary, traversed by a great river, and numerous streams, and which has passed into a proverb for its fertility. The march of a disciplined army cannot here be supposed to be attended with inconvenience or dangers. How different the reality!

Surrounded on the north-west by lofty mountains, and exposed to the north-east, the winters are peculiarly long and severe. With the interval of a spring, lovely but short, summer

sets in with an intensity which rivals that of winter; there is no protection against the inclemencies of either; the mud and wicker huts of the Troglodyte and miserable peasantry afford no lodging for troops, and are speedily broken down or filled up. There is not a road of any kind; there are no bridges or causeways; the soil is aluminous and friable, cracking, parched, and dusty in the summer, thick mire and mud in the winter; no pasturage is to be found in the one season, when the flocks and herds are driven to the mountains, and in winter military operations are impracticable. In the lowlands the forests are exhausted, and in the highlands they serve for the retreat of the flying population.*

An army entering suddenly in spring during the fine season, and without any measures being taken either for defence or for the removal of the stores and means of transport, will fare comparatively well, and once having crossed the country, established its etapes and got the administration into its hands, it can link its lines of communication and obtain, by agreement or force, abundant supplies. Then it can move with facility throughout the province, as we have seen the Russians do in 1849, when they sent fifty thousand men across both provinces to enter Hungary at its southern point, whilst despatching other bodies against Transylvania, and maintaining a reserve of sixty thousand men; the provinces furnishing the means of transport and subsistence for nearly one hundred thousand men, just as if they had been integral portions of the Empire. But the case is widely different if they are obstructed in their passage and delayed on their march.

The sluggish course and sinuous windings of the Danube show that its level is low and scarcely raised above that of the Euxine, which, being without tides, allows no facility for the discharge of the waters. The warmth of the spring and early summer causes the snow to melt with rapidity, and at this season a great quantity of rain falls, and in a peculiar manner, raining consecutively at fixed periods of the day. The numerous rivers and streams from the Carpathians rise rapidly and carrying down

* "A winter campaign in this country, though it is in the same latitude as the middle of Italy, is not so easy as may be supposed by those who know it not. Although the cold is rarely of long duration, it alternates with thaw and heavy rains, and while it lasts it surpasses that of northern climates. This may be attributable to the two lofty chains of mountains which enclose the valley of the Danube to the north and south. The villages are chiefly in devastated places noways convenient for quarters, march, or cantonments; the valley and the lowlands, either covered with snow or inundated, render the roads impracticable from the moment that it does not freeze. Men and horses are exposed to perish by hunger, finding no subsistence, and it being impossible to transport on the backs of beasts of burden more than what suffices for small corps or for expeditions of short duration."—*Valentini, Traité sur la Guerre contre les Turcs*, p. 48.

enormous quantities of water, inundate the country in their passage, and swell the volume of the main stream by which the central parts of Europe are drained. At the same period the northerly winds which have depressed the level of the Euxine cease, the southerly winds set in, reversing, when they have prevailed for some time, the current of the Bosphorus, which then runs upward to the Black Sea. The level of the latter is raised, whilst the Danube and all its confluent are overcharged; hence those sudden inundations by which the lowlands along its course are submerged. The water runs off, forming lakes and marshes, the communications are cut off; troops, baggage, and artillery flounder in the mire, convoys are stopped, provisions destroyed, material lost, and delay occasioned. In countries where art and industry have exercised their hand, ordinary incidents of this description would be rendered innocuous; and with causeways, sluices, dykes, and bridges, the country might be kept passable, and rendered wholesome. Here no such contrivance, however simple, is employed; and the face of nature with the exception of the mere furrow, lies to-day as the Deluge left it.

The great extent of stagnant water, and the exposed surface where it has retired, leaving behind slime and vegetable matter, under the increasing heat of summer soon generate miasmata, and the ague appears.

It is well known how inefficient is the Russian Commissariat; its hospital service is still worse. Add to this the filth of a Russian army, and it will be easily understood that these Provinces, wearing on the map so inviting an aspect, offer in reality to an invading force, that force being Russian, little more than a grave. Thus, in the last war, when unopposed, and having entered at the most propitious season (the end of March), and having all things prepared for their rapid passage, by their own avowal fifty thousand deaths occurred in the hospital out of a force of one hundred and fifty thousand men. What would have been the position of this army had the passage of the Pruth and Sereth been disputed, the means of transport removed, and the supplies destroyed? *Unless in possession of the Provinces before war is declared, the Russians cannot attack Turkey.*

A scarcely less important consideration is the disposition of the inhabitants. The aspect of that portion of the country which has been the field of war is so pitiable that the numbers of both Principalities was formerly not reckoned at above 500,000. The Russian census in 1830, which is probably below the truth, brought it up, to the astonishment of every one, to 4,100,000. This mass of men, however abject, must, if they act for or against either party, materially influence a contest

carried on on their soil. They are assumed to be favourable to Russia, but the fact is they have never been enabled—I may say allowed—to make head against her. I have traversed both provinces in all directions, and, judging from what I have seen, as well as from events, I have no hesitation in saying, not that they love the Turks, but that they hate the Russians. This truth, of the highest importance in judging of the actual balance of power and for the future independence of Europe, is put beyond question by the enthusiastic welcome recently given to the troops of the SULTAN.*

The Porte ceasing to suspect them, and anticipating hostilities by the advance of a respectable force to defend her frontiers at the Pruth, the population of the two provinces would immediately create a subsidiary army. The idea of stemming the torrent, the hope of preventing their country from becoming the theatre of a destructive warfare and a prolonged occupation, would soon rally 50,000 muscular and rugged peasants on the frontier, who otherwise would, with the remainder of their countrymen, have resigned themselves, as beasts of burden, to the invading army. A consequence of their engaging actively in the contest would be the systematic withholding of supplies, the removal or destruction of grain, villages, and means of transport. The population would retire on the approach of the Russians, and be soon out of their reach on the forest-clad sides of the Carpathians, and, once guerilla bodies formed by the natives, a Russian army would find itself in face of a wholly new enemy and dangers, and in the same position as that of DARIUS when attacking the Scythians of old.

While the central region presents so many obstacles to an invader, there is nothing which he can positively attack or hold; there are no gorges, no positions of strength, no fortresses, and no cities of importance. Bucharest, like Jassy, is a large village, wholly exposed. If he moves to the south, he will be pressed upon from the north; if he turns to the north, he will be ravaged from the rear. From the one side the enemy will descend from the mountains; from the other they will cross the Danube; in either case his retreat is cut off. The invading force can nowhere be collected in large masses, and, if it break itself up, will be sacrificed in detail. The defence being carried

* Referring to the year 1848. The higher classes, however corrupt or ambitious, share in the feelings of the people, as the following incident will show. The Russian Government was desirous of employing the same means in the Principalities, to obtain a footing, as she had done in Georgia—by intermarriages of her officers with the daughters of the principal persons. There was but one instance of a family willing to ally itself with a Russian. The Turkish Commissioner, in the autumn of 1850, paid a visit to Yassy, and was received with the greatest enthusiasm. The Russian Commander-in-Chief repaired thither to balance his popularity. No one paid him the compliment of a visit. “On aurait dit qu’il eut la peste,” said a Moldavian Boyard.

to the Carpathians, the Russians will be placed upon a soil wholly uncongenial. They are accustomed to the plain, and their value is restricted, especially against the Turks, to the use of the bayonet. For mountain warfare, the musket for taking aim is the arm, and that is what the Russian does not understand—that is the point of superiority of the Turk. When, in 1789, the Austrian Government, on account of suspicions awakened by the conduct of SUWAROFF, determined to remove them from Italy, and to send the army to operate with the other Russian army in Switzerland: the reason given was that they would find there a climate more congenial to their own. As THIERS justly remarks, a mountain region is the theatre least of all adapted for Russian troops, for there what is wanted is “practised tirailleurs.”

In the rear of the Carpathians lie Transylvania and Hungary. There is the most warlike people of Europe—a people hating the Russians, and united by ties of blood and sympathy with the Turks. It is impossible that they should remain neutral in such a conflict. A movement in Hungary would be followed by one in Italy and in Germany. It is certain that if the Turks defend themselves in the Provinces Austria, must be separated from Russia, and will throw her weight into the scale to prevent such a contingency (that is, that the Turks defending themselves on the Pruth, Austria is of necessity with them and against Russia, by the double reason of the certainty of their triumph, and the internal dangers by which she would be menaced if she were against); *the contrary reasons will operate upon her if the Turks withdraw behind the Danube.*

But even before Turkey possessed a regular army Russia was unable to attack her until she had appropriated the resources of these Provinces. In 1806 she entered them before she had declared war; in 1821 she was prevented from making war because Austria prepared to resist her peaceable entrance; in 1828 she entered simultaneously with the declaration of war at St. Petersburg, and when, Turkey being taken by surprise, she was assured that they would not be defended. In 1848 she again entered without war by a pretended unauthorised movement of her generals, and was obliged to quit without being able to make it. *She is now preparing to repeat the same attempt.*

By an article in the *Réglement Organique*, it is provided that each household shall hold in dépôt twenty kilos of Indian corn, which is calculated to be equivalent to the subsistence of an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men for two campaigns.

It does not require that a Turkish army should defend the Provinces to render it impossible for Russia to invade Turkey

proper : it suffices that a Turkish army should retreat before and across them. The whole question, then, consists in making Wallachia the theatre of war, and not the basis of Russia's operations.

I shall presently show that Turkey is no longer assailable on the east of the Euxine.* It is on this theatre, therefore, that any war between the two Empires is to be carried on. It is in every respect a desirable one for Turkey and an unfavourable one for Russia. It is close to Turkey and at a distance from Russia ; the one has to send her troops across long distances and inhospitable tracks, the other can convey them, without loss, by water and by steam. Were the field of contest on the east, the Powers of Europe would know and care little respecting the event ; Poland instead of a consciousness of common interest with Turkey, would be drained of her arm-bearing men to fill the Russians' ranks ; Austria would not be tempted to regain her independence, or Hungary her institutions.

The justification of what I have said respecting the dispositions of the population will be found in the historical sketch of the Principalities. I must now proceed to consider the further progress of the war, on the assumption that the Turks have been beaten, and that the Russians have pressed on to the Danube.

* A *bonâ fide* war is here understood ; not a war in which the operations are decided by Allies "in understanding with the enemy" (words of the then Secretary of War. Note, 1867.

CHAPTER III

THE DANUBE AND THE BALKAN.

THE Danube, no doubt, is but a river; and all rivers can be crossed: and the Balkan is a chain not to be compared to the Alps or the Apennines, which have failed to stop the passage of invaders. But the fact is that both the Danube and the Balkan have arrested invaders, although they were possessed of science, and their antagonists neither of science nor subordination. We have now to consider the aids which they can afford for a defence under circumstances wholly novel—that is, by troops disciplined, subordinate, and in considerable numbers.

The Danube is a moat in face of a continuous bastion. This feature is peculiar to it, and can be estimated only by local knowledge. I may therefore be permitted to enter into some details which have been suggested by the country itself, and have not, in as far as I am aware, been treated of in works on this subject.

After breaking through the mountains of Transylvania at Orshova, the Danube must originally have run a straight course through the hollow between the Balkan and the Carpathians either to the gap opposite Kustandji, or to the north of the chain of low hills which skirt the Euxine. But as this hollow was filled up by the alluvium brought down by itself and from the Carpathians, the streams and drainage of which are considerably greater than those of the Balkan, the river has been pushed down to the south until it reached the rise of the ground on the edges of the Balkan range, which it has scarped into a parapet. This is exactly what has happened in the upper plain of Hungary, where the drainage of the Northern Carpathians has

shoved, as it were, the river to the extreme verge of the plain, which seems to run like a ditch under the Servian hills.

By this means the river forms a crescent, the horns of which are presented to the invading force, confining the operations, rendering collateral ones difficult, and entailing the paralysis of a considerable force by the necessity of observation on the flanks.

The second point, though more striking, is not more important. The process of the formation of the plain shows that the left branch of the river is low, and that the right is high and precipitous. This is an undeviating character from the neighbourhood of Widdin down the whole way to the marshes at the mouth.

On the Turkish side you stand upon an elevated plateau; you everywhere look down upon the opposite plain; you command it as far as eye can reach; you perceive every movement.

The common peasant is ever on the alert, and knows exactly where the enemy is, and, consequently, acquires the instinct of stratagy. This disposition has materially affected these contests.

From the plain on the left bank nothing can be observed of the movements of the enemy, unless he chooses to show himself. If he is acting upon the offensive, he can conceal his movements; if on the defensive, his presence will everywhere be suspected.

The soil is generally argillaceous, from the schist and aluminous rocks which lie upon the north of the Balkan; whilst soft and greasy, it is very tenacious. No one has visited Constantinople without being struck with the stone-like tenacity of the earth, which overhangs the stream as if it were rock. Of a similar character is the soil which forms the right bank of the Danube. The consequence is that the bank presents an obstacle of the most serious description, being neither earth that you can walk upon, nor rocks that you can lay hold of.

It is needless to say that the Danube is a wide and magnificent stream—what then must be its importance when flanked in such a manner? When first it enters the plain it is rapid in its course, and in the early part of the year, during which the military operations would be carried on, or which at least, if not profited by, must render a campaign abortive, its bed is full, and a considerable portion of the left bank inundated. For the passage of the army, boats have to be constructed, or brought up the river. If constructed, it is upon the unsheltered beach, and in sight of the enemy, with timber to be brought from a great distance, and from places not in the occupation of the invading army. If

the vessels are to be brought to any given spot, they have to be towed up the stream, two or three hundred miles, and have to pass under the guns of two or three Turkish fortresses.

If pontoons are used, the great breadth of the stream and the inundation of the left bank render the operation so difficult, that the Russians in their late wars have only attempted it at one point, and that after the stream had withdrawn within its bed. If partial expeditions are attempted, the enemy has long prior notice of the preparations; and the boats while constructing remain exposed. In fact, the Russians cannot advance through the centre of the crescent until they have been allowed to cross the Danube at its northern point, and so occupy the plain of the Dobroja and the small ports along the course of the river, which can only be the result of sheer neglect.

There is another no less important contrast between the two banks—the one is healthy, and the other unhealthy; and this distinction extends down the whole course. On the right bank there is everywhere wood for fuel and for works; on the left, none. On the right hand there is everywhere abundance of streams; on the left, so soon as the river is quitted, an army is in danger of perishing from drought. “So soon,” says General VALENTINI, “as the wet season is concluded, the soil is as if fire passed over it; there does not grow a blade of grass; consider—able streams are entirely dried up;” thence he shows the necessity for an army, if it is to finish a successful campaign, to be in possession of all the important points before the hot weather sets in.

Thus, although it may be supposable in a diplomatist, it is scarcely conceivable how a military man should have urged as a precaution and security the abandonment of these defences. A more magnificent glacis for the protection of an empire could not be devised: it would be insanity to abandon it were the Balkan a Caucasus. I shall presently show that it is no Caucasus, and that the security of Turkey is in the depths of the Danube, not in the heights of the Balkan. There was, however, a colour for the suggestion in the last three wars, each of which the Russians commenced by occupying the Provinces. It was thereupon concluded that to all intents and purposes they were already Russian, and that their nominal connexion with the Porte was only imposed by the jealousy of the other Powers. Hence it was inferred that Russia could not be restrained from their occupation, and that Turkey could be saved only by sparing herself exhausting and useless efforts for their retention. This explains not only the suggestions of Monsieur BEAUJOUR, but possibly also the policy of England in 1806 and 1812, and, indeed, on every other occasion. This, indeed, is the reasoning of the friends

of Turkey at all times. The rule is to urge her by prompt concession to diminish the amount of ultimate sacrifice; they will always strip her of her armour in the interest of her defence.

The possession of these provinces by Turkey did not exhaust her in peace—did not involve her in war—nor in such wars compromised her defence. She did not require, as would an European Government, a large standing army to keep down the people. She had there no troops at all. The Russians did not make war on her on account of these Provinces. Their object was Constantinople; and so long as she held her ground in Wallachia and Moldavia was the war kept at a distance. If at the peace she reverted into possession of them, it was because Russia was not so strong as was believed. If Russia could have held them, most assuredly would her frontiers have been carried by the Treaty of Adrianople, if not by former treaties, up to the Danube.

Russia found in the Provinces not a population devoted to her, but a country that was open to her; not States that invoked her sovereignty, but plains that fed her troops. She entered peaceably because the Turks were diplomatically overreached, and found, when established, the resources prepared, which her own country could not supply. By them she carried on the war.

Now then we come to the question, Why did Turkey not defend these Provinces? This is the point on which the whole matter turns, and the difficulties disappear from the moment it is taken up.

After the defeat on the Pruth, in 1711, Peter the Great perceived the total insufficiency of his Empire to assault Turkey in this direction.*

At that time Bessarabia still belonged to Moldavia. At the two extremities of that province were placed the great fortresses of Kotzim and Bender, and the Russian force had therefore no resting-place after crossing the Steppes; it was met at once by the Turkish frontier and provinces. He therefore applied himself to detaching the Principalities from the Porte, persisted at all hazards in refusing to surrender CANTEMIR, by whose treachery he had been invited and deceived, and sent Prince MENSCHIKOFF to Constantinople to prepare the way for his future designs, entrusting to him for that end 200,000 ducats, fully equivalent at the time to half a million sterling. From that

* He and his army escaped through the dexterity of his wife. So great was the service she then rendered, that by it was justified her nomination to the succession after Peter's death. In that act he describes the imminence of the danger, and states respectively the Russian and Turkish forces at 20,000 and 200,000 men.

period Russia has undeviatingly applied her means of influence and corruption at Constantinople, her intelligences in the Provinces, and her successes in war to one object, which is the semi-independence of the Provinces, interpreted by their non-occupation by a Turkish force. She was aided in this matter by the reaction against her own intrigues; for the Porte, distrusting, after the defection of CANTEMIR, the native princes, replaced them by strangers to the Provinces, and subjects of her own, on whose fidelity she believed she could rely, and over whom she imagined that she possessed entire control. These were *Fanariots*. Thus was the entire administration placed in the hands of Russian emissaries by a measure designed to exclude her influence, and a burden of the most intolerable oppression laid upon the people by a policy designed to attach them to the Porte.

Although it had now been established by treaty that no Turkish forces should occupy the Provinces, still she retained the fortresses, and her troops had the right of passage to Kotzim, on the extreme west, and Bender, on the extreme east. In case of an invasion, these fortresses arrested Russia, and gave time for the advance of the Turkish armies from behind the Danube: for the inviolability of the Provinces by Turkish troops, depending upon the stipulations of a Treaty, ceased the moment that war was declared. But as Russia, not Turkey, waged those wars, the Turks were kept in ignorance and suspense to the last moment; war was known only by the passage of the troops.

The full benefit of this position was not obtained until 1812, when, at the moment that Turkey might have regained all the territory she had lost, a Treaty was concluded under the mediation of England, and by the treachery of a Fanariot by which the half of Moldavia lying between the Dniester and the Pruth, containing the fortresses of Kotzim and Bender, was surrendered to her. Now she was relieved from frontier fortresses, now the Provinces were wholly freed from the presence of Turks, she obtained a rich, a fertile, and healthy region where she could accumulate her force, and her stores, and with it that important line of the Pruth, second only to the Danube. A fraction of Moldavia was however, a small gift on the part of England, seeing that she had six years before gone to war with France, or resumed hostilities, to endow her with both Provinces, and that soon after she had attempted, with the same object, to bombard Constantinople.*

* The attempt indeed failed, but after the difficulties had been overcome. Had Sir Sidney Smith been in command, instead of Admiral Duckworth, the policy of England would have been successfully accomplished, and Russia would have been long ago established at Constantinople and mistress of the Dardanelles. The Admiral and the Ambassador both shrank from the execution of the order. The latter spoke of the "evil policy" of the case.

The advantages thus secured were on the point of being profited by in 1821. She had then assembled a powerful army on the Pruth; she had prepared an insurrection throughout the whole of European Turkey; the signal was given by the passage of IPSILANTI, in his general's uniform, with a body of Greeks, to raise the standard of Christian revolt. There was no Turkish force to oppose to them, and they were, in fact, destroyed by the Christian peasantry. Russia, who is always ready with an offer of troops to put down the insurrection she has caused, volunteered to send an army to restore order. On the refusal of the Porte, who sent its own troops, Russia withdrew her Ambassador from Constantinople, and would have assumed the act as the grounds of war had it not been for the menacing attitude of Austria and the unexpected declaration of the people in favour of the Porte. On this occasion England again took the side of Russia, and made herself at Constantinople her mouthpiece in the absence of her own Ambassador.*

When, in 1828, the Pruth was crossed, there were, of course, no Turkish troops in the Provinces, and, with the exception of the three or four fortresses retained on the left bank, there was no opposition made to her after she had entered them.†

In 1848 she entered without war at all, putting forward the plea of an Insurrection which she herself had openly fomented, just as in 1821 she had offered to the Porte to send her own troops to put down the Insurrection which had proceeded from her territory. When she had entered, she thence proceeded, after wintering there, to attack Hungary (her troops invaded Transylvania in February); and the next year she was on the point of playing the same game in Turkey itself.

But in 1828 she stood, and, consequently, in the next occupation she will stand, on entering, on a wholly different footing from 1828. Then she had not the command of the Danube. At the peace that followed that war, she got the Delta of the

* In the "Précis of the exposure of the differences that arose in 1821 between the Government of His Imperial Majesty and the Porte, presented to the Emperor Nicholas on his ascending the throne by the Russian Ministry," it is stated that conditions were agreed to at the Congress of Verona which Turkey was to fulfil before Russia should re-establish relations with her; and that "the negotiations to be opened to this end were confided to Lord Strangford." This was at the end of 1822. (Protocols of Verona are dated 9th November, 1822.) Speaking of Austria during the next year (1823), the Russian "Précis" says: "Austria concealed no longer the succours which she assured to the Turks." ("L'Autriche ne cachait plus les secours qu'elle assurait aux Turcs.") The document here referred to was first published in 1853, a year after the composition of this work.

† An expedition of 3000 or 4000 men sent across from Rustchuk is not worth mentioning.

Danube; she has since blocked up the entrance. At the peace she pertinaciously insisted upon the evacuation and rasure of the few forts still remaining to the Turks on the left bank opposite Bulgaria. Occupying peaceably the country in the autumn and during the winter, she can bring up gunboats and construct pontoons, as she did in 1849. We have seen of what vital importance to the defence of Turkey is the Danube; now to the possession of its northern entrance, acquired in 1812, she has added, since 1829, the absolute command for all warlike operations at the mouths of that river.

She stands in another respect upon new ground. In 1828, the European Powers, who, in fact, enabled her to enter, still ostensibly murmured at her entrance, whilst Austria was resolutely hostile. In 1848, her entrance was concerted with Austria, and defended in the British Parliament by the English Minister, who gave two reasons, both of which were of course false, and moreover contradictory—the first, that it was an unauthorised movement of the Russian general; the second, that it was concerted with the Porte.

It may appear surprising that the Porte should have suffered under any circumstances the exclusion of her own troops from her own territory; a territory of necessity the theatre of every war. It must be esteemed an infatuation without parallel: yet the Turks only concurred in opinion with the statesmen and military men of Europe. They were made to believe that the population detested them, and was wholly devoted to Russia; and they consequently ceded the point of the presence of their troops in time of peace, not unwillingly, believing that the force so situated would be compromised; never doubting that in time of war they would be in the field ready to meet their antagonists; for they had no notion of war except as arising out of causes, and therefore giving notice of its advent. The illusion is now dispelled, but the effects remain. The matter, however, has to be considered not only in reference to Russia and Turkey, but also with reference to the Provinces themselves. They no doubt hailed as a boon the being relieved from the insubordinate and disorderly forces of a former time. Here two circumstances have altered; they would now be too glad to have a Turkish army stationed amongst them. But whether the Turkish army paid or did not pay for their provisions, whether it was orderly or disorderly, the real question was, whether their country should or should not become the seat of war. The exclusion of the Turkish forces made it so, and also made the wars themselves; for with one of the present Turkish armies on the Pruth there could be no question of invasion. At all events, unless a Turkish force defends their frontier, it is their duty to

defend it themselves, and for this they are quite ready. Their chiefs have accepted with joy the proposal to form a distinct Ordu, with 30,000 men on foot, and twice that number in reserve; which, with the Turkish army in their rear to support them, would enable them efficiently to perform their duty to Turkey and their duty to themselves. Without the height of the Caucasus or the chivalry of the Circassians, these Provinces would thus become a barrier against Russia on the west of the Euxine, as inexpugnable as that which opposes her on the east.*

It may be suggested that the armies of these populations is open to the same objections which I have urged to the enrolling of Christians in the Nizam. But it is not here a question of embodying them in the regular army; it is that of furnishing a permanent and auxiliary force with its own constitution and under its own officers. If by the Capitulations the Provinces are to be free from the Turkish troops, they are also bound thereby to furnish their contingent to the SULTAN. Of their fidelity under these circumstances there can be no question, the only difficulty might lie in their will. When I first offered the suggestion to the Porte, it was received with astonishment, and incredulity. The question was not, "Can we trust them?" but "*Will they serve?*" Their assent having been obtained, the plan was accepted: the future inviolability of the frontiers would thus have been assured by means of this Wallachian Ordu behind the Pruth, with 25,000 Turks in the Dobroja. This was the substance my plan for the defence of Turkey; not a mere paper speculation, but a practical arrangement, debated and concluded severally with each of the parties concerned.†

Behind the Danube rises the Balkan, a strong and defensible region, but neither continuous as an inaccessible chain, nor impracticable for artillery. The chain to the westward, where it is high and defensible, would be left to the right by an invader, who, passing the Danube at Silistria, would take the route straight by Shumla and the Little Balkan to Adrianople. This is the direct line for the capital, and runs parallel to the coast, so that it could receive reinforcements and supplies. Here no remarkable physical obstacles oppose its progress; and the distance to the plain of Adrianople is but two hundred miles. The real obstacles consist in the pure Turkish population inhabiting

* Circassia has not fallen before the arms of Russia, but before the Treaty of Paris.

"Circassia has ceased to exist as a Nation in consequence of the conduct of Lord Clarendon at that Conference" (Paris).—Mr. Disraeli, June 4, 1866.

To this charge no reply was even attempted. *Note*, 1867.

† See "Memoir to the Sultan Abdul Medjid," *Free Press* Serials, No. 11. Acting thereon, the Porte demanded and obtained the withdrawal of the Russian army of occupation in 1850. See also "Denmark and the Duchies," 1852.

the district of Shumla in a radius of thirty miles, and that established at Silistria, Rustchuk, and Varna, the attack of which places constituted the principal operations of the last wars. The country is fertile, well wooded, with abundant streams of water, and well peopled, so that here the war can sustain itself. It will be found necessary to operate on the flanks, and the Balkan can be crossed, and the upper valley of the Maritza occupied. The inhabitants are Bulgarians, originally Turks from the Volga, but professing the same religion* and speaking nearly the same language as the Russians; they are unwarlike, and may be rendered favourable to the invaders; at all events, they would make no resistance. On the left flank the sea runs parallel to the line of march at the distance of about fifty miles, and approaches to within ten. Here, granting the superiority at sea, strong posts may be occupied, troops disembarked, and diversions made. The facility of an advance will depend upon the strength of the Turkish army left in Shumla, which again would depend upon the army which the invaders are able to leave to observe it, and on the success of their operations on the two flanks.

Such being the field, it will at once be evident that it is capable of opposing a most formidable resistance to a force which has had to fight its way from the Pruth across the Principalities. That it has done so we must assume for argument's sake only; but then, in what plight will that army be to meet the untouched and concentrated resources of the Ottoman Empire? The result will then depend, as the chances of all battles, on reciprocal mistakes.

Let us grant that Russia brings her whole available resources, undiminished, right up to the Balkan, even then Turkey can oppose to her half as many more of troops, double their value.

The attacking force has always the advantage, except when deserts interpose. In the case, however, of a fair stand-up fight, the probability is that the command of the sea will decide the contest. The Capital, which is the heart of Turkey, is exposed; and what is of not less importance, the communications and coast of the Empire are equally exposed to a Russian squadron sent round from the Baltic.

Russia, however, will run no risks; she will only act when she has made the chances sure. There will never be allowed a fair field for the trial of the merits of the Nizam. Russia will repeat the game she has so often played, and with such success; her foot will be placed where its print has been left. She is limited in method no less than in time and season, and the blow,

* It has always to be borne in mind that Russia has suppressed the Oriental rite, and substituted for it her official Church, with the Emperor the object of "worship."

when it falls, will be as unexpected as each one has been that has preceded it. She will enter Adrianople, when she does enter it, as she entered the Bosphorus; she will be the generous protector, not the grasping foe; she will enter the Principalities to protect Turkey from a Moldo-Wallachian Nationality, as in 1848, or from the ambitious designs of France, as in 1806, or on some other equally available pretext. When there, she will repeat against Turkey what she practised against Hungary in 1849. Settled in the Principalities, she takes Germany in flank, and already commands the West as well as the East.

It is not, I again repeat, a Christian Insurrection which can shake the Porte, or draw down a Russian intervention; that catastrophe will only come from a Mussulman schism. It is the innovations of Constantinople that are now Russia's sole hope. This is a military question, no less than a political and a moral one. If the Turkish Government has ceased to be Turks, how shall Turkey exist?

I conclude this review with the very consideration with which the Russian historian of the last two wars commences:—

“In general the Turks are not imitators, and there, perhaps, lies their greatest political wisdom. Their common expression is, ‘WE ARE OURSELVES.’ A Sovereign of genius, far from seeking to introduce amongst them European methods, would certainly cultivate the seeds of the peculiar qualities that evidently exist in the men of this nation. Then, but only then, might they again become dangerous, if not for all Europe, at least for their neighbours.”

CHAPTER IV.

THE BOSPHORUS AND THE DARDANELLES.

I CANNOT resign these Straits to a mere incidental reference nor trust to the spontaneous conclusions suggested by the map.

It was the Byzantines of old who devised the Trident as an emblem of dominion. It was by the Chersonese that PHILIP prepared the subjugation of Greece.

The Restorer of the Roman Empire preferred to its Capital a new seat on this then desert coast. All this time savage tribes alone occupied the Euxine. The Ottomans came at last, and placed a padlock on the Straits, above and below, and, thus secured, built up their vast dominion, the limits of which realised the dream of ORKAN, who saw the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile and the Danube, obeying the signet of that ring, typified "as a diamond between two emeralds, and two sapphires, the chief stone in the ring of Empire."

This capital, between two continents and two seas, required a peculiar setting—artillery. By means of that invention, Constantinople, an emporium and a capital, became also an arsenal and a fortress.

A Sultan might sit in the Admiral's kiosk on the Golden Horn, and reviewing his caravels, ponder in his mind, whether their thunder should be despatched against a Khan of the Crimea, a Shah of Persia, an Ameer of Syria, a Soldan of Egypt, a Grand Master of Rhodes, a King of Spain, or a Pope of Rome. Seated, like Eolus, on the mountains of the wind, by a gesture he could direct the storm of war to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west; the nations stood in suspense, and from the pillars of Hercules to the ramparts of

Iskander, the princes and people trembled when his hand was raised.

It is related of an envoy of Persia that, in endeavouring to fathom the designs of the Conqueror of Constantinople, he bribed one of his attendants to note if, as he sat upon his terrace, he particularly directed his countenance *to one point of the heavens*. The same Sultan, being questioned by a Vizier as to the destination of a fleet then preparing, replied, "If a hair of my beard was in my secret I should pluck it out."

The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had given to this tribe—so insignificant as to numbers—everything within their reach; they became masters of the Euxine to its furthest bounds, and of the whole of the Levant; then they paused; their care henceforward was to guard themselves; maritime aggression was possible only from the south, and there they provided against danger by guns and batteries prepared in the infancy of art, which have anticipated its latest discovery, and fill with admiration its most scientific professors. But on the north, that is to say, at the Bosphorus, no such care was needed; so that in that quarter—the quarter from which the Turks had themselves grasped the ring of Empire—the casket was left unguarded.

Another power arose in the North; by gradual expansion it reached the Euxine; it, too, commenced forging the tools by which that casket was to be forced; the world was alarmed; it was more than once forced to break the tools and to destroy the moulds.* But the world became accustomed to such practices, and those who had been most indignant at the projected burglary became the most serviceable in its execution.† Russia now got a maritime footing in the Euxine, and from that moment, in the words of the great minister of Russia, "Peace in Europe became an empty name."

This position is one upon which the mind dwells. It is a fountain of thought, and not a subject, and the more it is pondered upon the more difficult is it to write about; if, indeed, all is not said in the words of NAPOLEON, "Constantinople is the World." To have the mind incessantly bent upon it is to acquire an element of political power scarcely less in effect, and higher in character, than the force derived from its actual possession. It thus creates and constitutes the two Eastern Empires, whose conflict ultimately must shake the whole fabric of Europe—the one by possessing it, the other by pondering upon it.

It is curious that it is Russia herself who has called the attention of Europe to her designs thereon. She did so even at the

* Treaty obligations of Russia to maintain no ships of war upon the Sea of Azof.

† Story of Otchakoff.

time when PITT projected her total exclusion from the Black Sea. She was, indeed, at the time secure, by English treachery, of thwarting him, and was sufficiently acquainted with Western Statesmen to know that he would prefer the surrender of principle to the abandonment of office.* In the despatches of that period, which I have had an opportunity of perusing, and may be able one day to publish *in extenso*, I find the following communication from Mr. LYNDESAY, the British Secretary of Embassy at St. Petersburg in the year 1791 :

“ HASSAN PASHA’s plan was to put the fleet on a respectable footing, and then to endeavour to reconquer the Crimea, the Liman, and the Sea of Asoph, for he did not think that the recovery of the Crimea alone was sufficient to secure Constantinople. He began by reducing Egypt; but in his absence the Porte declared war, and upset all his projects. From what has been above said it is, then, evident that the Russians may, whenever they please, become masters of Constantinople. They are not, perhaps, sufficiently apprised of its weakness (!), but this cannot long be concealed from them, and its fall is, probably, not far distant; because the Turks themselves have not the means of retarding it, and because the interference of any European Power is, at least, very precarious, since the event might happen before they could even have heard of the preparation of an armament at Sebastopol.”

No one can doubt that these suggestions were furnished—of course indirectly—by the Russian Government itself. This the uninformed will be unable to reconcile with her designs. It is, however, Russia’s method. She wants your aid, and is able to

* ‘Leopold (of Austria) having concluded peace with the Turks at Sistowa, Catherine, thus left alone to carry on the war with that Power, might unquestionably have been compelled to restore all her recent conquests, particularly Ockzakow. The Cabinets of St. James’s, the Hague, and of Berlin, acting in concert whilst they were sustained by Leopold, could have dictated to the Russian Empress. Frederic William already threatened to march an army of 100,000 men against Riga, and every preparation was made for attacking the Livonian frontier *when the British Ministry receded*. These events took place during the spring of 1791. In embracing a line of policy calculated to set limits to Catherine’s conquests on the shores of the Euxine, Pitt acted in my opinion with equal wisdom and justice. But, unfortunately, he could not impress the House of Commons with a conviction that interests so remote, as well as so little understood, were of sufficient importance to run the risk of a war for their support. Fox, availing himself of these circumstances, inveighed with such effect against the ministerial plans, and was supported on every division by such numbers, that it became evident Pitt must either abandon his measures and his allies, or be finally left in a minority. *In order to keep Catherine firm to her determination of not relinquishing Ockzakow, Fox did not hesitate so send a friend and relative to St. Petersburg as his agent. Mr. Adair demonstrated to the Empress that if she remained inflexible, the House of Commons would either force Pitt to yield, or would drive him from the helm. Thus encouraged, Catherine refused to make any sacrifices of territory, or to restore Ockzakow. The English Minister, after a long conflict between political principle and power, at length resolved to consult his own preservation by renouncing his alliances.*—*Wrazall’s Memoirs.*

obtain it only through your fears and animosities. Intrinsic evidence is furnished by the two creations in the Black Sea, the one of which is too great, the other too little. Sebastopol and its batteries could aid no expeditionary force, and achieve no descent on Constantinople; yet on them have been expended vast sums of money; whilst the fleet was so starved that, in the course of a quarter of a century, it has received no addition, and is so weak in numbers, fragile in materials, and worthless in crews, that even after Navarino, and in Turkey's moment of extremest helplessness, it was incapable of any enterprise against its coasts. Nay, even at that moment, the Turkish flag held the sea, and in the only action that was fought a Russian frigate was captured. To those who entertain the opinions prevalent in Europe, this may be incredible, but it is so. Either Russia has been negligent of her resources to an inconceivable degree, or we must be wholly in error in the bases of our judgments. Russia has expended upon her Marine just what was judicious.

It sufficed to operate along the coast of Roumeli, in connexion with a large invading army; had it been of ten times the strength it could not singly have availed anything beyond this, without a contest on land; or, even with such a contest. There were no insurrectionary elements in Turkey which it could reach; and I have already shown why, from local circumstances, her vessels on the Caspian, as on the Black Sea, have availed her nothing in her wars with Persia and Turkey.

Had she augmented that force, she would have prompted the Turks to do the like; and a powerful Turkish navy could have found revolutionary element to work upon in her territory. It would have, moreover, excited the serious apprehensions of a descent on Constantinople, and produced an unsubduable irritation amongst the Turks fatal to her ulterior plans. It is by Protection that Russia conquers. It was as a Protector she came into Poland, into the Crimea, and into Georgia; and for that end it is internal revolution that is required, not external blows. *Her last war with Turkey has been fought.* In it she utterly failed. From its date has recommenced the wonderful reorganisation of that Empire, which is now unassailable to her arms. It is through Europe that she will now fall upon it—through its opinions, its intrigues, its interference, and the weight of its masses; then, indeed, the squadron of Sebastopol may again suffice to transfer to the Bosphorus a protecting or a liberating force to back the SULTAN against a rival, an insurrection, or a European invasion.

Russia no doubt uses at Constantinople, as she does at London and at Paris, the *undefended state of the Bosphorus* as an inarticulate threat, always within the lips of her representatives.

That has not prevented Turkey from restoring her navy, and constructing an army. What is the value of a menace which is answered, not by open retort, but by effectual means of prevention? I can tell a very different story. I know, from experience, the value of the *articulation* of that threat; and from that experience I say that, had the Bosphorus been fortified, the Russian flag might be now floating on the Dardanelles. I therefore conclude that Turkey is no more exposed to danger from the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea than she is from her armies; but that, on the contrary, Russia is exposed to those dangers, from the naval as well as the military force of Turkey.* It is that fear which is emphatically assumed by POZZO DI BORGO as having prompted the war of 1828, though, in vain, to meet them. Turkey is in no danger, save from a British Embassy; and that same Embassy is Russia's sole protection. I cannot place the case otherwise than I have already done. "Unless you rectify your course, by the detection and punishment of the guilty, your very physical means will be of no avail, if ever you require to use them. You may sink the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, dismantle Cronstadt, and capture Sebastopol, and you will only serve her."†

Besides, by the new application of galvanic batteries to sunken mines, the Bosphorus can be hermetically sealed against any attack, without expense or noise. If that did not suffice, a few PAIXHAN'S guns would do the business of a squadron, if Russia were ever so mad as to attempt the bombardment of Constantinople.

That her purpose has been to create a false alarm, and a misjudging fear, as proved by the erection of these batteries, is further proved by the selection of the points. Russia's outlet, whether for soldiers or for provisions, is not in the Crimea,‡ but to the east or west of it. It is into the Sea of Azoff that falls the Don, traversing the centre of Muscovy Proper; and Odessa is her great port of shipment, through which her commerce passes, and at which her soldiers have been embarked. *Odessa is not fortified.* She therefore anticipates no retaliation. We have assumed against ourselves the doctrine of these being closed waters; when Turkey asks our protection against Russia, we pretext, for our refusal, our interest in the integrity of Turkey.

The first stipulation was in 1809, when an attempt had been made by England to bombard Constantinople, without even a declaration of war. The object was to force Turkey to sur-

* Lord Ponsonby.

† Speech at Glasgow, 1840.

‡ "When (speaking of Sinope) a *Russian fleet*, for the first time, returned to Sebastopol laden with the spoils of *victory*."—*Times*, October, 1854.

render Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia. The stipulation at the peace (1809) was tantamount to a promise not to attack her again through the Straits.

In 1829, the British frigate *La Blonde* sailed into the Black Sea, by permission of the Porte; the captain—the present Sir EDWARD LYONS—was reprimanded, and permanent instructions were transmitted to Constantinople to prevent, *at the instigation of the Russian Ambassador in London*, such “irregularities” for the future.

In 1833, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was extorted on our instigating the Pasha of EGYPT to revolt, and on our inviting Russia to send an expedition to Constantinople to oppose him. The secret Article was for the exclusion of foreign vessels in time of war. England and France sent a naval demonstration in consequence, not against Russia, but against Turkey. The two Governments declared that they would act as if the Treaty had not been signed; but, after alarming the Porte, they retired.

In 1836, the Porte applied privately to England for the passage of some men-of-war. The English Minister refused, alleging it would be a violation of Turkish independence.

In 1839, Marshal SOULT proposed to force the Dardanelles in the event of a Russian descent. The English Minister refused, and betrayed the communication to the Russian Envoy, M. KISSELEFF.

In 1840, England accepted a Treaty sent from St. Petersburg, stipulating the occupation of the Bosphorus, Sea of Marmora, and Constantinople itself, by a Russian naval and military force, which Treaty produced a rupture with France, and all but involved the two countries in war.

In 1841, within eight days of the expiration of the above Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, was signed by England and France that of the Dardanelles, for the exclusion of themselves in time of peace; and this Treaty was called “for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire,” and was the reconciliation between England and France.

In 1849, England violated her own Treaty of 1841, by sending her squadron into the Dardanelles. The act was explained by “stress of weather,” which was false. The object given out, was to back the Porte in its refusal to deliver up the Hungarian refugees, which again was false: the effect was to put England in the wrong, and to paralyse the action of the Turkish Government.

This series of diplomatic instruments confirms the conclusions to which geography would lead us. It also shows us that the Western and Maritime Powers are moved by fears, or designs, of which Constantinople and its two protecting Straits are the

points. It is impossible to resist the conclusion, in reviewing them, that England has been acting perfidiously towards Turkey.* She commences by forcing the Straits, she attempts the bombardment of Constantinople, she professes to hold the Dardanelles, and this avowedly against France, not Russia. The same scheme may be traced throughout, France being in turn cajoled and offended, Turkey uniformly betrayed.

France is moved at once by fears of Russia and fears of England. She dreads collusion between them. Even at the moment of the most cordial friendship, Marshal SOULT gave utterance to that suspicion,† and, upon the word, England joined Russia, and came to a rupture with France.

Now these fears and designs have their origin solely in the supposed tottering condition of the Ottoman Empire and the supposed power of descent upon its capital attributed to Russia, two ideas, than which nothing can be more preposterous. Allured by the magnificence of the spoils, they supposed the danger, not to take the means to prevent, but to devise schemes to profit by it. In this frame of mind it is self-evident, as there is but one Constantinople, that Russia possesses in these mutual and fictitious jealousies the means of involving them in war, and will thus make, not the possession, but the thought the instrument of her conquest of Europe, as well as of Turkey.

The word now is, "Who shall possess Constantinople?" There is a common struggle of the three Embassies for influence there. France has her pretext in the Holy Places. England is counteracting the designs of France on the one side, and Russia on the other. Each of the three is busy in saving Constantinople from the other two. The spot is accessible by sea to all three, and Russia will encourage her rivals in that prostration of the Ottoman Sovereignty which will give her the opportunity of stepping in as its Protector. But let Europe be warned. When a Minister, at a Council Board of Paris or of London, can assume to dispose of Constantinople, reckon thereafter on no possible tranquillity. He has from that moment value to the amount of at least one hundred millions sterling under his hand, which he must hide, may dispose of, but cannot possess.

It requires the prospect of gain and the hope of impunity for an individual murder; less would not be requisite for a system swayed by no temporary passion. A descent on Constantinople would, however, be not a murder, but an attempt alone, with the certainty of failure and punishment. Russia seeks to win Constantinople, not to destroy it. Her power consists in the

* Lord Ponsonby's Memoir.

† Lord Palmerston paraît s'accorder très-facilement d'une occupation Russe de Constantinople.—Marshal Sout, 1839.

menace, not in the execution. Constantinople is as secure against a Russian bombardment as if the Atlantic rolled between and the Andes closed the Channel. Bombardment! That is dwindling to the calibre of England. The capitals she wishes to secure, England bombards.

The Governments of Russia and Turkey stand in mutual dread of each other; that of the one is based on reason, that of the other springs from ignorance. The reasoning fear prompts to incessant action; the unreasoning fear bewilders and benumbs. Concealing her own alarms, Russia plays upon the terrors of her antagonist. But what is to be said of the representative of a *friendly State* who constantly refers to the unprotected Bosphorus, never with a view to its fortification, but only to extort from Turkey some suicidal concession?

It must not be forgotten that this wonderful geographical configuration is repeated in the North; that there Russia is advancing simultaneously as in the South; that she will thus gripe Europe at the two extremities, whilst within those Straits lie the countries which supply the materials for war and food; so that when she has possessed them she will stand in the position of the garrison of a citadel in the centre of an exposed town, which it can at pleasure sweep with grape or starve. Further, the closing of the Euxine lays prostrate every resistance throughout Central Asia.* Her progress towards India, whether in the shape of assailant or protector, or of both combined, becomes henceforward a matter of her own convenience and of time.

I was once asked by the leading statesman of France the reason for having said that England would never go to war with Russia. I answered, because that was a question neither military nor naval, but geographical. "Ah!" he exclaimed, "I understand you. You mean the Dardanelles." Addressing the Chambers on the Eastern Question, he said, "Gentlemen, I must give you a lecture on geography." He graphically sketched the Continents which there converge, the seas which there unite; traced out the vast scaffolding of the earth composing the system of which this point is the centre; the warlike populations of the Eastern world dependent upon it for political freedom; the mighty nations of civilised Europe dependent upon it for industry and food; the barbarian of the north pressing upon it to launch himself therefrom upon the ocean; the Ottoman Empire holding by it and protecting Christianity, freedom, and civilisation. He showed that the agitations of Europe were like those of the market-places of Athens, where an intellectual people was occupied in disputations while PHILIP was thundering at the gates. The Dardanelles were the gates

* Witness already Circassia.

at which the Barbarian now stood, and Europe's fate depended on meeting him there and being there before him. He addressed but Frenchmen; I address Englishmen. Words are vain to races "used-up with political ideas;"* unless you have a fallacy to present no one will listen; and unless you rouse a passion no one will act.

Then I speak from bitter experience. I have learned how dangerous it is to propose an end, and how useless it is to slaughter a fallacy. And yet it is imperative on me to speak. If I succeed in convincing this universal nation of the necessity of resisting Russia, I know that in so doing I shall only be preparing for the ruin of Turkey, for thereupon you would set about acting, and you know not how to act. My object is not this. It is to persuade you that it is of absolute necessity to reconstruct the system by means of which you carry on your public business; for as it is, no man can be an hour in the Foreign Office without, consciously or unconsciously, being engaged in the service of the Emperor of RUSSIA, and that service is always the most effectual, when it assumes the appearance of opposition—deadly (as in the case of Afghanistan) when it assumes the mask of war.

When I said that war was impossible between England and Russia because it was a geographical question, my meaning was this, that your resolution to strike, if ever honestly arrived at, would render blows needless; that Russia's resolution to strike will come only after there was no possibility of resistance. So long as the Dardanelles are open, your first hostile measure must be to send a squadron through them, and Russia is brought at once to her knees;† but when the Dardanelles are occupied, you can no longer strike her, for they cannot be occupied till Turkey has lost the desire of her own independence.

I therefore hold it of vital importance to the very existence of the British Empire, that Russia should not get the Dardanelles. There is but one way of preventing her from getting the Dardanelles, and that is, ceasing to believe that Turkey wants your aid. Be assured of this, that you cannot separate Constantinople and the Empire. You cannot say, "Let the Empire go, and we will get the Dardanelles. You cannot rescue Constantinople from Russia, though you may ruin Turkey by playing that fine game. I know I speak in vain. I know that those who rule you have nothing to learn; and as for you, who are ruled, it matters not what you think. These words

* Words of Napoleon.

† The reader will understand that this refers to the consequences of a war in earnest, when the trade of Russia would have been sacrificed, Odessa occupied, Bessarabia recaptured, Poland, Georgia, and the Crimea delivered, and all those effectual measures taken which it was in the power of England to take.—1867.

are set down for the benefit of those who, if they understood, might save — the Queen of ENGLAND and the Turkish Government: the first has but to know the truth, the second but to distrust England.

These are, however, speculative and prospective matters. I wish to close with a real matter. It is Constantinople that menaces Russia, not Sebastopol that menaces Turkey. It is Russia that is at the mercy of the Ottoman Empire, not the Ottoman Empire at hers.

In herself, Russia is invulnerable to any of the great States of Europe. An attack on her by Prussia is too preposterous even to be dreamt of. It is Prussia who is exposed to her assault. The same thing may be said of Austria. The Empire of the CÆSAR lies at her mercy. Her armies have already appeared on the Danube as Protectors. As to France, with all her power, what can she do against Russia? * If she were again to move 500,000 men, she would require first to pass over the body of Germany. As to attacking her by the Black Sea, that would be impossible, unless Turkey were also at war with her; but then the operation would be superfluous. England—where can she attack her? She is not going to take from her Poland, her own gift! Failing that, what can she do? She may level Cronstadt, and occupy St. Petersburg. The EMPEROR will retire, and his troops may retire six miles, and that is all. In the Black Sea, as in the case of France, she can only appear in a Turkish war, where she is not wanted. Finally, let us take the case of a Confederacy, a European Confederacy against Russia. You might as well speak of a Greek Confederacy against PHILIP. A terrible day for Europe would be a Confederacy against Russia. The smallest of States may overthrow her, that has a mind equal to the task; if not, the more the Confederates, the greater the danger. Now let us take Turkey. The mere fact of war paralyses one half the Russian Empire, and convulses the whole. This is a new feature. The cause of it did not exist previously to the late war. It lies in the development of the agricultural population of Southern Russia, during the last half century. It is avowed by Russia herself, and that openly. Here are the very terms she uses in her Declaration of War of 1828:—

“The Bosphorus is closed. Our commerce is annihilated.
 “The ruin of the Russian towns that owe their existence to this
 “commerce becomes imminent, and the meridional provinces of
 “the States of the EMPEROR lose the only outlet for their produce,
 “the only maritime communication which can, in facilitating

* “Russia” said Pozzo di Borgo, “has nothing to fear from the Union of France and England, for the naval power of France would add nothing to the efficiency of that of England.”

“exchange, cause labour to fructify and bear industry and
“riches.”*

These were the words of NICHOLAS; but already had ALEXANDER called Constantinople “The key of his house.” That key, is the property of the SULTAN, and not of the CZAR, and, therefore, he offered to NAPOLEON half of Europe, in order to get it, and therefore too did NAPOLEON refuse. He knew that the Ottoman Empire was not to be shared, and that either it must stand or Europe fall.

The Western nations, however, did believe that Turkey was exposed to great danger from the Russian fleet, and their course, so far, was clear—either to obtain the entrance of men-of-war, or the placing of the fortifications of the Bosphorus on such a footing as would render any attempt upon the capital impracticable. They did not, however, follow either course,† and so far justified the judgments respecting them which I have attributed to Russia.

When Russia created a navy in the Black Sea, the other Governments had to require admission, not only to balance her power, but for all those reasons for which they have vessels-of-war afloat upon the ocean. So long as the Euxine was an exclusive possession of Turkey no one had anything to say to it; there were no questions of peace or war affecting it; any insult to which our flag might there be exposed could be avenged on Smyrna or Alexandria; we had no right, no need, no object to enter for. But the matter was wholly altered when another State arose upon its banks; when the Russian power came down upon its shores; when her advancing frontiers spread around its limits, and her conquering armies were transported across its waters; when our trade entering there was carried on with populations no longer subject to Turkey; when it was exposed to the violence of power, to the accidents of piracy, to the chances of war, and the despotism of blockades; to the questionable authority of quarantines. But it so happened that, although periodically alarmed to the last degree at the designs of Russia, and frequently injured by her acts, we have never taken that simple course of sending up our men-of-war.

This, however, was a matter with which Russia had nothing in the world to do. It was a question for Turkey, and for Turkey alone, whether or not we should pass through her

* Accordingly in the Crimean War the Bosphorus was not closed, and the only spot in the Black Sea at which a blockade was established was the mouth of the Danube! If any one still doubts this, let him read Admiral Slade’s “History of the Crimean War.”—Note 1867.

† Lamartine selected General Anpik as Ambassador in 1848, with a view of assisting the Turks in fortifying the Bosphorus. He never uttered a word on the real object of his mission.

Straits. Now, by the very reason that it was essential for Russia that we should not enter, was it essential for Turkey that we should. I do not mean navies to occupy and coerce, but vessels to observe. But on that matter we would hold no intercourse with Turkey, except to scorn and repress her appeals. If Russia has maintained the exclusion, it is by England's doing, not her own. It is to this very circumstance that Turkey owes the creation of her army.

The Bosphorus, after making Russia the menacing State she has become, has rescued Turkey from the dying state in which she was.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

CHAPTER V.

CAMPAIGN OF 1828.

THE problem contained in the three previous chapters will be admitted by all to involve the future fate of Turkey, and some will be ready to extend the application to Europe itself; it is one, therefore, which merits the most careful scrutiny, and as the best test which can be applied to it is the practical trial which it has undergone, I shall now proceed to pass in review the events of the late war.

To enter upon such a matter seems adventuring on the domain of fable; but though the figures are strange, the facts are not uncertain. The authorities of which we are in possession are indeed *ex parte*,* but on that account all the more favourable for my purpose. The Russian statements may be liable to the perversions incident to a contest, but they are free from the fallacies incident to reasoning ignorance. It is from the Russians alone that we have to expect anything like a just appreciation of the Turks; their intentional misrepresentation comes nearer the truth than European panegyric.

* "The Turkish and Russian Armies," by Colonel F. Irvanitchew: Ilmenan.

"Account of the Russo-Turkish Campaigns, 1828-9," by F. A. Witzleben: Magdeburg, 1829-31.

"The Russo-Turkish Campaign in European Turkey," by Major Moltke: Berlin, 1845.

"Treaty of the War against the Turks," by General Valentini; French Translation of Blesson: Berlin, 1830.

"Secret Dispatch, reviewing the Position of the Governments of Europe with reference to the Russo-Turkish Campaign," by Pozzo di Borgo, June 1829, Portfolio: London, 1836.

The war was declared at St. Petersburg on the 7th of May : on the same day all was prepared for crossing the Pruth, which was speedily effected by two *corps d'armée*—the 6th and the 7th. The first of these, under General ROTH, marched in haste to occupy Bucharest, which they did without seeing a Turk ; the second, under the Grand-Duke MICHAEL, sat down before Ibrail to besiege that place.

The passage of the Pruth being thus readily effected, and the country opened to Bucharest, there appeared no difficulty in attaining and crossing the Danube, and arriving at once at the heart of the Turkish strength, before any troops were assembled, or any preparations made to receive them ; for the Russians were already at Bucharest, before the Turks, at Constantinople, knew that they were at war ; besides, in the convulsed state of the Empire, it appeared that anything might be attempted with impunity. Colonel CHESNEY thus describes the opening operations* :—

“ On the 7th and 8th of May, 1828, the 16th, 17th, 18th, “ and 19th divisions of infantry, with six regiments of Cossacks “ and the Hulans of the Bug, composing the 6th and 7th corps, “ passed the Pruth, on bridges which had been previously pre- “ pared, leaving the third corps for the moment on the other side “ of the river.”

It will, therefore, appear inexplicable that the third *corps d'armée* should not have advanced by the same route and pressed on to reap a harvest that only required to be gathered, and that, instead of making use of the facilities for crossing the Pruth, it should have involved itself in the marshes on the left bank of the Danube, at the extremity of Bessarabia, there to consume an entire month in works to reach the river, and to be followed by a hazardous operation in crossing. Still more extraordinary must it appear that the Emperor, accompanying the army of invasion, should have attached himself to this corps, and exposed himself to these annoyances and danger ; but the fact is, that the issue of the campaign entirely depended upon this movement, so thoroughly understood by the Russian Generals, not in this war only, but also in that of 1810, and yet that the reasons for it should be passed over in entire silence by all the writers on the subject.

I beg the reader to open the map, and to study the ground. I do not think that it will require military knowledge or experience for him at once to detect the secret. He will see a strip of land, exclusive of the marshy delta of the Danube,

* Extracted from his unpublished Memoir to appear in the continuation of “ The Expedition of the Euphrates.” Since published separately, see “ Russo-Turkish Campaigns,” by Colonel Chesney.

running up between that river and the Euxine from the neighbourhood of Silistria to the very frontier of Russia, being about 120 miles in length and about 40 in breadth. The shading of the map will show him that this promontory is neither level like the plain beyond the Danube on the west, nor marshy like the delta on the north-east. The colouring will show him that it is not included administratively in Wallachia, but that it belongs to Turkey Proper. He will perceive in it no less than five forts stationed on the Danube, two of these commanding the passage to the Sulina branch, and another fort on the Kustendji, commanding the only anchorage along the whole line between Odessa and Varna. The peculiar configuration at its narrowest part, where the Danube suddenly turns away to the north, instead of continuing what would appear to be its natural course straight on to Kustendji, and the projection of a long lake half across the isthmus, and the words **TRAJAN'S WALL** traced on the same line, combine to declare the military character of the position. So that I say that any one who will reflect upon the matter for himself must at once perceive that the **DOBROJA** is the field of defence of the Ottoman Empire, and that its occupation must be the first object of an invading army; that not to defend it is to sacrifice half the war, and to occupy it without a contest is to win the campaign. It is necessary, however, to enter into some details which the map will not afford.

The Dobroja, strictly speaking, is no man's land; it has no native population, having been for many centuries exposed to the incursions of neighbouring States, and especially to the devastations of the Cossacks. The people scattered over it amount to not more than 15 to the square mile, and is composed of a medley of tribes not amalgamated, but living distinct. There are Tartars, remnants of the army of **TIMOUR**; there are Arabs, Cossacks, Bulgarians, and shepherds who come to pasture there from Moldavia and from Austria. The land is fertile, the winter not severe, the summer tempered by breezes, and the country well wooded. It is on two sides protected by the Danube, and with steep and generally inaboardable banks. On the north and east it is protected by the marshes of the Danube and an unapproachable sea-coast; yet it has the advantage of communication with Constantinople by the harbour of Kustendji. On the fourth side it is shut in by the Lake of Carasou, and a chain of heights where **TRAJAN** established the line of defence against the barbarian tribes of the Ister, the value of which is illustrated in the late wars by the advantage which Russia has taken of its neglect by the Turks.

The Roman Empire, under **TRAJAN**, had to be defended on

the Danube against a people occupying Wallachia. The Ottoman Empire has to defend itself against an enemy coming from beyond the Pruth, and has to protect Wallachia; the line of Carasou, essential in the first case, is only the rear of this entrenchment as applied to the last.

The process by which Russia has opened to herself the Ottoman Empire has been the establishment of the quasi-independence of the Principalities, from whence she has been allowed to deduce their non-occupation by a Turkish force; and this has become a Treaty stipulation. If Turkey is apprehensive of war, she does not dare to send forward an army to her frontier, because that would be a declaration of war, which she wishes to avoid. Russia, therefore, when she intends to make the war enters and possesses them before the Turks are aware that they are at war; hence the importance of the Dobroja as not being a portion of Wallachia, and yet extending to the Danube; consequently, the Turks may establish themselves in advance of Wallachia, and in face of Bessarabia, and command, by their guns, the Danube, below the Pruth, below Galatz and Ibrail, and therefore entirely intercepting the whole communications by that river. This district is made to the hands of the Porte; it is contrived, so to say, with a wonderful ingenuity to frustrate alike the diplomatic art and the military endeavours of its antagonist. It requires but to establish here Cossack colonies, or a Turkish population, or both, to render it one immense Shumla placed on the very frontiers of Russia, and sealing those of Turkey against all invasion. It was to this district, at all events, that, in case of war, her armies had to be advanced; there was no diplomatic impediment to their being so, and nothing but the most deplorable blunders* could have prevented that step.

But if the Russians had advanced by the line of the Pruth, then most certainly would the Turkish armies have been pushed into the Dobroja. In that case it would have been impossible to bring up the Russian flotilla, which has, with great difficulty, to be tracked by horses along the beach; and without that flotilla none of the fortresses of the Danube could have been captured, nor its passage effected. The siege of Ibrail, always so difficult and costly an operation at the beginning of a war, would have been rendered far more so; and, with the Turks established at this point, and Widdin at the other, Wallachia must become the theatre of war. Even if they advanced into the centre of the Crescent, their rear and their communications would have been exposed to constant enterprises, and the enemy would have been within reach of that narrow plain of Jocham, extending

* General Valentini, in speaking of these operations, says, "It is always the contest of a seeing man with a blind one."

from the north-west angle of the Danube to the eastern point of the Carpathians, by which alone, in case of a reverse, their retreat would have to be effected.

For these reasons it was of absolute necessity to commence the campaign by occupying the Dobroja, from which also the further advantage is to be obtained of maintaining the Turks in total ignorance of the use to which they might turn it.

Except the small garrisons in the six neglected forts of which I have spoken, and which were composed of Albanians and old Janissaries, and therefore disaffected, there were no Turkish troops in the Dobroja; yet the army destined for its occupation amounted to 30,000 men, a large proportion of which were cavalry,* the want of which was extremely felt by the rest of the army. I quote the operation as detailed in the Russian reports:—

“The chief of the staff of the Emperor, Count DIEBITCH, “flew to the Pruth, to prepare for the passage of the 3rd corps. “Difficulties were encountered which, on reflection, ought “not to occasion surprise. *The banks of the Danube, from “Silistria to its mouth, proved to be impracticable, with the ex- “ception of some points, in consequence of the inundations of “the season. The escarpment on the Turkish side comes up to “the water from Tultsja to Isaktschi, but close to the last place “it is possible to obtain a footing. On this side, starting from “the village of Satunovo, a causeway of four versts (6000 “paces) was indispensable to reach the river: it had to be “carried through a low valley, and required *four weeks for its “construction: it was far from being terminated when the “Emperor arrived, on the 18th of May.† It was desirable “that such preparatory works should be completed at this or “other convenient stations on the Bessarabian side of the “Danube before the opening of the campaign. If these pre- “parations were postponed to *avoid any indication of opening the “campaign, it is one of those faults with which policy often “afflicts war. When the causeway was almost completed, on “the 7th of June, and when the 3rd corps was about to effect “its passage, the enemy assumed an advantageous position on “the opposite bank. Its aspect was, indeed, imposing; but it “could be positively ascertained that it manœuvred to conceal “a weakness which, under the circumstances, was inevitable.***

“The passage of the Danube, under the eyes of the musketry “and the grape of the enemy, was, however, one of the most

* Two regiments of Cossacks, the 3rd division of Huzzars, the 1st division of Dragoons, and the 2nd division of Chasseurs, the last two forming the 4th corps of cavalry.

† Showing that the works had commenced three weeks before the declaration of war at St. Petersburg.

“difficult of enterprises, and was executed with the greatest
“talent by General ROUDSEWITSCH, under the especial direc-
“tion of the Emperor. The expectation proved vain of being
“able to transport the troops by means of merchant vessels;
“but the zeal of the Hetman of the Zaporogne Cossacks
“supplied the deficiency. Crossing with 200 of his men, he
“was enabled by degrees, with small boats, to transport
“15,000 Russians.* The fire of a battery placed upon the
“opposite causeway, and above all the attack of the brave
“Russian flotilla, soon extinguished that of the Turkish batte-
“ries on the right bank. Scarcely had General Prince GORTS-
“CHAKOFF appeared at the head of four battalions on the other
“side of the river than its defenders took to flight. Isaktschi
“surrendered a few minutes afterwards, the commandant giving
“no other reason than this, that it was contrary to all propriety
“that he should resist an Emperor of RUSSIA—a courtesy which
“he paid for with his head on reaching Shumla.”

These corps once landed had no marches to encounter, no loss, or sufferings from climate, provisions were amply supplied by the Cossacks from Bessarabia, and there was no enemy to meet them in the field. They consequently radiated off to Matschin, Hirsowa, Tultoja, Kustendji, to the Wall of TRAJAN and Chernavoda. To the neglect of the apparently important operations in Wallachia, this was the scene to which the Emperor transported himself; it was not till after the surrender of Ibrail that he was able (on the 10th of July) to advance from TRAJAN'S Wall upon Bazajik, where he was within a day's march of Varna, and two of Shumla, the vital positions of the Turks, the last of which, twenty days after the Russians had crossed the Pruth, was without defenders, and the former of which might have been carried by a *coup de main*, had the Russians appeared a week earlier.

Ibrail is in the form of a crescent, and stands on a plateau of from 60 to 80 feet above the water, touching the river at the southern extremity, and receding from it towards the northern. A detached fort on the low ground enfilades the beach between the escarpment and the river, and joins to the river the northern extremity of the Crescent. The Danube here divides into several branches. Matschin, on the Dobroja, is on another branch. The distance between the two places by water is five miles, and the communications were maintained by a Turkish flotilla of thirty-two gunboats which commanded the river. The

* These Cossacks had fled from Russia into Turkey, where 50,000 of them are domiciled, and are devoted to the Sultan. The Hetman in question was seduced by a large sum of money. The statement in the text shows to what extent Russia has been indebted to this active treachery.

rampart on the land side is 30 feet high, with nine strong bastions surrounded by a ditch. There are no advanced works, save the glacis of a narrow covered way. The strength of the place consisted in the Turkish population of 30,000 souls, out of which the Russians reckoned that 10,000 were found capable of bearing arms.

The Russians arrived on the 11th of May; the trenches were opened on the 25th, batteries having also been established lower down the river, to enfilade the branch passing by Matschin, and in which was stationed the Turkish flotilla. On the same night this flotilla was attacked by the Russians, and one-half the number having been lost or destroyed, it retired up the stream by Matschin, to rejoin the main flotilla which, through the negligence we meet with at every turn, had not been sent to the scene of action. The Russians now commanding the river, the works were advanced, and battery added to battery, both of mortars and heavy guns, the attack being directed against the southern angle, till the 13th of June, when, the third parallel being carried up close to the wall, mining commenced. There being in the garrison no professional defenders, the Turks could not be expected to employ art, and still less so as the operations were carried on during the night in consequence of the great heat of the day. Their fire, however, both of guns, mortars, and a long rampart musket which they used with great effect, considerably annoyed the besiegers, and cost them some thousand men. They made great fires upon the rampart to watch the enemy, and almost nightly sorties. The mining operations of which they had no experience greatly terrified them, and they expected to be all blown into the air. Not understanding the means of detecting these works, their attempts to countermine proved ineffectual, and the Russian preparations being effected on the 15th of June, the explosion took place, and the troops rushed to the assault before the breach was properly cleared. The inhabitants rushed also to crown the breach, and after a long and desperate struggle the Russians retired, leaving by their own account in the trenches 3000 men, and amongst them two general officers. That the defenders of Ibrail on this memorable day included children of tender age is proved by an incident mentioned by VALENTINI. The assailants had carried away with them a boy twelve years old. His brother, aged ten, had been killed in the breach. Being asked if he was not sorry for his brother, he answered, "Why should I be so? did he not die 'in the breach?'" "But," continues the narrator, "this boy must 'have learned these notions in some European school.'" Yet with strange inconsistency in accounting for such a defence by the spontaneous movement of the inhabitants, he says, "It is

“ the result of a warlike instinct, and a well-calculated personal
 “ interest, which will be obtained only in Christendom when we
 “ arrive at complete civilisation. With us the first bomb shakes
 “ institutions which can have security only in a military spirit
 “ and a love of country.”

On the day following, another mine was sprung, and more effectually, on which the Pasha offered to surrender on condition of marching out with arms and baggage, and retiring freely to Silistria. These terms were granted.

The Turks could not possibly have held Ibrail much longer. Already had the Russian army marched on on both sides of the Danube. The commander, like the garrison, had nobly done its duty. He surrendered when, in European warfare, further defence would have been impossible, as he had maintained his fortress under circumstances which, in European warfare, would have rendered defence impossible. He further obtained terms most honourable and useful, for, by prolonging the contest, he would not have been able to transfer the inhabitants of Ibrail to Silistria to become hereafter its heroic defenders. Yet when he arrived at Shumla he was put to death, assenting himself to the Spartan decree of the Grand Vizier, “ You have done well ; but
 “ you ought not to have survived the fall of Ibrail.”

The character revealed in the defence of this city explains the campaign and its results. Substitute for the word “ Turk ” “ Roman,” and the matter would be plain. Are not the acts which we have recorded worthy of Rome ? Does its history afford better examples of soldiers or citizens, of sternness or valour ? This population was a trading community ; twenty years had passed since it had seen war. It was domiciled in a foreign land ; it had relied upon its native impulses alone. Let any one consider what a trading community of Europe would have done, if so abandoned, in the face of 150,000 veterans ? The small fortresses of the Dobroja obtained the same honourable terms. One of them only was made prisoner ; the others retired to prolong their country’s defence, even though one of them, from the internal schism then agitating the state, forced their commander to capitulate. How the Russians with an open breach, and closing in the city upon all sides, allowed the garrison—a garrison so formidable and animated with such a spirit, and now filled with vengeance—to retire to garrison the next fortress is conceivable only by the respect which they inspired. In fact, as it has been well said, “ the dangers of a siege commence with the Turks only after, according to the rules of
 “ European war, further defence is impracticable.” Besides time, even calculated by hours, was to them of the greatest importance, as already before the walls of Ibrail had it been per-

ceived that the troops were not in sufficient numbers, and orders were expedited to send forward from the interior of the Empire all that could possibly be spared. But why were the Russians so anxious to get possession of Ibrail? The way was open on both sides; it contained but its inhabitants, and though they might defend its walls, they were not going to attack the Russians in the rear. Let them answer the question themselves!

“Of all the places possessed by the Turks on the left bank, ‘Ibrail was the principal. It was necessary to have it to be ‘master of the navigation of the river, *so as to get possession of ‘the other important ports and secure that of the invaded countries.*” It was the Danube that was captured at Ibrail!

The 7th corps being now free, it advanced, as did the 6th from Bucharest, to cross the river in the direct line of operations, that is between Silistria and Rustchuk, where a portion of the 3rd corps was expected by this time to have established a lodgment on the right bank to prepare a passage. General Roth had early been detached with a strong body to prepare on the Dombowitza (a river which passes by Bucharest, and falls into the Danube nearly halfway between Rustchuk and Silistria) the pontoons and materials requisite for throwing a bridge across at Tourtukni. This operation was not found so easy as was expected, in consequence of the occupation of Giurziova by the Turks, and their flotilla which, at that time, gave them the command of the river. This division had, therefore, to turn back to cross at Hirshova, and by the aid of vessels sent up from Ibrail, so that the 2nd corps now entered by the Dobroja and joined the main army under the Emperor.

The general quarters had already been established at TRAJAN’S Rampart, and “already had commenced to be felt the danger of “the weakness of means;” and it was necessary to wait for the fall of the fortresses in the rear. The experience of preceding campaigns proved that the Turks would oppose in Bulgaria a pertinacious resistance, whether in the fortified places or in broken ground adapted to their order of defence, and where numbers might easily paralyse art and tactics. It was not, then, until the 7th corps had joined from Ibrail that an advance could be made, which took place on the 10th of July, when the army moved forward in two divisions, by two routes, on Bazarjih, escorting, at the same time, the garrisons of the places that had fallen, to become in turn the defenders of Varna and Silistria. Bazarjih was found evacuated, and was at once occupied by the avant posts. The Turks immediately returned and drove them out; a Russian reinforcement came up, and again they were driven back. A division of infantry (hitherto cavalry alone had been engaged) came up to receive their comrades; the Turkish

cavalry threw themselves on the guns in the intervals of the squares, and finally were repulsed. The Russian army was obliged to halt several days at Bazarjih, awaiting reinforcements. Here, for the first time, was the Emperor gratified with the sight of the new uniform of the NIZAM; and it is worth while to record the impression which it made upon its adversaries:—

“We have observed, for the first time, a remarkable order in the movement of the Turkish cavalry; they closed up and deployed, scattered and rallied again; and it was easy to perceive that they were no longer directed by warlike impulses, but by the will of their chiefs.”

The flotilla was now making its way up the Danube, and Anapa, the northern frontier of Circassia, having fallen, the troops engaged in that siege, instead of being sent forward to join PASKIEWITCH, in Asia, were sent across the Black Sea and landed in the neighbourhood of Varna. Thus strengthened on the two flanks, the main army advanced on Koslondji, between Silistria and Varna, on a line with both, thirty miles from the one, and fifty from the other. This place the Turks had also evacuated. They were, however, reported to be “in position at a few versts distant from the route of Yeni Bazar. A reconnoissance of two squadrons found there 8000 cavalry (?) and five guns, and was this time better mauled even than at Bazarjih. The Lieutenant-General, hastening to the support of his flying squadrons, was instantly enveloped, and quickly reconducted (*ramené*)* several versts. The Turks must have had difficulty in comprehending how the immense resources of Russia could only furnish a division of huzzars for the avant-guard of his army. On the other hand, after all their disagreeable experiences, the confidence of this excellent division diminished only in proportion to the strength of its horses. . . . It would be unjust to reproach the officers, who acted only,” &c.

A junction being now effected with the army of General RUDIGER, it advanced on Yeni Bazar, and then on Pravodi, equally evacuated by the Turks; and, while it marched on Shumla, the troops destined for the siege of Silistria and Varna radiated in these directions. General Count SOUCHTELN, advancing up to the walls of the latter place, was saluted by a vigorous sortie, which caused the Russians to retire, “after a bloody engagement, leaving behind 300 men.” At the same time a reinforcement of several thousand men entered by the Bourgas route, so that the Russian General thought fit to retire and entrench himself at a respectable distance.

* Courteous military term for flight.

On the 20th of July, the Emperor advanced on the famous bulwark of the Ottoman Empire—Shumla. I may be pardoned if I say a few words in this place. It is, perhaps, the most historic of strategic points and of fortresses, and yet resembles in nothing other fortified places. When I first entered it, some years after this war, it was of a misty morning. Dismounting at the post-house, I inquired how far it was to Shumla, which I was all anxiety to behold. I had seen no walls; I had passed no gorges, crossed no heights; in fact, it is an open place, formed by hills abrupt and wooded, but not high or steep, in the form of a horse-shoe, looking to the east, with a radius of a couple of miles. It is an admirable position for an entrenched camp, but is nothing more; and in the hands of no other people would it be heard of to-day, as it never was heard of before they possessed it.

Here intersect the roads longitudinally and transversely, crossing from Varna to Upper Bulgaria, from the Danube to the plain of Adrianople and the Capital; consequently it unites at once the best ground for an entrenched camp, and a most admirable position for a camp to entrench itself in, whether opposing an enemy, operating in Bulgaria, or watching an army proposing to cross the Balkan.

The Russians advanced with the 3rd and 7th corps, strengthened by detachments amounting to no less than 60,000 men, with above a hundred guns. The Turks were only engaged in their field defences before the place, which was not closed. They reckoned them at 40,000 men. Although the Russians drove in on both sides bodies that came out to meet them, they were overawed by the imposing effect of the place and its defenders, and, consequently, divided in counsels as to the course of future operations. A similar effect seems to have been produced upon the Turks, judging, at least, by the statement of Colonel CHESNEY, who was at the place at the time. From his manuscript report I quote the following numbers and dates of the arrival of the troops, and account of the first operations:—

On May 17th the first troops arrived to occupy it.

	Cavalry.	Infantry.
May 17th, CARRAGE NEMEN . . .		800
„ 22nd, OSMAN PASHA . . .	2,000	
„ 27th, HUSSEIN PASHA . . .	8,000	8,000
„ „ HALIL PASHA . . .		11,000
June 2nd, HEMIM PASHA (Delhis)	3,000	
„ 30th IZAAD PASHA . . .		8,000
„ „ „ „ (Albanians)		4,000
	13,000	31,800

Amongst them the Regulars amounted to 8000 horse and 20,000 Infantry, including Artillery; and a portion of them were those which we have seen at Bazarjih and Kolousji. Colonel CHESNEY continues:—

“HUSSEIN PASHA immediately commenced to throw up a chain of bastioned field-works in advance of the old line, which he accomplished in forty days. The entrenchments took the shape of a grand front of a fortification, with its flanks resting on the crests of the mountains, and each ending in a fort. There are eighteen bastions running across the valley ($2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide); they are all mined; and in advance there is a double chain of *detached* redoubts, one at 300 and the other at 500 yards from the main line. These works are enclosed in the rear, and occupy some ground which would otherwise be advantageous to the enemy.

“Count WITTGENSTEIN, with 24,000, arrived just as the new works were finished by HUSSEIN PASHA. He was met, for the first time, in the open field by the Turks, about three leagues from Shumla. He repulsed them, with the loss of 2000 men, and drove them into the fortress, so panic-struck that they abandoned the redoubts outside, and he might possibly have entered with them. The Russians commenced throwing up works immediately, and on the 22nd of July the Emperor NICHOLAS arrived with 18,000 men.”

It is singular that the Russians take no credit for this loss inflicted on the Turks, and that they were not aware of their panic. It must have been, however, of short duration, for the Russians were obliged to abandon the design of closely investing them, were unable to prevent the entrance of convoys and reinforcements or to arrest the advance of the new field-works. Here was observed a phenomenon in military tactics, that of two armies carrying on siege operations against each other; so that sorties were made by the besieging force, and zigzags pushed by the besieged. Under such circumstances the expectations of a triumphant campaign vanished; all attack upon Shumla was out of the question—a close investment of it impossible; it could not be reduced by famine, as the large extent of works mutually defended and attacked exposed the army to the effects of discouragement and of loss with no possibility of success. Inquieted at the same time in its rear, and in a bare country destitute of fodder, and where, in a night attack, a Russian redoubt was carried and a general officer (Wrede) slain, it became evident that the Turks were beginning to contemplate the possibility of more daring and effectual enterprises.

“The position of the Russian troops before Shumla was beginning to become very critical, and so much the more as

“ they were daily exhausted in efforts to maintain a development
 “ out of all proportion with their disposable forces. Above all
 “ forage was wanting, by which the horses were ruined ; and with
 “ their strength the confidence of the riders diminished, who had
 “ no desire to deliver up their heads to the agile Spahis.* Here
 “ it was evident that the numerical weakness of the Russian
 “ cavalry deprived it of the means of subsistence ; had it been
 “ in greater force, and, above all, had there been enough of Cos-
 “ sacks, forage could have been obtained from a greater distance,
 “ and the service of the avant-posts effected with less fatigue.
 “ That happened which will scarcely be credible, that the whole
 “ cavalry of the army was on service daily at the avant-posts, or
 “ as foragers, and was almost entirely destroyed in this service.
 “ The infantry was exhausted and deprived of rest by the inse-
 “ curity of the avant-posts, and cavalry could not be reckoned
 “ on for action.”

Shumla was not the only place besieged. “ General ROTH,
 “ from the middle of the month of July, had drawn a blockade
 “ around Silistria ; but the weakness of his troops (40,000 men !)
 “ prevented him from closing sufficiently to cut off the commu-
 “ nications with Rustchuk (by the river), from which it drew its
 “ subsistence.” Nothing of importance occurred before that
 place during the campaign, except, indeed, an attempt made by
 the troops, on their retreat to Wallachia, to get possession of it,
 which failed.

Varna was now the chief object. The opportunity of the co-
 operation of the fleet, the facility afforded of transporting by the
 fleet the guns, shot, and siege material, the importance of the
 place, as joining the land operations with the sea, and the exclu-
 sion of the Turks from this *tête de pont* on the Euxine, presented
 sufficient inducements to render it a chief point of the original
 plan, especially as the fortifications were not calculated to resist
 a regular siege.

In the hopelessness of making any impression on Shumla,
 “ the siege of Varna became the principal operation of the
 “ campaign,” as it was expected that the troops set free might
 still be employed against Shumla. Therefore the Emperor, on
 the 3rd of August, went to superintend in person that siege.
 However, “ not finding the necessary preparations sufficiently
 “ advanced, and as it was necessary to await the arrival of the
 “ Guards, his Majesty, to avoid passing several weeks in inaction,
 “ went to Odessa ; thus at no point was there force sufficient to
 “ act with vigour.”

The Emperor returned at the beginning of September with

* “ In the month of August from 100 to 150 horses died per day, and in the charge
 of a regiment of huzzars sixteen horses fell dead from weakness.”

the reinforcements, and the operations commenced to become serious. Prince MENSCHIKOFF, being severely wounded, was replaced in the command by Count WORONZOF, and the Emperor's camp-general was established beyond the Devna to intercept the communications from the south, as it had not been found practicable to invest it on that side. The weakening of the Russian force before Shumla enabled the Turks, in the middle of September, to send out bodies for the support of Silistria and Varna; 14,000 approached the latter place. Marshal WITTGENSTEIN, by means of the reserve at Pravodi, Yenibazar and Rasgrad, operated so as to intercept the diversion, though not without difficulty and loss.

The contest was carried on before Varna with fierceness on both sides: several redoubts had been carried, and the lines had been much advanced, when OMER VRIONI, with 20,000 men, advancing to the relief of the place, debouched between Kamtchick and Varna. The Adjutant-General GOLOVIN had taken post on Kurtep. OMER VRIONI menaced the ford which ensured his retreat on Varna; but, on the other hand, the detachment was supported by the fleet. OMER VRIONI commanded a body of irregulars against which, not being held in much respect, a reconnaissance was detached, composed of one regiment of 1500 men, two squadrons of chasseurs, and two pieces of light artillery. The result was "stupefaction on both sides." The half of the body only returned, leaving the general wounded and a prisoner. It was now found necessary to reinforce GOLOVIN, General BISTRON taking the command, and Marshal WITTGENSTEIN received orders to advance all his disposable troops on the same point. These were placed under Prince EUGENE, with orders to rally Prince MADATOFF and all the reinforcements that could be spared from Varna; General DIEBITCH was also advancing, and General SIMANSKI. Thus then the whole of the disposable forces were concentrated around this irregular corps of Bashi Bozuks, with Russia's best generals and their Emperor at their head. It was the opportunity most of all desired of meeting the Turks in the open field, and it presented the further incitement that "the attack, if repulsed, must necessarily compromise in its consequences the fate of the army."

OMER VRIONI had established an entrenched camp according to the old Roman practice of the Turks (he indeed formed three) on the strong position of Kurtep; and the Russians, to their surprise, discovered by its dimensions that it was destined for an army, consequently that the movement of OMER VRIONI was preparatory to a great strategic operation to change the nature of the campaign.

Opinions were divided, but the case was desperate: the order

of the Emperor for the attack was in these terms:—"The grace
" of God and the courage of the troops inspire hope which the
" knowledge of the circumstances and of the ground cannot pos-
" sibly promise; but His Majesty can in no case doubt of the
" obedience and the zeal of the troops." Another appeal was
made to their chivalry in these terms: "His Majesty has destined
" to a heroic action a handful of brave men. The God of
" armies will be with them."

The operations which ensued between 8000 Turks and 20,000 Russians are too confused to be detailed, consisting of partial actions, attacks of redoubts and entrenchments, and *mêlées* in the forests. There seems to have been as little strategic combination on the one side as the other, and equal bravery. The advantages of discipline were, of course, all on the side of the Russians; the Turks had that of position, but not that of numbers; and it is wholly inexplicable how, in broken ground, and especially in forests, cavalry should have beaten infantry; in fact, the Russians remark that, from the agility of their horses, the Turkish irregular cavalry, in broken ground, are equal to *tirailleurs*. The devotion of the Russian officers was unparalleled; two general officers perished in leading charges; General SIMANSKI himself was killed, Prince EUGENE wounded. In one grave were interred the chief of the brigade, the chief of the regiment, two chiefs of battalion, and two chiefs of companies. The principal attack ceased only to prevent the total destruction of the troops by closing the combat. The Russians acknowledge a loss of 2000 men.

"Varna, the object of these bloody combats, was at the time
" on the point of yielding; two breaches were open, and pre-
parations making for the assault; it is therefore inexplicable how
" OMER VRIONI, after the failure of the Russian attack upon his
" lines, should have remained eleven days in position to witness,
" with his own eyes, the fall of the place he had been sent to
" relieve."

The first period of the siege, dating from the 14th of July, commenced with the taking of a distant position in the north by SOUCHTELN, with four battalions and four squadrons, supported by a reserve of four battalions and five squadrons. We have seen how he was unable to prevent the Capitan Pasha from entering from the south with a reinforcement of 5000 men, partly regulars; and at this moment he was ordered to Kousloudji to protect the rear of the grand army marching on Shumla, and could only leave his reserve to watch the place. It was only at the end of July that the Third Brigade of the 7th Corps, after the capture of Anapa, arrived before the place, on board the fleet, under the orders of Prince MENSCHIKOFF. The siege was

regularly commenced under his orders. Reinforced by a detachment, on the 3rd of August the Turkish posts in that direction were driven in; the besiegers then amounted to from 12,000 to 14,000 men.

On the 9th of August, a line of redoubts was established to the south, from the sea to the Lake Devna; the day before, the Russian vessels had destroyed the Turkish flotilla of sixteen vessels. Ships were also transported to the Devna, so as to assure the establishment of a detachment on the road to Constantinople. On the 19th, the fleet took up its position at the distance of 2000 paces, and cannonaded the town. The Turks replied the next day by a sortie, in which Prince MENSCHIKOFF was wounded; on the 29th, the works were advanced 240 paces from the place. At this time General WORONZOF took the command. On the 7th of September, the detachment of the guards, under the Grand Duke MICHAEL, arrived, carrying the attacking force to 18,000 men; next day the Emperor joined the army, and established his general quarters on board the Admiral's vessel. A sortie of the Turks, on the 13th, on both banks of the Devna, being repulsed, they were driven in from every point they had occupied beyond the ramparts, and henceforward restricted themselves to guarding against an assault by a measure well worthy of imitation, namely, the establishment of a large body of Albanians in the ditch, it being easy to shelter such troops from the enemy's fire, and they being always ready to attack upon occasion, and advantageously placed for a sortie, should it be advisable. The first mine was sprung on the 14th, under the sea-bastion, and appeared to have completed the breach commenced by the shot. The fire continued, without interruption, from the 15th to the 17th; a new battery of eight 24's effected a new breach by the 22nd. The Albanians in the ditch alone opposed an assault, and, to drive them out of their position by enfilading the ditch, the right lunette of the enemy was carried during the 26th.

At this period the division of OMER VRIONI arrived and the Capitan Pasha, desiring to support him, made a sortie with a large portion of the garrison, and then the Albanians were withdrawn. Two new mines were sprung, widening both the breaches already made, and in the night of the 6th several companies, of their own movement, scrambled over the ruins, without meeting opposition, and entered the place; they were, however, driven back with the loss of 400 men.

In this state of the siege, says the Russian report, OMER VRIONI remaining inactive, the greater part of the garrison determined to capitulate; and so on the 10th of October, notwithstanding the opposition of the Capitan Pasha, YUSUFF PASHA, commander of the place, marched straight to the

Russian camp, and surrendered himself as a prisoner with 7000 men. The brave Capitan Pasha nevertheless maintained himself with 300 men, and the Emperor, respecting misfortune and conduct so honourable, granted to him and his new Spartans a free retreat. YUSUFF PASHA, judging differently from other Turkish chiefs, had no regret to pass the Danube as prisoner.

This statement but slightly veils the fact that Varna had been doubly surrendered by treachery, first, through the mysterious inaction of OMER VRIONI, and, secondly, by the formal act of YUSUFF PASHA. The conduct of the first may be explained on other grounds; that of the second is explicable on none. YUSUFF PASHA is a solitary instance amongst the Turks. In Europe his crime might be extenuated by his being imposed upon through a fabricated order for his decapitation. The Turks have another code of morals. OMER VRIONI, on witnessing the surrender of Varna, hastened to retreat. The Russians were not in strength to intercept him; but, soon changing his mind, he attempted to regain position on the bank of the Kamtjik, which he had abandoned. In this design he was, however, defeated with loss. The Russians now commenced the retreat from all points except Varna and Pravodi. But they were everywhere incommoded; a small Russian body was annihilated in Bazarjik, and General RUDSCWITJ, in command of the 3rd corps, vigorously pressed during his retreat, had to abandon his baggage. So at the end of October ended the campaign, the Russians having lost the whole of their cavalry and *matériel*.

It is impossible here not to contrast these operations with those of 1810.

General KAMINSKI had but 100,000 men; he lost 7000 before Ibrail in a single repulsed attack; they had not then adopted mines, to which, in 1828, they owed the capture of Ibrail and Varna; yet the main army passed the Danube by the middle of May. Rutschuk, Silistria, Nicopolis, Sistova, were all carried; the latter was an important town, now utterly ruined. The campaign commenced thus early was expended, so to say, upon Rustchuk alone, which in 1828 was not touched; before Silistria even they failed. In 1828 Russia had doubled the force; her attention was concentrated upon this war alone, and her preparations had long been making. The Turks were in complete disorganisation, and distracted by many fears; such forces as they had were occupied by those alarms. They had to guard against an invasion from Greece, an invasion in Asia Minor, an insurrection at the capital, and, as they believed, an impending war with England and France. In 1810, it was

Russia that was so circumstanced, and she had for nearly fifteen years been engaged in war in Europe.

Whatever our conclusions regarding the nature of the new Turkish force, it is impossible not to ask the question, whether in the interval the military resources of the Russian Empire had not deteriorated. Her panegyrist does not attempt to deny that this is the conclusion which suggests itself. "It would appear," says he, "that the chiefs and all those employed in the army were then (in 1810) more familiar, by a war of several years, with the best manner of equipping themselves, and with making their arrangements in a desert and arid country, than could be generals whose experience was derived, although against the greatest generals, from cultivated countries (WHAT, WOURGHZOF, ROTH, MENSCHIKOFF, and GEISMAR). Besides, the army of KAMINSKI was better furnished with Cossacks; the horses and the harness less elegant, and vigorous in appearance, were better adapted to the country, and so the artillery and the cavalry were able to last to the end of the season. There were then no complaints of the want of subsistence or the loss of horses; and other arrangements of that kind, which our recent experience will no doubt induce us to revert to, will not escape military men."

If this fact stood alone, it would still be of the greatest significance; but the Hungarian war comes to confirm it. It has been the remark of more than one veteran general, that the Russians there appeared to have degenerated from that reputation which they had acquired in the great European war.

The deterioration as here indicated points more particularly to the condition of the cavalry, the Cossacks, and the commissariat; but we do not find the Russian infantry distinguishing themselves as might have been expected in the field; occasions invaluable were lost. The affair of Kurtepe can bear no comparison with that of Battin (in 1810); and the pompous demonstration against Shumla sinks into insignificance as contrasted with the operations of KAMINSKI, who made a vigorous attack on that place, and even carried one of the heights.

The effect of this conclusion is attempted to be veiled under a purposed moderation, the object of the campaign being stated to be, not to break the power of Turkey, but to obtain a peace. The publication of the Russian secret dispatches does not permit such a question to be entertained; the object of the war as there explained, was to break the new Turkish military organisation before it had time to establish itself; there can be, therefore, no question that Russia exerted herself to the utmost, nor would we find reiterated at every point, and from every

quarter, complaints of the insufficiency of troops, unless her purposes had been stretched beyond her means.

The honour of the defence is willingly attributed by the Russian writers to the new Turkish discipline. That there should be exaggeration in this respect is quite natural, both from the surprise occasioned by their bearing and conduct, and from the *esprit de métier* of military men; but the sketch which I have given of the campaign will show that this position is untenable. There were no regulars at Ibrail, which occupied one-third of the army during one-half the campaign, nor on the Dobroja, which occupied one-third during the same period; none at Widdin, from which point Wallachia was menaced in such a manner as to require a strong body of observation. The defence of Silistria was not by regulars, nor was that of Shumla, although there was there a considerable body of them. Varna, upon which the whole campaign turned, was again the defence of a place according to the old Turkish plan, and the force under OMER VRIONI were irregulars. Except therefore in minor operations, the Nizam had no opportunities of distinguishing themselves, and, indeed, they would have been sacrificed if they had, for the superior command was in the hands of the old Pashas, not merely uninstructed in the art of war, but distrustful and jealous of the new system. The Russians had, therefore, to contend only with their old antagonists, local obstructions, inhabitants of the fortresses, well armed Bashi Bozuks and Delhis on their horses, and hardy Albanians on foot, yet without being able to make on them anything like the impression that with half the resources was made in 1810.

General VALENTINI after a glowing encomium on the Nizam, which he compares to the French in the first wars of the Revolution, admits that for all practical purposes the conditions of warfare remain on their former footing, adding that the changes introduced by Sultan MAHMOUD had been less important in the introduction of discipline amongst the troops than by the establishment of subordination in the chiefs.

Europe, meanwhile, believed the forces of Russia overwhelming, and the fabric of the Ottoman Empire tottering to its fall. They expected to behold a triumphant march of the Emperor from the Pruth to Constantinople; they were perplexed by the results to the point of incredulity. "Every man," says Colonel CHESNEY, "was astounded, from the Duke downwards."

The Russian force engaged is variously stated. WITZLEBEN thus gives the detail of the main army under Count WITTGENSTEIN:—

Infantry	76,000
Cavalry	14,000
Artillery	5,000
Total	95,000

Colonel IWANITSCHÉW says that, "In the course of 1827, throughout the Empire, four recruits had been ordered in every thousand, Jews included; and the military colonels were required to bring up their numbers to the full war complement. The first army which crossed the Pruth in May consisted of 130,000 men; the Asiatic army, which marched simultaneously, of 68,000. A squadron of the Black Sea was allotted to support the movements of each army, and another sent round from the Baltic to co-operate according to occasion; that of the Black Sea consisted of ten sail of the line and six frigates; that of the Mediterranean, of three sail of the line and three frigates."* He states the army led by the Emperor, which advanced in July from the Rampart of Trajan on Bazarjik, to have consisted of 54 battalions (900 men), 48 squadrons, six regiments of Cossacks, and more than 250 pieces of artillery: General ROTH had 40,000 men.

According to the Turkish accounts there crossed from the Pruth and the Lower Danube, and were transported from Odessa and Anapa, from first to last, during the campaign, 216,000 men. Now, as POZZO DI BORGO admits that the whole resources of the Empire had been evoked during two years of preparation; as no inquietude then prevailed on the side of Poland; as the eastern frontiers, even to Siberia, had been left degarnished, that so early in the campaign as the siege of Ibrail "it was felt that more troops were required," that consequently two additional corps were advanced from the interior, and the guards marched from St. Petersburg; 200,000 men will appear not an excessive number, but rather the reverse. It is natural that the Russian writers should seek to diminish the number of forces employed in a campaign which was so disappointing their hopes, and so disgraceful to their arms; but still the most reliable of these authorities brings up the number engaged to pretty nearly the statement of the Turkish Government. We may therefore assume that nearly 200,000 men were employed in European Turkey, and also that that amount is the utmost which Russia can collect on this frontier. This is precisely the number which General VALENTINI, in his original work on the war of 1809-10-11, sets down as requisite for passing the Balkan, attacking Constantinople, and driving the Turks into Asia, and it

* "Turkish and Russian Armies," p. 139.

exceeds by nearly double the troops at the disposal of General KAMINSKI, in that campaign when he carried all the strong places on the Danube, nearly took Shumla, beat several powerful armies in the field, and sent detachments to Upper Bulgaria, during which operations his Cossacks crossed the Balkan,* and all this without having the co-operation of a fleet, either to aid him in the Black Sea or to paralyse the Turks in the south.

Now, let us see the forces which the Porte was able to oppose to this formidable armament—not after “two years of preparation,” but without the preparation of a single hour. When the *war had actually begun*, the SULTAN, according to IWANITCHIEW, called for the following contingents:—

	Men.
Asia Minor	45,050
Roumeli	52,000
Total not paid by the State	97,050
Troops paid by the State:—	
Grenadiers, with muskets	10,000
Zaims and Spahis	10,000
Mousouhurs, or new troops	40,000
Border artillerymen	20,000
Total	80,000
	177,050
Disposition of these troops:—	
For the security of the capital	15,000
For the fortresses of Asia and Roumeli (Dardanelles)	17,000
Defence of Asia and Erzeroum	30,000
„ „ Gallipoli	7,550
To oppose the Greeks	10,000
Defence of the Bosphorus	15,000
„ „ the Danubian fortresses	25,500
To Silistria	15,000
To Adrianople	10,000
The Commander-in-Chief, HUSSEIN PASHA, and KAZIR PASHA had of <i>élite</i> troops under their personal command	32,000
Total	177,050

* “Clouds of Cossacks passed the Balkan, and advanced up to the suburbs of Burgos.”—*Walsh's Constantinople*, p. 111.

The SULTAN was said to have organised, in the European manner :—

Massuris—regular infantry	40,000
Spahis—cavalry	10,000
Gunners—bombadiers and sappers	20,000
Garrison—gunners for the defence of the fortresses on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles	10,000
Total	80,000

But these corps were certainly never completed.*

MOLTKE counts the total of regulars, including artillery and cavalry employed, on the Danube at 50,000; 25,000 at the other fortresses, and 25,000 at Shumla. The Turkish Government calculates 32,000 in all as the troops of the State employed in the campaign—a number which seems to be borne out by the other reports. The contingents from the provinces called for so late did not arrive, and the diversion in Asia prevented the Asiatic troops from quitting their homes. We may, therefore, to these 32,000 regulars, or rather conscripts, add 20,000 irregular horse, 30,000 to 40,000 irregular infantry, and the Turkish inhabitants of Shumla and its district, and the fortresses; so that to oppose the Russian force of 200,000 the Turks had but 100,000 men, less than a third of which only was disciplined, and acted under subordination. In point of artillery the disadvantage was still greater.

They were further placed in the embarrassing predicament of acting upon two systems; all confidence in the old one was ruined by the introduction of the new; but the authority of the new one was not established, and the regulars were not merely raw conscripts, but beardless youths, and those who had instructed them did not lead them. The foremost men would not enter the Nizam, and the Government could not trust them with arms.

A defensive army ought to be numerically much stronger than an attacking one, as it has to guard all the points that may be endangered. Here we have the very reverse; and of this defensive army, the whole of that occupying the line west of Silistria to Widdin, including Rustchuk, and amounting, according to one of the reports, to 30,000 men, was never engaged.

The chief result of the campaign was to establish the credit of the new troops. It was not that as a corps it had distinguished itself, but as a system; the prejudices against it were broken; the impression it made upon the Russians, reacted upon

* Turkish and Russian Armies, pp. 163-5.

the Turks; the youth of its members invested it with a character of heroism; it had gained practice and self-confidence, while the irregulars, at the close of the campaign, had disbanded in a manner that resembled a flight; it had pursued the Russian veterans and driven them across the border. It had suffered comparatively little, both from the nature of the operations before Shumla, where it was chiefly engaged, and from the abundance and excellence of its provisions and stores; for to this point, in spite of its embarrassments, the Turkish Government had sedulously attended.

During the war recruitment had been actually pushed, so that there was every prospect of opening the new campaign under very different and much more favourable auspices. The Turkish Government was relieved from its alarms with respect to the European Powers, to Greece, and the inhabitants of Constantinople. It could send forward the regulars, which it had before retained for these objects, together with the new levies; and the contingents, from the provinces, which had been called up too late in the foregoing season, could now be early in spring in the theatre of war. But the treasury was exhausted. The revenue at that period little exceeded four millions; the fleet had been destroyed; civil war had not ceased to rage for seven years, and the Porte found itself in the inability of giving the bonus on enlistment to the Bashi Bozuks, or Delhis, with which otherwise it might have covered its frontier, or of paying the sums demanded beforehand by the Albanians, including large arrears. The provinces were so exhausted that it was impossible to force them to raise these troops from the moneys of the provincial treasuries. In fact, 1,500,000*l.* was requisite, but was not forthcoming; and zeal could not, in this case, supply its place, on account of the bloody internal feuds, *e. g.*, Janissaries, Derebeys, Greece, Servia, &c.

But the worst feature was the disorder of the administration, which prevented the adoption of the most imperative and the easiest measures: it was imperative to retake Varna, which might have been done during the winter; it was easy to destroy the works of the Russians at Silistria, which they found on their return in the condition in which they had left them. The greatest neglect of all was that of not forming a flotilla to regain the command of the Danube.

The Russians, on the other hand, were in a scarcely less agreeable predicament. The effort had been great, both as regarded expenditure and men; the cavalry had been annihilated,* their means of transport nearly exhausted, the hospitals filled,

* Moltke states their loss at 80,000 men.

and the surviving troops discouraged. But they had the advantage of a general of superior ability in the highest command; they also had the resources of Wallachia and Moldavia, from which they drew subsistence, and cattle amounting in value to no less than five millions sterling;* above all, they had the Danube.

* Turkey, at the end of the war, was made to pay a contribution of 13,000,000 of ducats, or nearly 6,000,000*l.*, no deduction being made on account of the Provinces.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829.

THE Turks at the opening of the Campaign had reinforced the garrisons of Widdin, Nicopolis, and Rustchuk. There was no army in the field, and but 10,000 men at Shumla. The new Grand Vizier, REDCHID MEHEMET PASHA, entered that place with a few on the 21st of March, and from that time reinforcements continued coming in. The Russians were more active. On the 26th of January, General GEISMAR got possession of two points on the left bank: the one, the *tête de pont* of Nicopolis, and the other near it; in consequence of which, on the 18th of February the Turkish flotilla of thirty boats was surprised and captured. A few days before, the Black Sea fleet had made a descent on Siziboli, at the southern extremity of the bay of Bourgas, by which means the Turkish army at Shumla might itself be compromised. On the 24th of February DIEBITCH reached Jassy, and the main body of the Russians put themselves in march; floating bridges had been prepared at Hirshova, near Silistria, by which the 2nd and 3rd Corps crossed in the beginning of May. The general quarters were again established on the 8th of that month, at the rampart of Trajan. On the 17th of May Silistria was invested. Little Bulgaria,—the real theatre of war—was in the hands of the Russians, by the possession of Varna, Siziboli, and Pravodi, which latter place they had fortified. All the local difficulties of the first Campaign were overcome, and they were in the centre of the Ottoman Empire in the full season of health and forage. But they were now met in this region by a Turkish army of force in the field. The Grand Vizier in the middle of May had marched from Shumla with 40,000 men, partly regular, partly irregular. The Russians, engaged in no sieges except the

investment of Silistria (being already in possession of the principal points), could oppose to them nearly double that number. It was the part of the Turks to protract the war, and to stand upon the defensive. There lay their strength, whether as to tactics, whether as to country and climate; and, besides, they were destitute of the strategic faculties necessary for taking the offensive. The course adopted by the Grand Vizier can only be described as insanity. It could have been no other, had DIEBITCH planned it for him.

The attack, however, was unexpected; and the Russians, being at the moment unprepared and dispersed, suffered on one point severely; they rallied, and by the act of concentration the Turks were repulsed with considerable loss, and ultimately retired. The principal affair occurred at Eski Arnautlar, where the generals on both sides were wounded; the Nizam, under a general of their own, HALIB, greatly distinguished themselves.

The object of the movement was to take Pravodi from the Russians, whilst at the very moment these were besieging Silistria, and the Turks were as incapable of besieging a place, as they were pre-eminent in defending one. Had that army been devoted to the protection of Silistria, that place would not have fallen, nor would its repulse have opened the way to the Balkan. This rash movement compromised the whole war. The same General, by an almost similar rashness, subsequently sacrificed the last resources of his master against IBRAHIM PASHA at Konieh.

At Silistria, the Russians found ready to their hand the works of the previous year. The place is commanded on the south, and it had no longer now the river open to it. The Russian flotilla now occupied a position above the town, as it had the year before, below. Batteries were established on the opposite bank and on the islands, which took in reverse the defences of the place. It was thus blockaded and besieged at once in the closest manner, and every front enfiladed. The third parallel hugged the works in front, and the miners were busy below. No less than eleven mines were sprung along the counterscarp and the rampart, which opened such vast breaches, that the enemy's crowning batteries looked into the town, and prevented the besiegers from lining the interior works. But still the Russians did not dare to storm, and continued advancing step by step, trusting to the effects of famine and disunion.

"The garrison of Silistria has covered itself with glory in
"awaiting this last extremity. By small but continual sorties
"it sought to arrest the progress of the sappers, and to maintain
"its communications along the Danube to Rustchuk. It opposed
"the subterranean attack even within its own counterscarp, but

“ that which above all proves the talent and the obstinacy of
“ this garrison was the grand retrenchment made during the
“ siege behind the attacked front, and admirably linked to works
“ beyond it.

“ We cannot pass in silence the great sortie of the night of
“ the 3rd of June to repair the fault they had committed in
“ suffering the development during a single night of the third
“ parallel. Creeping on while yet dark, on the rising of the
“ moon they threw themselves in several columns into the third
“ parallel, and turning, or passing it, reached the second. But
“ as the Russians had received notice of the sortie, the trenches
“ were full, with reserves carefully concealed, to fall upon and
“ intercept them; the combat, therefore, degenerated into a
“ *melée* of musketry, and the Turks only regained the place
“ after a severe loss.

“ Silistria had resisted for six weeks, and sustained the open
“ trenches for twenty-seven days, which surpasses all expecta-
“ tion, in a place without exterior works, against a vigorous and
“ well-directed attack. The Russians, expecting an earlier suc-
“ cess, had not left out of their plan that of also taking Rust-
“ chuk.”

The General-in-Chief superintended the operations at Silistria, and from that point combined the passage of the Balkan. The first step was the establishment of an entrenched camp at Kaorgu; on an elevated position, at nearly an equal distance from Shumla, Pravodi, and Varna, and in a straight line with Silistria to the north. This camp was occupied by a flying body almost exclusively composed of light cavalry, whose business it was to be constantly in motion in all directions, striking any assemblage that might take place of the inhabitants, and accustoming them to these repeated movements in all directions. The Grand Vizier was engaged in his siege of Pravodi, to which he had been suffered to return, and where he employed 40,000 men, the entire dependence of the Ottoman Empire, for any operations in the field. DIEBITCH, for his intended movement, had to pass between Pravodi and Shumla; he had to bring up his troops from Silistria, and to collect those stationed within range of Varna; he had, therefore, to conceal these complicated operations from the knowledge of the Grand Vizier, and, in fact, from the whole of the Turkish forces opposed to them.

He conjectured DIEBITCH to be equally intent on his siege of Silistria, which place he had on his side abandoned to him. But the latter having broken the communications of the Turks by his flying camp, while he established his own, and having taken all credit from reported movements of his troops, suddenly, on the notice of his arrangements being completed, and also that

Pravodi was in danger (the intelligence was carried to him in twelve hours by one Circassian horse, the distance being 100 miles), he suddenly quits Silistria with 20,000 men. The flying corps of Kaorgu became a vanguard, and joined on the way by General ROTH, on the 10th his camp was placed at Madara, so as to cut off the retreat of the Grand Vizier to Shumla.

The latter began to be alarmed at the presence in that direction of Russian corps, but was far from suspecting that he had to deal with their main force and their Commander-in-Chief, and commenced his retreat on two lines, not even taking the most direct one. Marching during the night, on the morning of the 11th, he had reached the wooded plateau of Kouleftja, where, though in a good position, he was enveloped in one extensive ambuscade, immensely superior in numbers: the body accompanying the Grand Vizier, though composed of his best troops, could not have exceeded 15,000 men. On this a hunt, rather than a battle, began, and terrible execution was done by the Russian artillery on the Turks, who had nothing to oppose to it, and which was planted to catch them, like sportsmen's fowling-pieces at a battue. The conduct of the Turks bears out the simile. During the previous night they had almost crushed a brigade of cavalry and taken from it four guns; and in the morning two squares were cut down in one of their charges by the irregular horse. The result, however, of the day was a perfect dispersion, and the Grand Vizier escaped with only a few attendants to Shumla. The irregulars thought only of making their way to their homes, and even the Nizam threw away their muskets. It is difficult to say whether, in the operations of which this action is the result, the palm is borne away by the Russian General for his ability, or the Turkish General for his infatuation. Silistria had not fallen; Rustchuk had not even been attacked; Varna is never heard of, and Shumla scarcely seen; yet the campaign is now decided and the Ottoman Empire prostrate. All because the Nizam has been so much increased in strength, and improved in character, as to be adventured in the field, and, being so adventured, is not trusted to its own officers.

“It was impossible for DIEBITCH in the first moments to have
“apprehended the immense results of this brilliant victory; it
“required several days for him to convince himself that no
“obstacle remained to the passage of the Balkan. Shumla
“without an army had lost its importance, yet it could not be
“attacked since the inhabitants alone sufficed for its defence;
“and a column had been instantly pushed on Eski Stambul to
“prevent the remnants of the army (a large portion of which
“had not been even engaged) from entering the place. But to

“cross the Balkan, it required that Silistria should have fallen, “for otherwise, even in case of success, a peace could not have “been dictated. So soon as it had fallen (30th of June), the “troops gradually rejoined. The Grand Vizier was closely “invested, so as to lead him to believe that the efforts of the “Russians were now to be made against Shumla; the detach- “ments from the south were made to come in by day, while con- “stantly detachments for the north were being sent off by “night, he being, in the mean time, amused with offers of “peace, which he rejected with disdain.”

In the mean time the passage of the Kamjik was forced on the 17th and 18th of July, and on the 24th the left wing was in possession of Bourgas, and the right was marching by the mountains on Aidos. The Grand Vizier learned the movement only on the 21st, when the heights of the Balkan were already crowned, and thus was the passage effected behind a screen of Cossacks.

“But had the remote satraps of Turkey acted with the least “concert, a combined defence might have averted the catas- “trophe which menaced the Empire, and stayed the storm at “the last moment. It is, above all, to the Pashas of Widdin “and of Scutari that it belonged to make a powerful diversion “in Wallachia and succour Silistria. But the first displayed “weakness, the second ill will.”

The second, however, did appear with an overwhelming force, but only after peace was concluded. He appeared not in Wallachia or at Silistri, but at a more important point—on the banks of the Maritza. Never was there assembled a finer irregular army than the 25,000 men he commanded; but this chief, though bearing the name of Pasha, was, in reality, a Dere Bey. He knew that he himself must be the victim of the new organisation if it triumphed, and he was, moreover, deceived by the Russians, and his readiness to recommence the war after the SULTAN had given in, and when, but for the authority of the latter, he would have exterminated the Russians, arose from his discovery of the deception practised upon him. My amiable friend, since then has resisted the SULTAN on his own account; he has been beaten, and owes to his master's clemency a more secure authority than that which he had received from his forefathers. At all events, in a future war the troops of his Martial Pashalic would be led by a General, and not by an independent Baron.

The Russians, on arriving at Adrianople, had but 8000 men fit to mount guard, when they were saved by the Treaty of Adrianople, forced upon the Porte by the representatives of England and France. The English squadron was at the Dar-

danelles, and the Admiral, Sir PULTENEY MALCOLM, threatened of his own movement to bring it up; and so it happened that England and France *saved the Russians*, and gave to Russia the Treaty of Adrianople.

The contest has been described as a fight "between a blind man and a seeing one;" but, indeed, the analogy between the two parties does not come so close. The one was in a delirium, and the blows it dealt were the spasms of convulsion, rather than the misdirection of aim. The final and dramatic adventure may be compared to a man scaling the back of a whale, on the calculation that the monster is in torpor or in sleep.

It is, perhaps, a fortunate circumstance for Turkey that such was the event, for a shock, not less powerful, was requisite to break her torpor. It is, however, curious that the Russians, while teaching this lesson, were profiting in their turn, copying the Turks in the art of war, and picking up from them practices which they themselves were abandoning. On the second passage of the Danube, the Russian cavalry appeared with Turkish lances, and some of the regiments with Turkish scimitars; and during the winter, to prepare for the contemplated passage of the Balkan, DIEBITCH had sent to the Kalmuks on the steppes of the Caspian for a supply of those despised camels, by the destruction of which Russia has rendered desolate the steppes of the Euxine.

The reader may have in two quarters of an hour run through these pages; the subject has occupied the writer for many and anxious hours. It has carried him thousands of miles, and exposed him to privation and toil; he may therefore be suffered, though not professional, to offer an opinion respecting the practical inferences to be drawn from those two most important campaigns. It is this: Turkey wants no disciplined troops for her defence. People the Dobrója, ply the adze, work the pick-axe and shovel along the Danube, give shelter and walls to that race of warriors which she possesses in hundreds of thousands, and which no other nation has so much as thought of, and these trenches will become the tomb of every invading army.

There are two branches in which the Turks are pre-eminent: populations defending as garrisons their walls, and irregular horse. With the latter in sufficient numbers, and with chiefs under subordination, no invading army could make its way. This cavalry is almost as good on broken ground as infantry, and when it is in sufficient numbers it can dispense with infantry; it then acquires a wholly different character—that character, in a word, which made the Tartars, masters of the world. This body does still subsist in Turkey. It has not been used, or in so

trifling a degree as scarcely to be observed; but it is not destroyed. The Pashalic of Aleppo could alone furnish 40,000. It costs nothing in peace, and can be obtained in war for not more than the charge of the current expenses of the troopers. In Europe soldiers have to be made; in the East they are found. There is the risk of losing an innate spirit in the accidents that may break a fictitious discipline. It is next to insanity to endanger by any speculation, the warlike ignorance which gave to Turkey the results of 1828.

I am not debating the relative merits of the Nizam and the ancient system, but I wish to see neither destroyed by an improper mixture with the other. It was the misfortune of Turkey that the two systems were antagonistic. She may be soon called on again, when, if unsuccessful, the war will not terminate like that of 1829. It is imperative, therefore, on her to husband all her resources and to call forth all her energies. She will make a fatal mistake if she considers that for the defence of Bulgaria she must rely upon the Nizam. If she assumes the contrary as the basis, then she may superadd the powers of the Nizam. Let the plans be combined, but let not the bodies be confounded, or the systems mixed up together. Let each have free scope for its peculiar characters, and pride in its respective merits. Let it not forget the example of Kurtepe in 1828, and Koulefscha in 1829.

But if the Nizam is not wanted for the defence of Bulgaria, it is requisite for that of the Principalities. There it would be impolitic as well as dangerous to adventure Bashi Buzuks, Delhis, and Albanians, and therefore does the existence of this body place in the hands of the Porte the effectual means of carrying its defence from the Danube to the Pruth, and in keeping the war at a distance, render it impossible for Russia, whatever successes she obtains, to make an impression on the Empire. Whilst by carrying the war to that point, a combination between Russia and Austria is rendered impossible, and Austria, in fact, is restored to independence. The occupation of the Principalities affects Austria exactly as it affects Russia; from the Principalities Russia threatens at once two empires; the Principalities free, they menace her very existence. In a word, the safety of Europe requires a Turkish army (or its equivalent) in the Principalities in time of peace.

PART II.—THE ARMY.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGINAL INSTITUTION.

ANXIOUS spirits incessantly warn Europe against Russian art; time was, she was warned against Turkish arms. The travellers and statesmen of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries contrast with that of Europe the gallant bearing, the spirit and ardour, the discipline and sobriety of the Ottoman army which furnished the model, while the terror which the Empire inspired supplied the impulse for the creation of those armaments, which from the means of external defence have degenerated into a source of internal danger.

Our first knowledge of the Turks is as hordes devastating Europe. "The Turks encamped in Europe" was considered the felicitous expression of a profound truth, and the anticipation of an inevitable destiny; but the Ottomans stand in relation to the parent stock of Huns* as the present English Government to the ancient Goths. Its establishment in Europe was methodical, its advance rapid but progressive; it built there, and is again repairing.

Against no people who have attained to dominion can be less advanced the charge of ambition. Greatness was forced upon them by those at whose expense it was to be achieved. The Greeks have only themselves to blame if, like the Seljouks, they did not continue to the end to possess faithful allies in these terrible Ottomans.† The Ottomans knew only at the point of

* De Guignes selects that name for that of the whole race.

† "This good harmony between two Princes, natural enemies, arose from this, that the Sultan had extended the circle of his possessions less by encroachments on the Byzantine territory than on that of the Princes of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Wallachia, and of some Greek Commanders, who, profiting by the weakness of the Empire, had declared themselves independent."—Von Hammer, p. 252. French Ed.

the lance the Tartar hordes which devastated Europe and Asia. They advanced into the centre of Asia Minor to meet TIMOUR and his myriads, and at least diverted, by the shock, the avalanche from the Bosphorus. At Angora there was a Sultan defending, and a Sultan assailing the West: of the 120,000 men brought by BAYAZID against the 800,000 of TIMOUR, the only portion faithful to their colours were the contingents of the Christian tributaries of the Sultan of Adrianople. Against this invasion the Emperors of Constantinople raised not a hand; it followed that the line of Ottoman must ascend their throne.

The Mogul conquests present us always with the ideas of ferocity and numbers; the Ottomans were destitute of numbers, and could not exhibit the character of ferocity. Their achievements are, therefore, owing to other qualities—system and order. In tracing their development, I shall avoid generalisation and restrict myself to details, which would be dull, heavy, and uninteresting were we treating of most other people; but which in this case are relieved by the strangeness of the features, the greatness of the results, and the variableness of the events. The military branch includes the whole State. The Army was the estates of the kingdom. The Army had its Courts of Law, and its operations on the field have never been abandoned to the caprice of a Court or a Cabinet. In tracing, then, the progress of the Administration, which constituted the strength and furnished the conquests of the Empire, we follow also that of its ideas and polity.

The Ottomans placed between Christians in Europe and Mussulmans in Asia were prevented, by animosity of race from incorporating the one, by antipathies of religion from assimilating the other. Yet, to draw from both a military and political force that should be imbued with the spirit of the dominant race; to entrust the sword of Islam to Christian hands, and yet preserve the Mussulman supremacy; were the only conditions upon which this tribe could emerge from its insignificance. This was effected by the Janissary organisation.

The first modest step was the investiture of ERTOGRUL, chief of a tribe of 400 tents, in the Emirship of Eski Sheher, by ALAHEDDIN, Sultan of the Seljouks, in whose territory his tribe had long pastured its flocks. This occurred in consequence of a victory over a horde of Tartars. His success is attributed to a body of light horse, the name of which is one “which, for “two centuries and a half, was the terror of Germany and of “Hungary*—Akinji.”

OSMAN, the second prince of this dynasty, who was the

* Von Hammer, vol. i. p. 59.

founder of its greatness, achieved his small but remarkable successes by the valour of his tribe, and by the aid of the Akinji. His son, URKHAN, first instituted (1320) a regular infantry. They were called *Piadè* and *Yaya*—the first the old Persian word for a foot soldier, the second Turkish, with the same signification—names which indicate a departure from local ideas and tribe habits. These were, like the troops of the Egyptians, Arabs, Jews, and Mongols, organised by tens, by hundreds, and by thousands, and the names of their officers have remained to this day. They were permanently on foot, and regularly paid. This, however, was but a first essay—a prelude to that great discovery in the art of war, which recalled and rivalled the Roman legion and the Macedonian phalanx.

It does not appear that any discipline was established, or manual exercise introduced. Permanency and “*disponibilité*” were the stages then reached, but insubordination soon displayed itself; the SULTAN took frequent counsel with his brother ALLAEDDIN, who refused the share he offered him of his flocks to become the peaceful pastor of his people, and with TCKENDERELI, the founder of a family of Vizeers, like the Barmecides or the Kiupruli. In the Council of these remarkable men was worked out a new plan, the honour of which is principally due to the last, who lived to see his small community, without incurring a single defeat,* transformed by means of it to an empire.

The corps was not of a uniform character, but composed of three orders, distributed as follows:—

Yenitcheri, 62 Buluks (squadrons).

Segbans, 33 Oda (chambers).

Yayas, 100 Djemaat (companies).

The first alone consisted of the new levies; the second were the hunting household of the SULTAN; the third an incorporation of the Yayas. Each company had four grades of officers, whose titles were taken from the household establishment, as Chief Soupmaker (Captain), Chief Cook (Lieutenant), &c. The Chief of the Segbans (Huntsmen) commanded the whole. The staff was composed of four officers, whose titles were derived from the chase. The *Yaya Beys*—of whom there were fourteen—were distinguished by a *bounkhak*, or horsetail. A legal officer was attached to each company to regulate its relations with the local authorities, or with other corps. Their name was placed first in the firmans addressed to the body. Promotion followed one undeviating course, until the office of Aga was instituted by

* The destruction of a Turkish force in Bulgaria was a surprise in time of peace—not a defeat in war.

SELIM II. No Sultan before him had interfered in its internal organisation. That it possessed, and was intended to possess, a large share of independence is unquestionable. It is a solitary instance of a military institution so constituted by a Sovereign. It was, in fact, a Parliament, or rather the old Tartar Currultai. Securities for a people's liberties in the shape of checks have always had their root in ancient custom, and have been antecedent to legislation. The Ottomans present an example of the reverse. No Sovereign of modern Europe has had so many checks imposed upon him by his people as the early Sovereigns of the Ottomans imposed upon themselves.

We have been accustomed to see in the institution of the Janissaries a forced abduction and apostasy of Christian children. The facts I have cited dispose in a great measure of these objections; but still the sixty-two Buluks, which properly constituted the Janissary corps, might be justly obnoxious to the charge. These, however, were originally composed of prisoners as their life was held forfeit, their enrolment might be considered rather a grace than an oppression. Nothing appears to show that the profession of Islam was a condition of service;* to a comparatively recent period Christians were enrolled, and under circumstances which will not admit of the supposition of informality.†

The body was recruited from the tribute children, restricted to a thousand a year, and taken from the Bosnians, the Greeks (of Morea), the Bulgarians, and the Armenians. This is doubtless an infraction of the institutions of MAHOMET, which impose on the Rayas the poll-tax in lieu of military service. It would appear, however, that the districts whence they were taken were not at the time incorporated in the Empire. These children might become Mussulmans, but there was no constraint.‡

* The Chiefs of the Buluks wore red boots, the others yellow; this being the distinction between the two creeds. The first must have been Christian. The Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia were invested with the Janissary *caouk* and heron plume, which, consequently, could not have been regarded as a religious distinction. The Sultan was enrolled as a common Janissary, and it is singular that the body which he selected was the one thus distinguished as Christian, so that the intention must have been to put down religious animosities.

† D'Ohsson mentions the case of an Armenian patriarch, who, having learned that he was to be arrested, enrolled himself in an orta of Janissaries over night. Next day the officers found the patriarchat in possession of the orta, assembled to protect their comrade against the Sultan's order. The sleeve of Hadji Bechtash did not desecrate the Christian Primate, and he could wear at pleasure the mitre and the caouk—head dresses, which in fact closely resembled each other.

‡ "It was rarely that force had to be employed; the parents solicited as a favour the admission of their sons into the corps. The levies took place once every two or three years. The recruits received their education in the ortas of the Adjemi Oglans, where they were instructed in the Mussulman religion. . . . However, the young Christians were not constrained to change their faith: to this the maxims of the Government were opposed no less than the precepts of the Coran."—*Tableau de l'Empire Ottoman*, tom. vii. page 327.

The Spahis, a body neither less celebrated nor less important than the Janissaries, equally sprang from the Yayas. The SULTAN had the right of settling conquered lands, but this settlement once made was irrevocable. By it was fixed the rate of tribute paid in kind, and the feudal plan was immediately followed in all the conquered countries.

These lands were divided into four classes—

Khass Houmayoum ;

Khass Vuzera ;

Khass Umura ;

Khass Arpalik.

The first constituted the demesne and revenue of the SULTAN, and was in the nature of petty sergeanty ; the second and third were in the nature of grand sergeanty, the appanage of the high officers of state, whether general functionaries or local governors ; the fourth, literally “barley money,” was distributed into lesser portions, and supported the Spahis.

The fiefs were divided into two classes—the Timars or Knights, with less than 20,000 *aspers** revenue ; Zaims or Barons, with more than that, since they had to furnish one Spahi, termed Djebelu or Cuirassier, for every 3000 *aspers* or *kilich* (sword). There were Zaims, who were followed by 30. They could redeem themselves from service at the rate of 50 piastres per man. This body amounted under SOLEYMAN to 200,000.† The Pashas had to furnish, for their fiefs, Djebelus at the rate of one for every 5000 *aspers* ; and at this rate their contingent would have amounted to 250,000. Thus the fiefs of the Empire supported nearly 450,000 cavalry.

When called out they were under the orders of the Beglerbeys of the Province or Sandjak (flag). They were recruited from sons of Spahis (the parentage being duly testified) and were consequently termed Teskerelees, or “certificated ;” whilst those in the gift of the Pashas, and who were appointed under them, were known as Teskeresiz, or “without certificate.” A supplementary allowance was given from the Treasury for every enemy slain in battle—fourteen entitled to a Ziamet.‡ They were only required to follow the standard of the SULTAN himself. This Order, while emanating from a line of martial Princes, was above all things calculated to maintain in the chief of the State those soldierlike qualities the signet of which has been so peculiarly stamped on the race of OSMAN. When the

* This word is supposed to be derived from the *ασπρον* of the Greeks, as applied to white money or silver ; but we find it in the oldest Oriental writers, as, for instance, in the Dabistan, where it is a measure of years. It seems to be most likely to have meant a “horseman’s pay,” from *asp*, a horse in Persian,

† D’Ohsson, vol. vii. page 375.

‡ Origin of the practice of presenting heads.

SULTAN no longer took the field, the Turkish chivalry lost its vigour, and, it is remarked by a writer of the sixteenth century, that the Spahis were then so degraded that they did not dare to inquire if the SULTAN did, or did not, march in person.

The idea of this feudal organisation is attributed to ALLA EDDIN, who proposed thereby to simplify the administration, and to give the army an interest "in preserving as well as in conquering." It is not, however, uncommon for the discovery to be made, of things as old as the hills. The feudal system must have been the original system of all conquest, for it is the most perfect and most simple ever devised. It is in the nature of a clear-sighted and upright people, and requires no precedents or antecedents; such a people will be always found, under similar circumstances, doing the same thing. Of course that which is simple will never be hit upon by a people used up in speculation; nor can one which implies great reliance on the fidelity of subordinates be dreamt of when that character is wanting; the system, if introduced, would be, in that case, as bad as in the other it is the reverse.

We find, however, not merely coincidences in early times, but the use of terms which immediately connect the institution of ALLAEDDIN with early Tartar usage. Spahi is the name they have left in India (Sepoy); *Mansoub*, the Turkish designation of "charge" or "office," is the name in Tartary for fief; and under the old Mahabadian dynasty of India, "Timari" was the title of an officer appointed in each district for "the protection of the helpless"—a designation which might well be given to the Timariots of Turkey, who were enjoined and empowered to be the protectors of the peasantry attached to the fiefs.

In most countries the acquisition of a horse is the first sign of the improved condition of the man. This is particularly the case with Turks. The feudatories, as their circumstances improved, mounted themselves and their followers; and thus the Piade became cavalry. To this period must be referred the formation of the Turkish breed of horses to which so much of their superiority was owing,† and which they could not have brought with them, being originally so small a tribe.

* Dabistan, vol. i. p. 173.

† THE SADDLE THAT DOES NOT GALL AND THE TWO MEALS A DAY.

A military friend thus writes:—"The Turks before the introduction of European discipline rode well, and had a good breed of little spirited horses. A wretched system of riding was introduced by their instructors, and a breed of horses comparatively spiritless and worthless.

"The English and French cavalry (since the campaign of Africa) is every day riding shorter, or returning to the method which the Turks have abandoned. Of his equestrian qualities, the Turk now only retains his fondness for the horse, his care in tending him, and a habit (the relic of the pastime of throwing the jereed) of charging with great rapidity."

These feudatories dwelt throughout the country with their vassals. The distinction of creed, which established in this case a line of demarcation as to military service, prevented the inhabitants from mingling with the vassals, and, consequently, the amalgamation between the conquerors and the conquered which followed the feudal establishments in Europe. But it possessed this advantage, that the land was never seized on by the feudal chiefs. The Spahilic remained in Turkey as distinctly a tax, or impost, as the tithe does in England, and no more would a Timariot have pretended to the proprietorship of his Arpalik than the Rector in England to that of his parish. The Beneficium, or Feud, retained in Turkey to the close of the system the character which it possessed at the beginning, and, while it never usurped the land from the occupiers, it never denied its obligation of service to the State. This is, in fact, the secret of the elasticity of Turkey. That "cheap defence of nations" was to it not, indeed, cheap, but it has proved lasting; and the resumption of the feudal tithe by the Government after the phases of vigour, power, corruption, and decay had been passed through, is an event without a parallel. The administration is thus replaced in all its primitive simplicity, and it only requires ideas to be equally free to have a society in a condition such as it was when it emerged from the Desert.

The Agab, a new class of infantry, arose to replace the Yayas, a sort of Cossacks on foot, as the Akinji were Cossacks on horseback—without the pay of the Janissaries, or the fiefs of the Spahis. Their name (literally *expeditus*) became scarcely less terrible than that of Spahis, Janissaries, or Akinji. The four bodies (the number *four* is peculiarly affected by the Mussulmans) complete the original of this military organisation; unpaid and irregular cavalry and infantry, and regular and paid cavalry and infantry; of these four bodies, one only was paid out of the Treasury.

As the system developed itself, and the Empire expanded, various additions were made, and modifications took place. The principal are:—The formation of a body guard drafted from the regular bodies; the institution of provincial troops; and the addition of various corps required by changes in the instruments of war, or for the conducting of siege operations.

The household troops were first instituted by ORKHAN, and were composed of four Buluks, or companies of cavalry. They were imitated from the corps created by the Kalif OMAR, for the guard of the Sandjak Sheriff, and had the same title, *Bulukiat Harbiyah*. They were raised by recruitment—at least such is the inference from the names, *Onloafaji*, or "receiving pay;" and *Gourba*, "stranger." They were each divided into

sol and *sagh*, or right and left. Their number was at first only 2400.

The guard, however, was soon increased by four odas of Janissaries (named *Solak*), by feudal cavalry (*Spahis*) and *Selikdars* (esquires), and at a later period by *Bostangis*, enrolled in the Janissaries, and *Salastors*, who, like the Immortals, were bound by oath never to fly, and were employed on the western frontiers. The six bodies of cavalry had, like the corps of the Chinese, peculiar flags. The *Spahis*, like the Janissaries, red; the *Selikdars*, yellow; the *Buluks* were green and white, green and red, and white and red. The feudal cavalry received a supplementary pay; being permanent, they were distinguished from the other by the name of *Odjak* (fireplace), and were carried, the *Spahis* to 10,000, the *Selikdars* to 8000. This body became of great political importance, and in the feuds of the capital constituted the balance between the two factions of Janissaries and *Spahis*.

The provincial troops were termed *Ayalet*, *Asheri*, and *Yerli Neferat*. The first were those levied for war at the expense of the province, though probably receiving only on enlistment an equipment; the second was a local defensive militia. The provincial levies are mentioned as *Levend-Segban* (corrupted into *Leymen*). These must have been the Huntsmen of the Pashas, for they are distinct from the *Segban* Janissaries, and bore such inveterate hatred to them that the provinces were repeatedly convulsed by their feuds. There are other provincial troops, such as *Sarigis*, Yellow-caps, *Yuruks* and *Janbazan* (*Enfants-Perdus*). The government levied in the provinces in time of war other bodies, termed *Miri Askeri*, or, "troops paid from the Treasury."*

The command of these troops was thus distributed. The Janissaries were under their own officers. The *Spahis* under the *Beglerbeys*, named by the SULTAN. The command of the *Akinjis* was hereditary in the house of MICHAEOGLU, which had early joined the Ottomans, and claimed to descend from the Byzantine Emperors. When the civil administration under Pashas was organised, they were generally also *Beglerbeys*, and they consequently brought into the field the provincial contingents, together with their *Segban* and the *Dyebelus*, which they had to furnish for their fiefs. Thus commenced the inordinate power of the Pashas.

A TURKISH tribe is military in all its movements, habits, and equipments. No uniform was therefore requisite; indeed, our

* *Dol Keledgi*, naked sabres.

Serden Guetchdijes, who have surrendered their heads.

Gunulas, volunteers (rabble).

first uniform in Europe was the adoption of their ordinary dress.* Still there are evident traces of the plan of giving a distinct costume, at least to the regular army, and uniform colours to particular corps. Thus the white felt cap in URKAN's time distinguished the whole military service. The Janissaries adopted a peculiar dress. Various Odas had particular costumes.† The corps had, as in our army, colours corresponding with their uniforms. The idea of uniformity in dress was not peculiar to the Ottomans. At the review of his troops before entering Asia Minor, TIMOUR is mentioned as commending greatly the contingents from Samarkand, because each body was uniformly dressed.‡ The distinction which we associate with the colour of a flag, was formerly in the East observed in the dress of the person.

The Ottomans have ever aimed at dignity and splendour; and careful as they were to distinguish by dress every class of the people and their subjects, the army must have been in both respects peculiarly the field for the exhibition of this national taste. Their costumes, as preserved down to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have exercised the pencil and graver of TITIAN; but the most perfect record of the Turkish uniforms is to be found in the first *Illustrated News*, published weekly at Vienna during the second siege, each number of which contained a characteristic woodcut of a Turkish soldier or officer, and an account of the corps to which he belonged.

I have said that the first uniforms were devised at Samarcand. From the Highlands of Tartary, where the warlike spirit would naturally first have arisen, other branches of service seem to have derived their origin.

The ancient Greeks attributed to the Turks (Medes) the first distribution of the army into separate corps. In the account transmitted by the Dabistan of the Mahabadian dynasty, mention is made of regular discipline and of an established order of battle. "They were drawn up in right, centre, and left columns,"§ and this has been the basis of the military organisation which through all vicissitudes has descended to our times. The organisation by threes, which pervades every portion of our service, is clearly derived from a people whose strength was cavalry;|| for the horse being in length three times his front width, three horses presented the same front when wheeled to a

* Travellers in Turkistan have been struck by the close resemblance of bodies of horse to troops of hussars. We still, in the language of Europe, preserve the Turkish names of parts of the uniform, thus, calbek, dolman, &c.

† The Peiks wore the uniform of the Byzantine guards, green velvet, with gilt helmet and black plume. Harbadjis, red. Tufenkjis (sharpshooters), green.

‡ Shirrifiddin, chap. 44, V. Hammer, v. ii. p. 83.

§ Dabistan, vol. i. page 178.

|| The French move by fours.

flank. This, then, formed the molecule, and according to it the whole body was moved. As this could hold neither for chariots nor for infantry, and as the ancients did not use cavalry in line, their tradition of the derivation of discipline and distribution from the Turks is amply borne out. It is true that another order prevailed amongst the successors of ALEXANDER, derived from the Indians, whose system was based upon the elephant; such may be found to-day in our order for artillery. The progression rose by multiplication, as one, two, four, eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and sixty-four, which was the phalanx complete, corresponding with the sixty-four squares of the chess-board, that image of war falsely attributed to the Trojan contest, wherein no elephants were used.

I now come to that most interesting subject — Turkish Artillery. The great arm of antiquity after the sabre was the bow and arrow, to which the term “artillery” was applied. Taschend, the ancient city of Tokaristan, was called the “Mother of the Bow;” and from the general name of Tokara, whence has come Turkistan and Turk, has probably been derived *τοξα*. In the old Coman language, “sageth” means arms generally, whence *sagitta*. The helmet and buckler of the Greeks are connected both in fact and name with the same country.*

Familiarised with the use of projectiles in war, it is to be expected that they would soon adopt gunpowder, the knowledge of which is now admitted to have been very ancient amongst the Chinese. But it is a question whether the Chinese did not derive it from them. Such is the opinion of the principal writers among the Jesuits.† This is to be inferred from the general course of inventions, which the Chinese appear to have almost universally derived from Tartary. When ROMULUS was marking out the limits of his new city, gunpowder was already known, and two thousand years before the birth of SCHWARTZ pieces of ordnance had been cast in China.‡ The Moors used guns in Spain in the beginning of 1200, if not in 1100. The distance between the employment of this instrument in the defence of a city to its use on board a vessel, or on a battle-field, is still as great as that which geographically separated the first casters of guns from the places where they are at present so much employed.

The claims of the Chinese having now been generally admitted, it is supposed that ordnance reached Europe through the

* These points will be illustrated in the early history of the Turkish race, originally intended to precede this volume.

† Gaubil and Visselou.

‡ M. Parony : Report to the Academy of Sciences, 1850

Moors of Spain, or the Venetians.* Neither, however, had any connexion with China. It is unaccountable that it should not have been perceived that the Turks, who conquered the northern portion of China, in the early part of the thirteenth century, were established all round the Black Sea, with the exception of a strip between Varna and the Bosphorus. It is now doubted whether, indeed, the Black Prince did use guns at the battle of Cressy, but there is no doubt that MURAD I. had before then employed them at the battle of Cossovo; on both sides they were used, the Turks having already instructed the populations with whom they were at war.

Employing artillery in the field it was easy (reversing the process in Europe) to apply it to fortresses; the peculiar nature of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles invited to its use. To the batteries placed above Constantinople is attributed the fall of that city, the supplies from the Black Sea being cut off. At a subsequent period, and after the Venetians had penetrated into the Sea of Marmora, they equally fortified the Dardanelles. The enormous calibre of the guns placed there still astonish the traveller, and their effect has been proved on our line-of-battle ships, on the only occasion on which the passage has been attempted.

In the campaign that followed the capture of Constantinople they had three hundred guns. Their siege-train was equally remarkable for weight of metal and number of guns. At the siege of Scutari they cast into the place shot of fourteen hundred weight. At that of Neuhäusel, in Hungary, on the first day, seven hundred shot were gathered by the besieged of not less than three palms in diameter. The largeness of calibre was not the only point on which they anticipated modern invention.† They employed red-hot shot at the siege of Vienna. The howitzer seems also to have been an invention of theirs, and also its successive improvements, and even down to the time of SELIM III. they ran ahead of Europe in invention. One species, adopted by the Russians under the name of "Unicorn,"‡ gave

* "A Venetian paterera of wrought-iron in the repository of Woolwich, which is one of the earliest specimens extant (two and a half inches bore, two feet five inches length), it is *loaded at the breech* by a movable chamber seven and a half inches long secured by a wedge. As this piece is similar to the old Chinese guns, which are supposed to have been adapted to the embrasure of the great wall in the third century before Christ, it has been presumed that the Venetians derived it from their early intercourse with the Celestial Empire through the Black Sea."—Chesney's Fire-arms, p. 49.

† "The Musée de l'Artillerie at Paris, contains, however, a Turkish culverine, which seems to have been one of the earliest light guns that were made in Europe. The tube of this piece is formed of several sections, which are firmly joined to each other by nuts and screws, and it *loads at the breech* by means of a movable chamber."—Chesney's Fire-arms, p. 56.

‡ "European Powers appear to have made the mistake of adopting the short in

rise to the Paixhan gun for red-hot shot and horizontal shells, which is about to produce such a revolution in naval warfare.

Scientific men in Europe anticipate one further change—the substitution in ordnance of steel for cast iron. The Turks have again anticipated us, by sending to the Exhibition of 1851 a nine-pounder of damasked steel. They also sent three muskets of ingenious contrivance, loading at the breech.*

With this instinct for warlike instruments, and as the first introducers of artillery into European warfare, their corps of artillery must have occupied an important place in their armies. The same instinct extended to fortifications. Administrative disorder has prevented the application, and, therefore, seeing the dilapidation of their walls, and the neglect of all sorts of works which has prevailed for a couple of centuries or more, those statements must appear extraordinary and incredible, but they rest on indubitable authority. They first used flanking walls and mined glacis. They first made regular approaches, and devised the system of zig-zags and parallels. The latter were distinctly planned at the siege of Zege-detty, under SOLEYMAN; and the former are mentioned at that of Candia, though of a peculiar fashion, and overlying each other as the scales of a fish. They also first introduced mining, and even before the use of gunpowder reduced cities by *burning* down the curtains of the wall.†

The various corps introduced by these adaptations consisted of *Topjis* (artillery men, from *Top*, a “gun”), *Djebedjis* (armourer—*he* *Djibellu* were “wearers of cuirasses”), *Douloum-jis* (miners), *Coumbarajis*, *Martoloses*, *Top-Arabajis*, *Woinaks*, &c. (bombardiers, sappers, train and waggon men). So important was this branch, that of four bodies enumerated as receiving a largesse on the opening of the Polish war of 1672,

preference to the long howitzers, with the exception of the Turks, from whom General Osmolski, of the Polish army, captured one of the longer and more efficient weapons in 1745. It is understood that Romanowicz, a Hungarian General, used one of these pieces about 1765; and during the struggle previous to the partition of Poland in 1772, the Russians took some howitzer-guns, which they adopted under the name of unicorns. A Turkish piece, in the Repository at Woolwich, nearly corresponding with our twenty-four pounder howitzers, bears the date of 1805, when many others were cast by order of Sultan Selim.

“A battery of unicorns was taken from the Russians by the French after it had done good service at the battle of Smolensko. Napoleon, on seeing the captured gun next morning, is said to have exclaimed, ‘Ce sont ces diables là, qui nous ont attrapés de si loin hier.’ An improved instrument of this kind was the consequence of their attracting Napoleon’s attention; and the celebrated Paixhans’ gun, which now takes a prominent place both by land and sea, subsequently appeared. On one of these, and that of almost the smallest calibre, has been based the new system of field artillery by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, according to which a twelve-pounder howitzer-gun is hereafter to serve for every purpose in the field.”—Chesney’s *Fire-arms*, p. 319.

* It must be borne in mind that this was written in 1852, not 1863.

† The process is described in the *Memoirs of Timour*.

two of them are the Djebedjis and Topjis, the other two are the Janissaries and Spahis.

In appreciating their military organisation, it is not to be overlooked that the Ottomans suddenly created for themselves a marine. The Romans did so likewise, but they, ages before, had navigated the Mediterranean from Egypt to the Pillars of HERCULES. The Turks up to that moment knew nothing of the sea; yet their vessels were the models of those built in France in the time of LOUIS XIV., which we have been so glad to capture and to copy. They recently had the finest line-of-battle ship, frigate and corvette, afloat.

The Spahis and Selikdars of the guard received a pay besides their fiefs. There were enrolled Spahis (*Spahis Oglan*) and Janissaries (*Adjam Oglan*)—the first without fiefs, the second without pay; also, associated Janissaries without pay (*Yoldash*); retired Janissaries received fiefs. Other feudatories, *Ghedecks*, were engaged in the civil service of the Porte, but were bound to serve on being called out. The *Mosseleman* were a special and small body of cavalry with fiefs. There were other cavalry corps which seem to have been raised by different Sultans. *Beshlees* (hussars) *Djebellus*, like the Mamelukes, bought slaves; *Serdenghetchdis* (forlorn hope). The Segban, like the old dragoons, served on foot, or on horseback.

The whole may be thus divided:—

1. Permanent troops (Janissaries, hired Cavalry, and Regimented Spahis of the guard, artillery, &c.).

2. Feudal troops.

3. Provincial troops (*Ayalet Askeri*).

If we take the end of the sixteenth century, we may reckon the troops at—

Permanent:

Janissaries	50,000
Spahis, say	250,000
Artillery, Armourers, &c.	50,000
Guards, besides those drafted from Janissaries and Spahis	

War Levies:

Akinji	40,000
Ayab*	100,000
Ayalet Askeri (cavalry)	40,000
Miri Askeri (infantry)	100,000

Of these, the Janissaries, Artillery, and the Guards were alone a charge on the Treasury.†

* These, at the second siege of Vienna, were calculated to vary from 80,000 to 150,000.

† A statistical Memoir, presented to the Sultan in 1652 (see Von Hammer, vol. x.

Here we find combined permanent and disciplined infantry and cavalry with irregular foot and horse; a feudal establishment with provincial armaments, and forces conjointly raised as tribute, by conscription, by enlistment, and by estates. By the economy of the arrangement the SULTAN could bring these enormous armies into the field simultaneously in the heart of Europe and Asia.

One constant order of battle was observed—that adopted by MURAD I. at Iconium, in 1386, against the Karaman Emirs. The Provincial troops of Asia formed the right wing; those of Europe the left. The centre was composed of regular bodies of cavalry and infantry, the Janissaries forming the front line; the six Buluks were either in the centre of the centre, or formed the reserve. In Europe, the European contingents occupied the right wing.

The value of the military system of the Ottomans can be appreciated only by what it has accomplished. The tribe of OGRUL numbered but 400 tents; for a whole generation it dwelt peacefully in its Bithynian pastures. Its place on earth was so humble that it had, with presents of cheese and butter, lambs and wool, to bespeak the protection of the commander of a Greek fort for its heavy movables, whilst it shifted for the summer, to its mountain feeding-ground. Another generation elapses, and the Janissary sword with its twofold edge is menacing Europe and Asia. The name, then ungiven, of OSMAN has become terrible to every neighbour, and marvellous throughout the globe.

The tribe commenced its career of conquest through a quarrel with the Greek commander, and surprised his fort. It then repulsed a Tartar tribe, and its Emir was consequently invested by the Seldjouk SULTAN with the government of a town. It then proceeds to war with its petty neighbours in Asia, crosses to Europe, makes war on all its tribes from the Danube nearly to the Adriatic. Folding back on Asia, it overthrows the descendants of GENGIS KHAN, subjugates successfully the nine States which had sprung up on the ruins of the Seljuks, which these Tartars

p. 450), sets the Janissaries down at 55,000. The Spahis were entered only at 29,000, which refers to those receiving additional pay. The whole account of numbers, revenue, and expenditure is incomprehensible, in consequence, I imagine, of the distinction not being made between the revenue which entered the Treasury, and that which went directly to the support of fiefs.

In a treatise of Hadji Khalfa, proposing a new financial organisation, the total amount of soldiers paid by the State, in the time of Suleyman, is set down at 41,000; the expenditure for them at 122 millions of aspers. They increased gradually, until, under Mustapha, they amounted to 100,000, and were reduced at the end of the reign of Murad IV. to 59,000, at an expense of 253 millions of aspers. The enormous disproportion between these figures and the armies in the field, prove that the mass of the army was supported from other sources, viz. those I have mentioned in the text.

had overthrown. It then beats the armies of the Byzantine Empire wherever they appear as foes; humbles the Bulgarians, Serbians, Albanians, and reduces the Emperor of the East to the condition of a vassal. It has at once to combat polished States in their decline, and nomade people in their rudeness and vigour; it has for foes, strangers whose tongue and manners are unknown to it, whose religion is hostile, and compatriots of the same tongue, habits, and belief. It has to deal with disciplined armies, with experienced generals, with mountain defences, roving populations, deserts, and fortresses; it has seas and rivers to cross, multitudes and distance to overcome, and is equal to every fortune.

Yet here no CONFUCIUS or MAHOMET proclaimed a creed, no LYCURGUS instituted laws, no ALFRED or CYRUS restored freedom to an oppressed people, no ROMULUS collected refugees within an asylum, no CLIVE or ALEXANDER led forth an army of high discipline against nations destitute of its terrible energies, no PIZARRO or ALBUKERQUE brought to bear unknown instruments of destruction. It had no Tartar horse; no ATILA or ALARIC conducted innumerable hordes to devastate the earth. Whence, then, this expansive power? Its military order and political discipline. All other things it had in common with its neighbours. These alone, were peculiar to itself.

But the system was not twofold. In one bond were united tactics and jurisprudence. The statesman who planned the Janissary body was himself Grand Judge of the Army. The SULTAN, who instituted them, pretended to no "Prerogative of war and peace." The lawfulness of war was provided for together with the means of conquest.* The institutes of MAHOMET are common to all Mussulmans, but no other Mussulman power has provided to the same extent in this respect for their execution, nor consequently enjoyed to the same degree the benefits of their wise provisions. In this the Ottomans resembled the Romans no less than in their organisation, and no more could Sultan or people, than Consul or people, engage the State in a war at their own caprice. Thus both empires combined the elements of strength with the secret of longevity, by associating discipline with law: and so it was that in both cases a small community expanded into a vast empire.

A century and a quarter elapsed between the institution of the Yayas to the conquest of Constantinople, and by that time, independently of achievements against the Greeks, its Janissaries, and Azeb, Akinjis, and Spahis† had made their valour and dis-

* This subject treated in the chapter, "Political Character of Islam." This chapter has since been printed in the "East and the West," by the Hon. H. Stanley, who has added valuable notes to it.—ED. D. R.

† Paolo Giovio thus describes the employment and action of these various troops:

cipline felt by all surrounding nations in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Serbians, Bosnians, and Hungarians received a signal overthrow on the Morizza in 1363; the Turkish princes of Asia Minor at Iconium in 1386. Three years later was fought the first great battle of Kossovo in Serbia, where the Sclavonian confederacy was broken. Some years later the great array of the Chivalry of the West, under SIGISMUND, was mown down at Nicopolis. Six years later, the Sultan surnamed "Lightning" met the hordes of Timour at Angura, and the catastrophe, for which the Tartar was more indebted to the vain-gloriousness of his antagonist than to the numerical superiority of his own forces, did not prevent the recovery of the consistency of the Empire ten years later on the field of Chamourli. Thirty years later, for the first time they were defeated by Hungarians at Vasag, but their superiority was immediately reasserted in the memorable field of Varna (1444), and again at the second battle of Kossovo (1448), when the armies of Hungary, Transylvania, Bosnia, and Serbia were destroyed, and the feudal aristocracy of the latter swept root and branch from the earth. Five years later Constantinople fell. From this period it occupied three quarters of a century to extend their Empire northward to the Dnieper, westward into the centre of Hungary, southward through Syria and Egypt to Nubia, through Asia Minor or Mesopotamia, till it reached from the Tigris to the Adriatic, from the cataracts of the Tanais to those of the Nile. In the various battles fortune seems scarcely to have wavered, for in all this course of time they experienced but two reverses.

For a century and a half their power did not advance, but the tide stood full. They gained two great battles. The hardly fought and scarcely lost battle of St. Gothards, in 1664, marked the period of their greatness. Still was it followed by a Treaty which placed in their hands the bulwark of Hungary, while eight years later they were in possession of Podolia, and had disposed of the Ukraine.

The first heavy blow was the Treaty of Kainardgi, by which the Crimea was detached, and the large tract from the mouth of the Donetz to the Bug was ceded to Russia—a territory not indeed an integral portion of the Empire, but of which the value consisted in keeping Russia back from the Black Sea. Eight years later a corresponding tract to the east of the sea of Azof was incorporated with Russia. In 1792 (Treaty of Jassy) the limits of Russia were further advanced from the Bug to the

—"First come the Akinji, or Tartars, and sweep on till they find resistance. Then come the Azeb, upon whom the enemy may fight themselves weary, and when it is a fortress that is attacked they fill up the ditches with their bodies, in order to let the Janissaries pass on to the assault."

Dneister. In 1812 (Treaty of Bucharest) they advanced to the Pruth.

On the Austrian side, were lost by the Treaties of Carlovitz and Passarovitz, Transylvania and the thirteen counties of Hungary, and finally the strip of Moldavia known as the Bukovina. All these, however, were outlying portions of the Empire, and either tributary or protected States. The Ottoman State as it existed under SULEYMAN has suffered no diminution to the north or west; but at the period of the extinction of the Janissaries, or rather after the disastrous war that followed, Turkey was shattered. Its provinces stood each by itself. A reconquest of the Empire to the Nizam had to be undertaken, as if the Empire had to be refounded.

But the disorganisation evinced in the series of defeats which, commenced at St. Gothard, had affected for two generations the whole institutions. Its balance had been maintained not by chambers and estates, but by the urban and territorial militia, three bodies of distinct character. Instead of the sons of the Spahis succeeding their fathers, the fiefs were set up to sale by the women of the Seraglio, and the public posts were monopolised by their creatures and common mountebanks. The lowest rabble of Constantinople was incorporated in the Ordus. The discipline of both bodies was consequently relaxed, and the doors of parasites were besieged by expectants, dependants, and adventurers, whilst the high officers of State, losing legitimate power, sustained themselves by the factions which they formed amongst the rival corps of these corrupted soldiers. The life and office of the SULTAN and his ministers were determined by barrack cabals and street conspiracies. The Buluks were infected by the disorder of the corps from which they were drawn, and there remained no longer any curb save that furnished by their mutual jealousies. One of the worst effects of this disorder was that the Spahis used their influence at the capital and their power in the provinces to extort the offices of farmers of revenue, whilst the multiplied charges fell upon the Empire with such terrible effect that whole provinces were devastated. The increase of exactions entailed decrease of revenue, and to supply the deficiency of the treasury recourse was had to deterioration of the coin. In the last four years of the sixteenth century, specie fell one-half in intrinsic value,* and thence those violent

* Up to 1584, the *oke* (two pounds and three-quarters) of silver was coined into five hundred aspers. It was in a couple of years coined into more than one thousand. By connivance between a Jew banker and the Beglerbey of Roumely, a new coinage for the payment of the troops was nearly as much deteriorated. This was the occasion of the first insurrection against the Sultan. The Beglerbey lost his head; the garrisons of Pesth, Ofen and Tabreez revolted and killed their pashas. In four years there were three revolts of Janissaries, each followed by the destruction of a Grand Vizier. They soon after took to slaughtering Sultans.

convulsions which deluged the capital with blood incessantly threatened the ruin of the Empire.

Against the Janissaries were rallied at this time the SULTAN, the Spahis, the Ulema, the body of the Guilds, and, to a great degree, the provincial troops. In 1622, the plan for their destruction was first formed. ABBAZA PASHA was the originator, and the young Sultan OSMAN readily entered into it, and paid for his presumption with his life. The Spahis, fearing a similar fate, made common cause with the Janissaries. Sentence of extermination was actually pronounced upon them also, but in vain, by MURAD IV. These bodies were sufficiently disunited to destroy all order in the Government, and all discipline in the army, but sufficiently allied to resent all attempts upon either. It was only after they had brought the Empire to the very brink of ruin that they severally fell—the one by a struggle so desperate that it entirely perished, the other by a suppression so easy that the event has passed by wholly unnoticed.

Thus the work accomplished by Sultan MAHMOUD in 1826, had been planned two centuries before. So also had the Nizam Jedid, readopted by SELIM, been proclaimed by AHMET KIUPRELI. The word Nizam is now equivalent in Turkey, and indeed throughout Europe, to “troops.” It means, however, “new order,” and was originally given to regulations for relieving the Christians of the empire from illegal taxes, and the tyranny of the Spahis and Janissaries who collected them.

With the exception of the Canon of SULEYMAN, it may be said to be the only general administrative regulation of importance since the days of URKAN. The name was well chosen, the measure happily executed: the author lives in the grateful memories of the coreligionaries he raised to greatness, and the fellow-citizens he redeemed from misery. The purpose of that measure was to curb the licence of the soldiery by abolishing revenue farms and indirect imposts. But the scheme of SELIM III. was the imposing of these very grievances to raise a mercenary army! He had imbibed European notions of finance and government.

Economy is the only legitimate resource of a Turkish sovereign. He can neither impose taxes, nor incur debt, nor demand benevolences, nor dispose of titles. When SELIM was planning his new troops, he, in this respect, also appealed to his European advisers. They saw in Turkey no *Octroi* and no *Droits reunis*: neither doubted they the despotic authority of the SULTAN, nor the superior advantage of that mode of taxation. They dreamt not of resistance on the part of a people who had neither Parliament nor Press, and could not even suspect in the mind of an illiterate nation so much as predilections on financial matters.

Consequently the ordinance was issued for levying the taxes which were to supply the funds for the new troops, and the SULTAN was so infatuated as to give the same name to the new imposts that were to exasperate the people, and to the new corps that were to supplant the Janissaries.

The reasoning which had satisfied the monarch was not equally successful with the people. They looked upon these taxes as usurpations, and resisted them as an attack upon their customs and religion. The hatred for the new taxes was transferred to the new troops. By this proceeding the Janissaries became defenders of the national rights, and the SULTAN, whose purposes and character have won for him the applause of Europe, held to have fallen the victim of fanaticism and turbulence, did fall a victim to his own guilt and folly. This was the first exercise of "European influence," and the first result of "the march of intellect."

MAHMOUD, though his disciple, was constrained to adopt a different course. He at once attacked the Janissaries and destroyed them even without the aid of military force.* His success was owing to his not mixing up a question of odious excise with one of public order. He simply appealed to the people against an obnoxious body, and they decided in his favour.

The Janissaries were an oligarchy — military, not administrative; they squandered the military resources of the Empire — but interfered not with its political administration; they drained the treasure — but, as farmers of revenue, they did not multiply modes for replenishing it; they were an aristocracy, not of producers, to create and maintain privileges for certain interests — but of consumers, whose interests were inseparably bound with freedom of markets and exchange, and lowness of price; they were representatives of a dominant class, which, confident in its supremacy, stickled for no prerogatives that interfered with the internal customs and institutions of the realm — not a conclave of churchmen. Though they might individually despise or maltreat a Ghiaour, they meddled not with the creeds or church governments of other persuasions, nor suffered them to be meddled with.

We must distinguish in this body the Janissary from Turkish principles.

The first are: violence, corruption, and prostration of military strength; exhaustion of the treasury; resistance to all, and therefore to beneficial changes.

The second are: non-intervention in the collection of the revenue, unrestricted, unburthened freedom of markets and

* The small body of artillery does not deserve to be considered as such.

exchange, impossibility of illegal taxation on the part of the SULTAN, inviolability of local customs, appropriation of charitable and other funds, succession of property, decision of voluntarily-elected judges, of church administration in spiritual matters, and in several important civil functions immediately vested in the elected dignitaries of the various persuasions.

These principles have been the *Dü boni* of Turkey, preserved in the midst of the most convulsed and troubled times.

SELIM, falsely termed a Turkish reformer, arbitrarily imposed new taxes. These taxes, too, were of the most obnoxious kind, for they rendered exchange difficult, and raised prices; they rallied interests and opinions on the side of the Janissaries, and he fell a victim to his apostasy by imitating Europe.

Not more a Turk, but less an European, MAHMOUD did not commence his imitation of SELIM until after the abolishment of that which was Janissary. Then only was he emboldened to attack that which really was Turkish.

However, the ground was now free for that reconstruction which has proved to be the most important at once and most incomprehensible of modern events. It was so free, not only because the old militia had disappeared, swept away by a blow, but also because the financial embarrassment had likewise disappeared. The re-creation of an army to be equal to those of the great States of Europe could be contemplated by no one on an entire Revenue, not amounting to one-half or one-third of what these States expended on military purposes alone. Yet the attempt had to be made if the Empire was to be preserved. The navy was restored so far as, after the destruction of Navarino, to hold the sea against that of Russia,* and an army in all its branches, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, equal to any in Europe, was created. It was, in numerical force, sufficient to defy the assault of its two military neighbours, should they combine to attack it. This has been effected without imposing a new tax. The revenue of 4,000,000*l.* has, indeed, gone on increasing through increment of productiveness, but the resources from which the new organisation has been fed, have chiefly consisted in the appropriation to that end of feudal dues; in fact, those very resources of the ancient Gothic Governments of Europe which in the West have been usurped by classes.

We will now, therefore, have to consider the design and execution solely from a military point of view.

* In the only action hazarded by the Russians they lost a frigate.

NOTE.

THE MOVEMENT BY THREES.

The Author has received the subjoined observations from a cavalry officer :—

“I was much pleased to see, in the History of the Turkish Army—an army peculiarly noted for the excellence of its cavalry—that the *movement by threes* was the basis of its organisation. I am sorry to say, at the same time, that this most natural movement for bodies of horse (so natural that, on emergency, a body of ordinarily trained men will, when ordered, wheel by threes without telling off) is now, as in Continental armies, done away with in the English army. It was said, at the time, of the Board of Cavalry Officers—composed equally of Light and Heavy Dragoons—that a proposition made by the Light Dragoons for doing away with fixed pivots was accepted, and that, in consequence, a proposition from the other section for doing away with the movement by threes was also accepted. In fact, of late years, the rage for change that pervades everything has been introduced into the drill of the army; so that almost yearly the drill-book is fundamentally altered.

“In European armies, cavalry is divided into heavy, medium, and light; the difference, in Continental armies, between the extremes being that the heavy cavalry are large men and horses, and the light small men and horses, the medium being lancers and carbineers. But all these corps are in effect heavy cavalry, as, from the necessary want of training of the men, they are very inefficient for outpost duties, and, from the same reason, can only keep pace with the infantry and commissariat. Russia and England are exceptions to this, the former having a real light cavalry in the Cossacks, each man of whom owns his own horse, and has from infancy been used to riding and the care of horses. In India England also possesses a light cavalry in the Irregular Native Horse, where also each man is a horseman, and owns his horse, and has to provide both for his horse and himself; so that for such corps, during a campaign, all the detail of the commissariat is arranged by the men, the wholesale part being alone to be provided by the chiefs, viz., that the bazar that follows each corps shall have the means of providing for itself.

“In confirmation of the excellence of this arrangement, NAPOLEON, at St. Helena, described such an organisation as his beau ideal of what an army should be.”

CHAPTER II.

NEW ORGANISATION.

THE Janissaries are extirpated; the Spahis make surrender; the Guards had long before disappeared. The provincial organisation of the Pashas is thoroughly broken; the hereditary chieftains (Derebeys) are put down; and this work is accomplished by invasion, insurrection, disorganisation, and revolt, no less than by the prompt energy of the SULTAN. The heavens indeed are black, and thunderclouds impend, but still the ground is cleared and the whole work of conception and organisation has to be commenced anew. SELIM's scheme had extended to nothing beyond the enrolling of mercenaries and the disciplining of some regiments so raised, according to the European fashion. There was no leading character, or comprehensive plan, and MAHMOUD was as little embarrassed or aided by the Nizam of his cousin as by the regulations and constitutions of KIUPRULY and SULEYMAN. The new design was not at once conceived. It was worked out slowly, and while it was in progress the Turks kept their own counsel, and in its maturity it has taken by surprise, those best acquainted with the country.

The Legion is one of the truly excellent institutions which are found, not framed: it reappears at the interval of thirty centuries. The same plan has been devised by a nation who had never heard of a Latian and scarcely of a Roman people. It was a complete army, composed of infantry, heavy and light auxiliaries, and cavalry; it belonged to its district, and was the forum encamped; and to this day throughout Europe it furnishes the peculiar designation (*municipality*) of civil as distinguished from political or military organisation. Service in it was reckoned tribute. The Legion gave to Rome her simplicity and vigour, and built up her fortunes.

The new Turkish system is composed of camps, called "ordu,"

(whence *horde*). Such was the name given by JENGHIS KHAN to his armies, in which was included the whole polity of the Mongols.* Each camp has its complement of horse and artillery; belongs to its district, which is told off into circles corresponding to the subdivision of the camp. The conscripts serve for five years. The recruits who replace the *emerite* find in their new comrades their relations and neighbours, so that no tie is severed, and the army remains rooted to the soil. They receive pay, but still the service is a tribute, and it falls on the Mussulmans alone. These Ordus are each 30,000 strong, precisely the same as those organised by JENGHIS KHAN on the Amour for the conquest of the world.

The new military distribution of the Empire has been made, to the exclusion, however, of the Danubian provinces, Serbia, Bosnia, Egypt, the coast of Barbary, and the Islands. The remainder has been divided into six circles, each furnishing one Ordu of 25,000 in time of peace, and 30,000 on the war establishment. They are thus composed:—

Infantry, 6 Alaï of 3300	19,800
Cavalry, 4 Alaï of 1000	4,000
Artillery (64 guns†), 1 Alaï of 1800	1,800
Giving for the six camps	25,600
Infantry	118,800
Cavalry	24,000
Artillery (384 guns)	10,800
	153,600

War establishment, 180,000.

As service is a religious duty imposed on the Mussulman, the question never arose of the liability to conscription; all are liable, but exceptions are made in favour of a sole male in the family, an only son of a widow, and a student. The first conscription fell upon those between the ages of twenty and twenty-five. They are now, progressively after eighteen, subjected to the ballot. The ballot papers for so many recruits as are wanted are inscribed with the words, "I am a soldier." Those who draw them pass over to the recruiting officer. The first conscrip-

* There were seven "ordus" of the Huns of 30,000 each, whence Transylvania is called Siebenburg, from the castle which each had there for the protection of their women and flocks.

† The original phalanx of elephants as copied by the successors of Alexander from the Indians (see Oliver). The subdivisions of the elephant-phalanx was 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1. The half phalanx is the number which most frequently recurs in battles; 64 is the number of the squares of the chess-board.

tions were a sort of press-gang, the soldiers seizing all they could lay their hands on, and the people taking to the mountains or the desert.

A most methodical arrangement is now introduced. Maps on a large scale exhibit the groups of villages, and the circles coloured according to the regiment, company, or corporal's guard they furnish.* The numbers are marked on them, the distances given in hours, and the references in figures to the registers. These are entered in volumes of thick vellum three feet by eighteen inches, where every house in every village is marked: the father, below him the sons, and (if any) their sons. There is space left for the genealogical tree in each of the lines for succeeding generations. Each fifth year a new entry will be made, so that the Government will have a dictionary of the names and ages of the members of every family. They will also serve as records, available as evidence in courts of law for determining the succession of property.

Each camp is commanded by a general (Muchir), two lieutenant-generals (Ferik), three infantry brigadiers (Liva), one of whom commands the reserve, two cavalry, and one artillery. The pay and rations of the different grades are as follows:—

Rank and File	Monthly Pay.							Number of Rations.
	Piastres.							
	20	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
On Bashi	30	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
Chaush	40	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
Mulazim	170	.	.	.	.	.	.	1
Yuzbashi	270	.	.	.	.	.	.	2
Colashasi	600	.	.	.	.	.	.	4
Bimbashi	1,125	.	.	.	.	.	.	8
Caimacam	1,350	.	.	.	.	.	.	12
Miralai	1,800	.	.	.	.	.	.	16
Miriliva.	7,500	.	.	.	.	.	.	32
Ferik	16,000	(equal to 160%)					.	64
Mushir	75,000	.	.	.	.	.	.	228
Seraskier	100,000	.	.	.	.	.	.	

Below the Bimbashi the officers have clothing served to them, and all ranks receive badges of distinction. The seven higher are set in brilliants. These are the substitutes for finery in dress, and a great economy. They may receive their rations in money.

The daily ration amounts for the month to 10 lb. 5 oz. of rice, 1 lb. 5 oz. of butter, 16 lb. 10 oz. of meat, salt and onions 1 lb. 9 oz. each, oil, candles, and soap 6 oz. each, and bread $63\frac{1}{2}$ lb.

* These maps are constructed on the Chinese plan; the south is the top.

The ration comes to two piastres (4d.) a day. At English prices it would cost from 8d. to 9d. The pay is under 2d. per diem, and if laid out in coffee, sugar, tobacco, tumbek, sweet-meats, fruit, and the bath, would require from 1s. 5d. to 1s. 6d. in England. The Turkish soldier is thus considerably better off than the English soldier.* Coffee, pipes, and nargilles are as freely used and offered in the barracks as in a gentleman's establishment. The private soldiers appear to give as frequent alms as other classes of the community.

One of the greatest disorders in the old times was the want of a commissariat. This caused the exhaustion and devastation of the provinces through which the troops marched, and often occasioned the loss of armies, or their dispersion at critical moments. It was, therefore, to be expected that it would be the first to be remedied as unquestionably it was the easiest, and presented, alas! the temptations to which European Governments are most exposed. Any officer of experience consulted beforehand would have suggested this as the first reform. The Turks, however, have not introduced a commissariat; the Treasury furnishes the money for the specified quantities, at the market price, and the troops have committees, composed of all grades, to superintend their mess, as is practised amongst us by the officers. The officers receive their rations in money. It remains to be seen how the system will work in war, but I have no doubt as to its success. It will require, however, in certain circumstances that the Government shall provide for there being stores within reach. In the mean time it gives to the army a civil physiognomy and business habits; it prevents speculation, contents the men, relieves the Government from an additional branch of administration, and prevents the soldier from becoming the mere machine he is in our armies.†

If the Commissariat appears to be neglected, it is not so in the Hospital service; no care, or expense, has been spared in this department. It has not been completed, but the scale on which it has been carried into effect in the capital and some of the chief cities exceeds anything to be seen in Europe. The most salubrious sites and picturesque exposures have been selected for the hospitals. Physicians of fair acquirements have been

* "The lot of the Turkish soldier is a very happy one. They are better fed than any other troops in Europe, having an abundance of provisions of excellent quality, and partaking of meat once and of soup twice a day. Their magazines are fitted with stores, and the regiments have large reserves. The pay of each soldier is twenty piastres a month, the whole of which he receives, as there is a prohibition against withholding from him any part of that sum. In short, everything has been effected that could promote the welfare of the soldier."—Marshal Marmont's Travels, p. 61.

† Admiral Slade has observed, in one of his works, that the *kiatib*, clerk of the regiment, does the work of the commissariat.—Note, 1868.

obtained—all the allowances are on the most liberal scale, and these institutions are models of cleanliness.

No punishment can be inflicted except by the decision of a Council. In penal cases, the Court Martial does not try and condemn, it merely investigates the facts, and transmits them to a higher court, where a member of the Ulema presides to see that the soldier is not withdrawn from the legal jurisdiction of the country. Military Councils are attached to every command, great or small. They must be consulted by the commanding officer. Nevertheless, the sole responsibility rests with him.

The comfort and sense of honour of the soldier have thus been the special care of the framers of the new system; not, however, as the result of any theory, but because it is in the habits and the ideas of the people. The army is composed of the privileged, or, at least, honoured class, who are all equal, and the lowest of which may attain to the highest grade in the Army or the State. They are not enlisted from a class bordering on destitution, humbled in circumstances, disrated in opinion, and excluded by their relative uncultured state from attaining to pre-eminence; nor are they raised by conscription, and the unlucky only chosen; but they serve as a duty, imposed by their being the dominant class. In both respects they are of a wholly different grade from the troops of Europe. Arms is their special career. They have been, before enlistment, distinguished from their fellow-citizens by wearing them, and hence the regulations, pay, and provisions are but analogous to the *locus standi* of the corps.

Each battalion has an Imam—*Tabour Imamy*—a most valuable class of officers, who wear a sword and the same uniform as the other officers. His functions are chiefly those of a schoolmaster; he teaches the soldiers reading and writing, and theology to the officers and soldiers.

It may here be the place to speak of this religious instruction, in so far as it bears on military duties. This is a point which cannot consistently be passed over, difficult as it may be to render it intelligible, and painful as it may be even to mention it in the presence of those who are expected to be the readers of this work.

I have advisedly used the term "Theology." The reason is this: the instruction received by all Mussulmans, and therefore by those who compose the army, has, first of all, reference to the very highest obligations laid down in the "Word of God." The difficulty of explanation consists in this: that, amongst those to whom the explanation is offered, the Word of GOD (as the Commandments of men) has ceased to be of any value in regard to the taking of human life in an aggregate manner. The soldier,

amongst Christians, is held to no higher duty than that of obedience; so that it is not only improper, but even inconceivable, that a soldier should exert his private judgment in such a case, or be in possession of rules according to which such judgment has to be given. Yet such is the condition of the Mussulman soldier. He is forbidden by his religion to take life without cause, and the rules are laid down for him by which the cause shall be determined.

It has already been stated that in the origin of the Turkish military institutions the insurrectionary faculty was consecrated as a check on the violence of Sultans, and that discipline and justice were reconciled by the withdrawal from the political and military authorities of the power of declaring war.

These provisions would be realised only in so far as the people were brought up to revere their religion.

This has been practicable by the judicial character in which alone its expounders appear before the nation. Their status being that, not of a Hierarchy, but of a Supreme Court, intervening as such only on the occasion of an external war or of an internal rebellion.

The creation of a new and salaried military force opened a new experience. It remained to be seen whether this powerful and armed body should become an instrument in the hands of the Political Government to enable it to override the law in making war abroad, and to suppress internal liberty by being available to crush domestic insurrection.

Such has been the consequence of standing armies in Europe, and analogy would point to a similar result in Turkey. There has, however, to be taken into account in Europe something more than the enrolment of armies. Simultaneously with this change came another, unobserved, it is true, but of the highest importance, and which consisted in the ceasing by the churches of Christendom to teach men that there was crime or sin in any act ordered by a Government. In some nations they were even taught that men perpetrating such crimes were virtuous and meritorious.*

No such attempt has, as yet, at least, been made in Turkey; and every soldier knows that without the *Fetva* for declaring war he cannot draw the sword; and if he does so he will not only be, by the belief of his church, vowed to eternal perdition, but that also he will be refused, by its ministers, as in the case of suicides in Europe, burial in consecrated ground. Whilst every penalty is accumulated to deter from unlawful war, so is every inducement held out to incite to just war. The supreme dignity

* The Russian military oath is to "extend the frontiers."

of *martyr* is conferred on those who fall in that kind of war, which canonically receives the title of *gazy*, or "religious war," namely one undertaken "for the *defence* of religion"—in other words, a war in which the Mussulmans have been attacked because of their faith. This branch of the subject, however important it might be for our instruction, has small practical bearing on the danger which the new military organisation might bring on the Ottoman Empire. The real danger consists in the facility of using the army to suppress internal revolt—in other words, the encouragement it might afford to the SULTAN and his Ministers to attempt to impose taxes beyond the "lawful" ones; to infringe either religious laws or administrative customs; to change the succession of the crown; to interfere with the authority of judicatories; or, finally, to put down the real safeguard of the State, the supreme authority of the Law as represented in the Ulema.

In regard to insurrection, the same course has been taken as in regard to war; that is, to define its character, and to bring in the teaching and authority of religion to repress it when groundless, and to support it when just.

Thus no speculative grounds are to be assigned for an insurrection any more than for a war; in the one as in the other a case can arise only from *acts*. So also the proceedings must be directed and confined to the repression and *punishment* of such acts. The procedure is identical with our method in Europe in respect to differences arising between individuals. It can be so, because for them public affairs are as simple, and therefore as easily apprehended, as for us private business.

The Mussulman, therefore, who would raise the standard of revolt for speculative change would be treated as a madman. He who did so as resisting a wrong would still incur the penalties of excommunication, unless justified by the *Fetva*. But when, on the grounds of a wrong, the *Fetva* is issued, he who falls fighting in such a cause against Kaliff, SULTAN, or any *constituted* authority whatever, receives the title of *Shahēd*—second only to that of martyr; his corpse requires no ablution, and he is buried in the clothes in which he fell.

So long, therefore, as the Turks retain reverence for their religion, obey its injunctions, and preserve the independence of their Fecial college, the new standing army will neither become a danger to their neighbours nor to themselves.

That politeness which gives equality and steadiness to Eastern society, establishes subordination without the necessity of severity or punishment; and the European officer, who is astonished and disgusted at the habits of familiarity which he observes between

the highest and the lowest grades,* and the terms of endearment which the general will bestow on the private, is merely ignorant of the military elements which the disciples of Islam possess.

The soldier has no *class grievance*. There may be, notwithstanding these checks, tyrannical officers, and in some cases (especially in the 5th Ordu), a prolongation of the legitimate term of service. With these exceptions, I have found no complaint, and, as regards the administration, but one abuse, the drawing more pay than the number of men; but this does not affect the private. The costume is, indeed, a subject of heart-burning, but that is not peculiar to the soldier, and (unhappily) this aversion is wearing away. The opposition, which in each province manifested itself at first, had reference not to the service, but to the uniform. There is no aversion to the conscription, such as is experienced in Europe, and it repeatedly happens that soldiers will not accept their discharge.

To provide against the danger of the breaking up of these bodies, and sacrificing their spirit and constitution, it has been laid down that they shall not leave their province in detachments, and that there shall be no separate command of less than 10,000 men.

After the term of five years' service in the Nizam, the soldier enters the Redif (Reserve), in which he serves for seven years more—standing to his Ordu exactly as when in barracks, save that he is at home. In this lies the difference with the Prussian Landwehr, where the regiment has no connexion with the province. They assemble a month in the year at their ordinary places of rendezvous for drill and exercise, and receive during that time pay and rations as the Line. There is thus a Redif Ordu ready to supply the place of the Nizam Ordu, whenever called on for foreign service, or there is a second Ordu ready to march. The number of disciplined men is thus yearly augmenting, and the present number is 212,000. When the system is completed it will give—

Nizam	180,000
Redif (say)	300,000
	480,000

Of the six camps, four only have been completed. Those of Arabistan and Hedjaz are but in process of organisation. The following table will show the distribution:—

* "The captain brushes the major's boots, and the major fills the colonel's pipe."—Wm. Hamilton's "Asia Minor."

1ST ORDU, KHASS.SSA OR GUARDS.

(Western border of Asia Minor.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Ismid; 2nd, Broussa; 3rd, Smyrna; 4th, Aïdyn; 5th, Kutayieh; 6th, Sparta.

Cavalry.—1st, Isnik; 2nd, Tyra; 3rd, Karahissar; 4th, Sparta. Artillery, from all the province.

2ND ORDU, DERI-SEADAT—CAPITAL.

(Adjoining districts of Europe and Asia.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Adrianople; 2nd, Shumla; 3rd, Boli; 4th, Angora; 5th, Konia; 6th, Kaisarieh.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Babadagh; 2nd, Yuzgad; 3rd, Angora; 4th, Konia. Artillery, Tchorum.

3RD ORDU, RUMELI.

Infantry.—1st Regt., Monastir; 2nd, Tirhala; 3rd, Selanik; 4th, Uskup; 5th, Sophia; 6th, Wydin.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Jannina; 2nd, Prezrin; 3rd, Sophia; 4th (Not formed). Artillery, Monastir.

4TH ORDU, ANADOLIS.

Infantry.—1st Regt., Sivas; 2nd, Tocat; 3rd, Kharput; 4th, Erzerum; 5th, Kars; 6th, Diarbekir.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Tocat; 2nd, Van; 3rd, Mardyn; 4th (not yet formed). Artillery, Kharput.

5TH ORDU, ARABISTAN (Syria.)

(Redif not formed.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Sham (Damascus); 2nd, Balbek; 3rd, Acre; 4th, Sidon; 5th, Beyrut; 6th, Haleb.

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Havran; 2nd, Tripoli; 3rd, Deirulkamar; 4th, Hama. Artillery, Latake.

6TH ORDU, IRAK (Mesopotamia and Cerobia.)

(Rediff not formed.)

Infantry.—1st Regt., Baghdad; 2nd, Sulymanieh; 3rd, Kerkuk; 4th, Mossul; 5th, Jidda and Mecca; 6th, Mokha and Massu.*

Cavalry.—1st Regt., Baghdad and Bassora; 2nd, Mossul; 3rd, Derié and Nejd; 4th, Jidda. Artillery, in all the provinces.

The effective force is estimated at 120,000.

The portions of the Empire not included have separate establishments, which are partially disciplined, and there are other bodies which more or less contribute to the public defence. These are :—

* ? Masowah. This was garrisoned from Jiddah, now from Egypt.—Note 1868.

Egypt	20,000
Serbia	6,000
Bosnia and Upper Albania, say	40,000
Wallachia and Moldavia	6,000
Tripoli and the islands	20,000
Gunners (local bodies) at the Dardanelles, &c.	20,000
Police corps, mounted and on foot	30,000
	142,000
On board the fleet and in the arsenal	34,000
	176,000

We thus have a grand total of 650,000 men, of which 150,000 only are a permanent charge on the Treasury. But in case of war in which the populations took an interest, Wallachia, Moldavia, Serbia,* and Bosnia might contribute 150,000 men beyond the numbers here set down.

The original institution of the Ottoman armies has been a subject of admiration, but how much more extraordinary is their reconstruction. They were instituted in the midst of victory, they are reconstructed amidst disaster and defeat. Then there were conquered lands to distribute—then there was a Treasury overflowing by the enlargement of the State and the simplicity and economy of the early Sultans; now the resources are at once cut off and anticipated.

As I have adduced the conquests of the one period in proof of the excellence of the system, so must I enumerate the difficulties of the other to vindicate the greatness of the achievement.

The Janissaries were destroyed in the midst of a civil war—the Greek Insurrection. The Powers of Europe immediately after annihilated the Turkish fleet.

The Porte believed herself at war with England and France as well as Russia, when the latter seized the moment to pour in her armies. Yet already is a force (few and raw indeed) ready to take the field. They are nearly annihilated. A peace is signed imposing a war contribution equal to a year's revenue; her Danubian provinces are occupied, and thus in 1830 she has to recommence the military organisation. Next year breaks out insurrection in Albania, followed by that of Kurdistan, and immediately afterwards by that of Egypt. The Nizam is again annihilated at Kutayah. Egypt and Syria are wrested from the Porte. The Russians enter the Bosphorus. The Treaty of Hunkiar Skellessy is imposed. On this the Porte again recom-

* In 1843, when war threatened, Serbia offered 80,000 volunteers.

mences on a large scale, plans the incorporation of the provinces in the Nizam, institutes the reserves, and sends young men to Europe preparatory to the formation of officers.

In the four years that followed, the Russian indemnity is paid off, the provinces freed from Russian occupation, the fleet restored, and a body of 100,000 men disciplined. Then again broke out an Egyptian revolt—the Turkish armies are again annihilated, the fleet carried off, and at the same moment the SULTAN, whose energy had offered the only hope of restoration, dies—a young and weakly prince ascends the tottering throne. Again Europe gives Turkey up.

From that period Turkey has enjoyed twelve years of repose; but this repose is a result of her success. The rapid concentration and good countenance of the Nizam alone prevented a rupture with Russia in 1844 and with Russia and Austria in 1847, and again with both those Empires in 1849. It has also served to introduce order in the provinces. Thus was Albania reincorporated in 1831, Kurdistan and Serbia a few years later, Syria in 1840. Tripoli acknowledged once more the supremacy of the SULTAN. Egypt has again lapsed to the SULTAN. In 1851 the Danubian provinces were freed from Russian troops, and Bosnia, the sole remaining province unsubdued, became an integral portion of the Nizam system.

In such measures Finance is a primary consideration. The revenue in the time of SELIM III. did not exceed 4,000,000*l.*, of which about a quarter was absorbed by the Janissaries. From 1806, commenced an almost ceaseless state of war and insurrection, reducing the provinces furnishing revenue to one half, and exhausting the remainder. Russia occupied the Principalities; England forced the Dardanelles and attacked Egypt; the long Serbian war commenced; Baghdad and Albania soon after, under DAOUD and ALI PASHAS, raised the standard of revolt. Then followed the Greek war, and the other events already enumerated. At how much shall we rate the permanent defalcation of revenue during this long course of misfortune?—at what the war expenses and indemnities?—how much for the Russian war closed in 1812?—how much for the Serbian and Greek wars?—what the pecuniary sacrifice at Navarino?—what for the expenses of the war closed in 1829, with its indemnity?—what for the two Egyptian campaigns? Between 1806 and 1840 not less than 20,000,000*l.* have been so expended, with a revenue curtailed at least one-third. Yet we have Turkey with an army equal to that of its most flourishing period, the best paid in Europe, and without the imposition of a new tax.* To the

* The new customs' duties, introduced by the English Treaty, are a deception practised on them, and a loss to the Treasury.

army and navy nearly 3,000,000*l.* is at present allotted, and the revenue now (1852) amounts to 8,000,000*l.*

But it will be objected, "Here number is of little or no avail. What is the quality of these troops? Fewer would suffice, if good, and so many will not, if worthless. That they are of inferior quality is to be inferred from the defeats which they have invariably met with, not from the Russians only, but from Egyptians." I am inclined to believe that in the average of events discipline will be found to beat character, and the character most essential is aptitude for discipline. The Russians are certainly not to be put as men on a level with Poles or Turks; yet they acquired an immediate ascendancy over both from the moment that they were disciplined. The Egyptian fellah, by the same process, easily mastered the Turks. The question simply is, whether the beating which the Turks have received has borne this fruit.

The temper of a people is tried by blows; disasters strengthen if they do not break down. The Russians owe their discipline to the Swedes, who thrashed them into order, and their endurance to the Tartars, who trampled them into stubbornness. They have taught both lessons to the Turks,* but what a difference between the two processes—the trial of the one was at best a scorching sun, that of the other a fiery furnace.

When the organisation was first attempted, the belief was universal that the Turks had utterly degenerated—that the decay apparent in the institutions had its root in the character of the people. It was disbelieved that they ever had any merits; their triumphs were referred to numbers and ferocity; or if they did possess some martial virtues, these belonged to the hardened life of nomades, or the reckless impulse of a predestinarian belief. At all events, now, every such quality had disappeared, and their name had passed into a byword for sloth, turbulence, ignorance, and cruelty.

I recal, in writing these words, the impressions under which I first visited that country, and it was not without a struggle that I yielded to the convictions of my senses. After experience more varied, extensive, and intimate than has, I believe, fallen to the lot of any other European, I have formed an estimate the reverse of my preconceptions. I do not know, and I cannot imagine, a finer raw material for a soldier than the Turk. He is no longer, indeed, the roving Tartar, but he has not lost the martial instincts of his original condition. What can be desired more than a warlike spirit with a religious temper, a cleanly person, a hospitable character, a polite demeanour, deference for

* As since confirmed on the Danube in 1853-4. Note, 1868.

letters, respect for justice, and a sense of national dignity, united to courage, a love of arms and horses, and experience in their use?

By his temperance in diet, and his abstinence from fermented liquors, as also by cleanliness, the Turk is healthy. He is small and sinewy. He is brave by temperament. He is proud in himself but respectful to others, particularly his chiefs. He is formed from childhood to those habits of deference which we endeavour to create by discipline. He is not liable to the seduction of speculative opinions. He is incapable of desertion to a foe. He is indifferent to odds, and to be conquered must be "hacked in pieces."* He has the ploughman's hardihood of frame, the cynic's contempt of death, the savage's endurance of privation, the gentleman's sensitiveness to honour.

I am glad to be able to give the opinion of General BEM:

"Vigour, courage, confidence, and subordination distinguishes the Turkish soldier. Pride of race, abstinence from fermented liquors, and a sense of religious duty give courage and ensure discipline. Gravity and *etiquette* prevail in a Turkish barrack. Ten thousand Turkish are worth 15,000 or 20,000 Austrian or Russian infantry."

A military man writes to me:—

"The infantry is only deficient in field officers; but non-commissioned officers may perfectly well perform all the duties of captains and of subalterns of infantry, as seen in the British footguards. The real use of commissioned officers is to raise discipline by raising the officer to a higher caste, to make a nursery of field officers by the devoting of educated men to the drudgery of the profession, and in some armies to insure their leading, and being followed by a sense of superiority in the officer, and of inferiority in the men. But for reasons peculiar to them discipline is attainable in a higher degree among the Turks by means which would prove inadequate with a Christian, or western population. Every soldier in his character of Mahomedan and Ottoman has as much pride of position and race as it is possible to impart to him. Between the Moslem private and the Moslem Seraskier, the difference is merely rank not social station. In European Turkey every Mahomedan is what a Basque noble was in Spain, or a Roman citizen throughout the Empire. It is not true that any discouragement prevails in the ranks of

* "L'espèce de soldats est excellente. Le turc a les qualités qu'exige le métier de la guerre. Il réunit la force à l'agilité, l'ardeur à la souplesse; il est intelligent, endurci à la fatigue, et porté à la frugalité jusqu'à se contenter d'un peu de riz ou de graine: il dort au bivouac comme dans son lit; il se défend individuellement avec énergie: il faut, pour le vaincre, le hacher.—*Beaujour, Voyage Militaire, T. II., p. 372.*

“ the Nizam. The soldiers are anxious to fight, at least, against
 “ the Russians, ignorant of the disasters of their country and full
 “ of faith in the result.”

“ Europeans are ready to undervalue the Turkish troops on
 “ account of the loose slovenly appearance of their necks and
 “ feet. This, not from negligence, but from the frequency of
 “ ablutions, and the habit of sitting without shoes. This habit
 “ is to a certain degree detrimental to their walking, and the
 “ want of sufficient exercise, and high feeding occasion some
 “ distress to the men on long marches, in changing garrison, or
 “ in the first few days of a campaign. But after a short time
 “ the stamina resulting from their good living tells, their feet
 “ uninjured by heavy or tight shoeing become fitted for the
 “ work, and they get into excellent condition just when Prussian,
 “ Austrian or Russian troops would be falling off.”

The old Russian generals, says General VALENTINI, were reminded by these Turkish recruits of the French under DESAIX. These are his words, from which I will not take the edge by translation :—

“ Tels que les Français d'alors combattèrent leurs adversaires
 “ sans connaissance, et sans exercise, tels nous avons vu aujourd-
 “ hui les Osmanlis faire leur premiers essais, sous les mêmes
 “ auspices. Des coups décisifs étoufferont toujours des forces
 “ naissantes, qui par une guerre lente et méthodique se seraient
 “ élevées à une puissance formidable.”*

The concluding sentence shows forth the purposes of Russia in that war, and reveals a maxim which has guided her policy since that day. Decisive blows not having sufficed for the intended purpose she has abstained from rendering to the Turks that service which the Lacedæmonians did to the Beotians, and which she herself has to the Circassians.

A still more important witness, however, is Count POZZO DI BORGO, who thus writes in a secret despatch to Count NESSELRODE, in June 1829, and he conveys the conclusions of a general officer as well as of a distinguished diplomatist.

“ The experience we have just made must now reunite all
 “ opinions in favour of the resolution which has been taken.
 “ The Emperor has put the Turkish system to the proof, and
 “ His Majesty has found it to possess a commencement of phy-
 “ sical and moral organisation which it hitherto had not. If the
 “ SULTAN has been enabled to offer us a more determined and

* *Guerre contre Les Turcs*, p. 229. Colonel Chesney who followed the operations of the war, passing and repassing to the one and the other army, bears his testimony to “ the bravery and obedience of the youthful soldier of the Nizam.” His account of the war, which will be a valuable contribution to the History of Turkey and Russia, will appear in the Third Volume of his work on the Euphrates.

“regular resistance whilst he had scarcely assembled together
“the elements of his new plan of reform and ameliorations, how
“formidable should we have found him had he had time to give
“it more solidity and to render that barrier impenetrable which
“we find so much difficulty in surmounting, though art has
“hitherto done so little to assist nature.”

If we have ascertained that Russia dreaded the “nascent
“force” of the Ottoman Empire, and “the moral and physical
“energy” of the new system, we have gone as far in respect to
evidence and authority as possible; and I have shown, I think,
in the subject itself, in results up to the present time achieved,
viz., the tranquillity of thirteen years, and in the opinion of
other qualified judges, strong confirmatory grounds of her opi-
nion. The failure of the attempt made in 1828 to crush the
system only justifies the step. Let it not be forgotten that the war
was undertaken, in the words of Prince LIEVEN, to “Diminish the
DANGERS of the future.” I shall now proceed to the grave consi-
derations involved in the numerical strength to be given to the
Nizam, and the question of the enrolment of the Christians.

CHAPTER III.

NUMERICAL STRENGTH ; ENROLMENT OF CHRISTIANS ; CHANGE
IN COSTUME, SALUTE, AND CLEANLINESS.

MONTESQUIEU predicted that the means adopted for their safety would, sooner or later, bring to the ground every Government of Europe.

That warning has availed them nothing ; may it not be equally unfruitful with the Turks ! This passage I translated for and laid before Sultan MAHMOUD, in 1834, together with the well-known opinion of NAPOLEON to the same effect, and his project for a general disarmament. At that time the plan of the Redif was definitively adopted. The point was to fix upon a force sufficient for the defence of the Empire, but not oppressive for the Treasury, nor alarming for the liberties of the people ; and so to organise it that it should retain its provincial character, and furnish, in case of necessity, a large supply of disciplined men. The Porte had the singular good fortune of being able, in this respect, to exercise a judgment. Everywhere else the army has come in the course of time, and the numbers have been determined as much by events abroad, and by the opinions of strangers, as by the circumstances or the will of the people themselves. Turkey required no troops for her internal tranquillity. She had to look merely to defence, and that case was limited to one foe, who could reach her only by one road. The force required had, therefore, to be calculated on that which her antagonist could bring against her at one time on that point.

Russia has on paper a very large number of men, and her effective army may be 800,000. We have seen her thrice engaged, in the south and west, in a war on which all her energies were concentrated. Once with Poland, once with Hungary, once with Turkey herself. We could not desire more

ample means of estimating her relative weight of power and her facility of moving armies. The circumstances are too well known, however, to require more than reference; and as she is undergoing no change, we may take the force brought against Turkey in 1828, "after two years of preparation," as the full amount of that which she will be enabled to employ in a future invasion. I have entered, in describing the "Frontier Provinces," into the local circumstances that impede her progress in every movement she makes to the south,* where climate is her enemy, where bogs, marshes, and inundations entomb her armies.

We may, therefore, assume that against Turkey she can bring no more than 200,000 into play; but if she had myriads at her disposal they would be of no avail, for the greater the number the greater would be the loss. This number is far too large. Her armies by their size lose agility, are vulnerable and perishable. Besides having to act in neutral territories, nothing turns the scale more than mere mass by the oppression which they create, and the animosity they engender. The smaller the army, so it suffice, the cheaper it is; the less exposed to reverses, the easier to move, the fewer the contingencies, and the less the loss between recruitment and the battle field. Europe herself, England excepted, has set but a bad example, and has lamentably degenerated since the days of MARLBOROUGH and FREDERICK THE GREAT, whose armies were small, the perfection of their mechanism enabling them to employ the "extended order." Such has been the case in all conquests. The Romans sent 30,000 men against MITHRIDATES, JENGHIS KHAN sent 30,000 men to conquer China, ALEXANDER led the same number into Persia, the Goths into Spain, WILLIAM into England, and WELLINGTON commanded no more British troops at Waterloo.

The British army remains the only specimen at present of the *corps d'élite*. This is perhaps attributable not so much to military conclusions as to political causes. Parliament does not vote a rate of conscription, but supplies the money, leaving it to "the department" to find the men on whom economy must be practised, by care of their health, and attention to their food and clothing. Consequently, we have seen the full number of the men recruited for a regiment, brought into the field; and our armies, rarely attaining 50,000, were always successful against those of NAPOLEON, which were the produce of conscriptions of half a million at a time, not individually inferior, and commanded by the best officers and generals in the world.

* It has been stated on good authority that a Russian regiment marching from St. Petersburg to the Caucasus has lost more men than an English regiment through the whole war of the Peninsula.

On the Continent the conscription and the budget are voted severally: the first is decided by general statistics: local circumstances fix the Revenue; pride takes charge of the numbers, the commissariat is left to prudence. The conscripts are fed and cared for in an inverse ratio to their amount. When called into action the difference appears, and quality must be made up for by numbers, deficiency in compactness and rapidity is supplied by "profound order," to the simultaneous sacrifice of the resources of the State and the efficiency of the army.

If this be a general mistake and fallacy, to what extent must it not affect Russia? Her raw material, except as regards endurance and obedience, unpromising. She entertains for it the greatest contempt, and sacrifices men with the utmost recklessness. The soldier is in every respect considered and used as a beast of burden, or rather as material to move a ramrod or to fill a ditch. The numbers are a source of profit to the chiefs of all the departments, and the Emperor is powerless to change the system. He cannot reduce his armies, nor therefore improve them.

It is for Turkey, then, to profit in this respect at once by her freedom of action and her high standard of soldiers. She has commenced with respecting them, paying and feeding them well. Her danger is the being led astray by the Russian practices, and the opinions of continental Europe, and this is my inducement for entering into a matter otherwise foreign to my subject. The army is to the State what the sword is to the soldier. Let her copy in this respect her own scimeter. The material for the one is equal to that of the other. Let it be equally light and ready. The "short sword" of Rome conquered the world, but it was wielded by small armies.

A marginal note to ALISON'S History of 1812 is to this effect:—"The difficulties of the Danubian Provinces supported "the Ottoman Empire." If so, even when those provinces were abandoned to the enemy, what defence does Turkey require beyond protecting them? In the campaign of 1828, had she sent forward her raw recruits to defend the Pruth and the Sereth, never would the Russians have advanced to the Danube, and that body of recruits would have amply sufficed for her defence. It is impossible, indeed, to separate the military from the political defence, and if the political defence is abandoned, what can armies avail? and what avail, again, are armies if she neglects her fortresses? With a couple of camps 30,000 strong, and her fortresses placed in a respectable condition, her protection would be as sure as if the Caucasus or the Himalayah filled up the gap between the Carpathians and the Euxine.

This conclusion does not spring from an under estimate of the

Russians, but from knowledge of the character of the Turks. We have seen the Russians accomplishing wonders against the French. Their stolid nature fits them for the shock of disciplined men, but, excepting the Cossacks and Malo-Russians, they are not a match for light and expert irregular troops; nor are they fitted for siege operations. The points in which the Turks are strong are precisely those in which the Russians are weak.

No one who has not witnessed it can form any idea of the desperate character of these sieges. The Turks lie as close as cowards, and die like lions. The child, the octogenarian, shares the common frenzy. They care little for batteries and defences. When the breach is practicable, then do they prepare for their stand; then do their assailants tremble for the result; each house, each wall, each partition, is a new entrenchment, and tens of thousands will perish in single combat, from house to house, before the place is taken. The Turkish Government, has then, to look to its fortifications. The first thing is to strengthen them, and to induce the settlement in them and around them of a pure Turkish population. It may create a new system, but it ought not to sacrifice an old and inestimable security.

The Europeans at Constantinople believe, or affect to believe, that the numbers drafted for the army will exhaust the Turkish population, and so prostrate the Mussulmans' supremacy; consequently, the Power principally interested in the fate of Turkey, England, has urged on the Porte the adoption of a more judicious system. That system, however, is not the reduction of numbers, but the supply of men from another source—in a word, *the enrolment of the Christians*. This plan is presented to the Turks as relieving them from undue pressure; to the Christians as establishing for them political equality! It proceeds from a high source, no less than the Government of Great Britain, and is indirectly urged forward by all the influence at the command of Russia. In fact, the proposal offered as an expedient for recruiting the army is the subversion of the institutions of the land. The plan urged to defend the Empire against Russia will fill it with convulsion and revolt.

The Rayas, by the Code of ISLAM, are exempt from military service. They are so by compact, for on this condition the subjection of each province severally took place. For this exemption they paid the Poll tax. This is equally a fundamental institution. There resides in the State no legislative body with power to alter either law. To do so would be a revolution, and if one is changed both must be so. You therefore simultaneously strike at the laws, religion, military organisation, and finances.

But do the Mussulmans desire this relief? Do the Rayas seek this privilege? I cannot argue the question. I will only say

that the Mussulmans would rise to resent the attempt on their supremacy, the Christians to resist this infraction of their privileges. The most odious of all charges is the "blood tax." Who ever heard of appeasing the discontent of an overburdened people by imposing upon them forced conscription? Unwarlike they may be, but not to the point of quiet acquiescence in a wrong which in its consequences would destroy them as distinct races and faiths.

If the Mussulmans cannot support a weight which is the condition of their privileges, let them sink. If they needlessly increase its pressure, let them be advised. I neither desire to see the Christians absorbed into the Mussulmans by an enrolment of children, nor an arming of the Christian population (if it were possible) called forth to aid a Russian invasion.

The Christian provinces, which possess distinct administration, in which no Mussulmans dwell, and where the general law of the Empire does not run, are not only not excused from service, but *are bound to furnish their contingents*. They are placed under their own officers, and serve according to the conditions of their union with the Porte. Thus it is that Christians appear, and have always appeared, in the Ottoman armies. Wholly different is the proposal to enrol them in the Mussulman corps of each province. There they would be isolated, mixed with the Mussulmans, and, subject to Mussulman officers, they would, following the example of the Janissaries, soon become Mussulmans. It does flatter the vanity of a Bulgarian, Boyard, or an Armenian Seraff to hear of a "Bulgarian" or "Armenian" regiment. If there be deeper views when the enrolment of the Christian provincials is spoken of, it is the dismemberment of the province that is meant. The English Embassy is angry because this is not done; but it should begin by offering to the Turks 400,000 men, the one-half to keep down the insurgent populations, the other to meet the Russians invited to support at once the dearest interests of their Christian co-religionaries and the sovereignty of their Mussulman Allies.

But so far from believing that the actual measure is likely to injure, or extinguish, the Turkish population, or supremacy, I anticipate a contrary effect. The exhaustion of races does not come by accident and misfortune: natural causes alone bring their decay. Torpor was the disease of Turkey. There could be no better remedy than a course of discipline which does not dissever the army from the people, or generate an *esprit de corps*. Instead of exhausting their numbers, impairing their social position, or diminishing their prospects, it will dispel the sluggishness which was creeping over them, and the despondency which was invading their minds. It will ultimately promote private

enterprise and industry by tempering the springs of public spirit.

But the conclusions of the European diplomatists have been based on false data. I have before me a report prepared for a European Government, from which the following is an extract :—

“ In European Turkey the army is entirely drawn from the Mahommedan, and chiefly from the Ottoman population, which only numbers 700,000. Supposing we place at 500,000 the other Mahommedans, and we will have more than one conscript out of every five adult males.”

The names of the corps have given rise to this mistake. The guard of the SULTAN and the “camp” of the capital appear as if raised in Europe; whereas the first is exclusively raised in Asia and one-half of the second; so that, instead of 75,000 men being raised from one million, 37,000 are raised from 3,500,000. In Asia, the Mussulman population cannot be rated under fifteen millions, which will bring its contingent of 112,000 men to one soldier in 125 souls. There certainly remains a heavy pressure upon those in Europe, which it would be very desirable to see equalised. This may easily be effected by including Bosnia in the Rumely Ordu, or by giving a labour substitute to each family from which a conscript is taken. The Bulgarians and other Rayas, if disinclined to fight, are willing to labour; and may be obtained at the rate of the soldier; the family he assists would also supply food. The balance would thus be restored at a charge of some 80,000*l.* a year, which might be advantageously economised on the exorbitant pay of the superior grades of officers.

Instead, however, of thinking of lightening the burden where it is heaviest, the Turks are now only dreaming of increasing its pressure where it is lightest. Their mind runs to the augmentation of the army. The Bosnian recruits are superadded to the establishment, and it has been seriously proposed to enrol in the Redif all the young men eligible for the conscription, amounting to two millions. This sudden impulse is partly to be attributed to the reaction which has followed past depression,* and partly to the effect of the union of Austria with Russia, an event which has naturally filled them with alarm, but which, justly estimated, ought rather to be a ground of security. They are

* “The efficiency of that force (Rédif) has been fully demonstrated of late, when an army of 62,000 men was assembled in the space of six weeks, on the occasion of the interruption of amicable relations with Russia and Austria on account of the Hungarian refugees. In another month, 200,000 men of the Rédif might have been collected at Constantinople had they been required; and it furnished matter for astonishment to the many foreigners in that capital to behold a thoroughly drilled and disciplined army thus extemporised in a camp, to which a number of mere peasants in appearance had been seen flocking from their villages.”—SKENE. *Three Eras of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 70.

exposed at present to no danger which is not diplomatic, and whatever tends to sever ties with the diplomatists of Europe, tends to their security.

It was RIZA PASHA who, although the leader of the reactionary party, had fallen into the idea of enrolling the Christians. He had commenced with embodying the workmen of the Arsenal, and had them reviewed before the SULTAN. Fortunately he fell from power, and was succeeded by that statesman whose name is peculiarly associated with the entrance of Turkey into the system of Europe, RESHID PASHA. From him the completion of this measure was confidently expected, and the more so as his great support was the English Ambassador. The expectation has, however, been hitherto disappointed. RESHID PASHA has carefully avoided saying, or doing, anything. It may be inferred that, belonging himself to a portion of the Empire inhabited by Greeks (the Morea), he was not, like his predecessor, deceived by specious fallacies, but prudent enough to keep his own counsel.

A new danger has arisen for Russia out of the Nizam, and that is—*desertion*. The Russian armies, whether in Europe, or in Turkey, have not hitherto evinced any such disposition, because, in the first case, the soldier was in a strange land amongst nations which he despised, and with whom he could hold no intercourse, and in the second, because the inducement to which I am about to refer did not exist. That inducement is the circumstances of the Turkish soldier in regard to pay, food, the treatment he receives, and the station he holds. The Russian soldier is, after all, a man, and it is impossible he should not contrast these with his miserable fare,* his eleemosynary pittance,† and his doglike treatment.

“The dogs of Constantinople are better provided than the Russian troops.” Such were the words of an Attaché to AHMET PASHA’S Embassy to St. Petersburg. At Bucharest, where the barracks adjoined, the two armies could study each other. The Turks, when they threw out the offal, used to say, “For the dogs and the Russians,” and the Russians were daily seen contending on the dung-hills with the dogs. “They never knew before,” said a Turkish soldier, “whether wheaten bread was black or white, or flesh meat sweet or bitter.” The Russian regiments that have been recalled from the provinces, instead of returning to their ordinary stations, have been dispersed in small

* According to Captain Alexander, the food of the Russian soldier consists of black bread, salt, and a portion of spirits daily.

† The Turkish soldier receives monthly, and without deduction, the same pay as the Russian does in twelve months, with deductions.

bodies, and sent to be forgotten, or killed off at distant and dangerous posts.

It has been supposed that Russia dreaded to send her armies to the West lest they should be contaminated by the doctrines of France; but the steam of the Nizam kettles and the sight of its Pilaf is more alarming to her than all the phrases that ever were penned on the rights of man.

There is no obstacle to intercourse between the armies. One-half of the forces Russia would employ in a Southern campaign would be composed of troops whose sympathies would be Turkish, not Russian, or whose dialect would be understood by the Turks or their co-religionaries.

"Russia," said NAPOLEON, "will advance or fall to pieces; and it is to be expected that she will advance, for the warlike populations which compose her armies have tasted the luxuries of a more genial climate, and sigh for their possession." The means of acquiring these were discipline, and the discipline which was enforced on the Russians was terrorism. Success, corruption, a faulty organisation, have relaxed the bonds to that degree that changes are made, not with a view to amelioration, but by the necessity of concession.* Each of the recent external struggles has had for its result a curtailment of the military service. It had been for life; it was then for twenty years. After the Polish war it was reduced to sixteen years. Since the Hungarian war it has been reduced to eight or ten. It is clear, therefore, that the Russian soldier has learned to be discontented with his condition, and that the Government defers not perhaps to his opinions, but to his feelings. But this is no improvement of the condition which is curtailed; far less will it bring diminution of the desire of change, or indifference to the seductions of better treatment; and so may the fruition of the good things of the South be sought for by other means than conquest.

No one, however, will question the first part of the proposition, and Russia, like all systems formed for aggrandisement, must go back if she does not go forward. She has not advanced in the last twenty-five years on either side of the Euxine.† Nor has she in the interval been accomplishing any great revolution, consolidating any progress made, or amending any existing in-

* The following observations of Napoleon have their political as well as their military bearing:—"Unlike the French and English, the subjects of the Russian Empire improve their condition by becoming soldiers. If I called on a Frenchman to quit his country, I required him to abandon his happiness. The Russian, on the contrary, is a slave while a peasant, but becomes free and respectable when a soldier."

† The English, French, and Sardinians gave to her Circassia. At the end of 1853 Turkey had beaten the Russians, and would have resumed the recent conquests of Russia but for her allies.—Note, 1868.

stitution. Neither the condition of the troops nor the efficiency of the service is improved, but the reverse.

That array of bayonets which dazzles the eyes of Europe itself threatens the Empire with its chief danger. The military system is a millstone, which will drag the head under water so soon as it ceases to be buoyed up by the prestige of diplomatic success, so soon as the people begin to suspect that their endurance is in vain, and that the world is not at this time to be subdued.*

In comparing the present with the ancient military organisation of Turkey, one contrast cannot fail to be observed—the absence in the new system of the light irregular horse. Yet this had remained the only serviceable body in the Turkish armies, and was particularly necessary against an enemy who had made use of similar troops; to them, indeed, that enemy was indebted for the terror her name inspired, and so great was their share in her successes, that the word “Cossack”† has come to be synonymous with “Russian.” This oversight and error I am not able to explain; it, however, is more than counterbalanced by the course adopted by Russia towards this population, whose political importance had slumbered for nearly a century, but who had for the two previous centuries determined the fate of the surrounding kingdoms. They “secured Poland against the Russians, the “Tartars, and the Turks whilst the Poles retained their affection.” When the Poles had lost that affection they brought first the Turks to Kamnietz, and then the Russians to Warsaw. They gave to Russia her victories over Poles, Tartars, and Turks when she had succeeded in securing their affection. Circumstances are altered, and they again emerge from the condition of a class of troops.

This vast mass of intervening military population, actually furnishing to Russia almost exclusively her cavalry and artillery, has to be taken into account under a new head in estimating the amount of force required by Turkey for *military* defence against Russia. The latter can no longer safely trust regiments composed of them in presence of a Turkish enemy in force. This consideration tells both ways. It is of the very last importance. It is fully appreciated by the Russian Cabinet.‡ It is unper-

* “Le Russe se paye de sa degradation actuelle par l'espérance de la domination future.”—Custine.

† “As light cavalry they are unrivalled; they and their horses have marched one hundred miles in twenty-four hours without halting: with them in front, no Russian army can be liable to surprise; in charging, they spread out like a fan, uttering their ‘hourra,’ each man acting individually.”—Sir W. Scott.

Napoleon compared them to the Bedouins advancing with confidence into unknown regions, and as formidable to the most powerful armies opposed to them.

‡ In the campaign on the Danube the Russian cavalry and light artillery had to be withdrawn three leagues to the rear. Fourteen men were shot at Bucharest in one day for attempted desertion.—Note, 1868.

ceived, with one or two exceptions, by the persons surrounding the SULTAN. It is a result of the reconstruction of the Turkish army and of the manner in which, as regards the well-being of the soldier, that reconstruction has been effected. The Nizam is the bulwark of Europe against a barbarian invasion from the North, or would be if the Porte were conscious of what it had achieved, and so closed the chapter of Diplomatic meddling.

There remain two incidents of the military organisation calculated to react injuriously and even fatally on the character of the people, which it is impossible for me to pass over, however insignificant or harmless they may appear to the Western reader. These are the *costume* and the *salutation*. The first is actually, the second prospectively, desecrated; the first by the substitution, the second by the superposition of another. The first has been, indeed, assailed with a purpose, the second compromised without so much as a thought. Both I hold to be fundamental for the Ottoman Empire. To have left them as they were would have cost nothing. What they have put or are about to put in their places has nothing to recommend it. The rancour of the late SULTAN against the Janissaries both explains and justifies the adoption of a costume different to theirs; it noways justifies that one which was then composed and which is both hideous and foreign. It is at least foreign in appearing to be so, though the like is to be nowhere found on earth. It has descended from SELIM III., and belongs to his bastard imitation of Europe.

The opportunities afforded me by the late SULTAN were not neglected to urge a return in this respect to the old ways; and these endeavours seemed at one time to be successful, so far at least as one body was concerned, the Imperial Guard. The argument that in this case prevailed was the example of the CZAR. It was at that time proposed that the Guard should be composed of contingents from every Province and Tribe, each wearing its own costume. By what direct influence this plan was overruled I know not, but I record it in the hope that it may be some day revived when the mania of copying will have passed away, and Turkish sense and self-respect will combine to turn their own resources to account.

Such an expectation is not destitute of historic grounds. Once before in their history, that is four centuries ago, a like mania of imitation developed itself, yet within two generations it subsided.

The change has already lost its strength of passion; its only support is fallacy. They cannot defend the Nizam costume on its own merits. When it is assailed, the only, but the invariable, answer is, "The old Turkish costume was cumbersome. A man cannot manœuvre with ten pounds of cotton on his head, even when not moistened with rain, or march with six yards of

“broadcloth in his trousers.” *Turkish* dress! There was no Turkish dress to be seen at Constantinople at the time so referred to.

The dress which had become so cumbersome and extravagant was imitated, or rather caricatured, from the Arabs; the Arab dress itself is not unmilitary. The proper dress of the Turks was, in the last century, to be seen in the *armies of Europe*. But in a more general sense the Ottoman costume is the costume of the various populations of the Turkish Empire, the Albanian—the image, the prototype, perhaps, of that of Rome, the gorgeous raiment of the Guegue, the endless variety of Bosnian, Servian, Illyrian, Wallachian, Curd, Druze, Arab, Uzbek, Turcoman. In each case it is the object of their affections, and constitutes a part of their distinct existence, which Turkey has never conceived the design of trampling upon, and in which consists its security and strength. This is the great blemish of the military system. This has engendered one of the internal struggles in which the Government has for the last twenty-five years been engaged. This gives it its hideous aspect; this lowers the estimate of Turkish mind and character. The army is created, but it wants something to make it Turkish. It wants the horse tails, it wants the noble folds of the Romans, it wants the rich gallery of historical portraits of its subject States. It must cease to be clad like a scarecrow before it can feel or command respect.

As to the Salute, this is what has happened. In teaching the manual exercise the European instructors have, as a matter of course, taught the European Salute. They did not observe that the Turks were already in possession of at once the most perfect and the most ancient of forms of salutation. They did not consider that the military salute of Europe was an invention of modern times to supply the want of ceremonial in the people; a ceremonial of some sort having been discovered to be of absolute necessity in disciplining a body of men. Far less did they perceive that this military salute of theirs was as ungainly and coarse as that of the Turks was poetic and refined.

They indeed experienced resistance. Every feeling of the Turk revolted against abstaining to give the TEMENAS to his superiors. A compromise was, therefore, fallen upon; which was to give both salutations. Thus you will see a sentry first carry arms, and then, holding his firelock in the left hand, perform his Temenas with the right.

So far there is small disturbance; but as the double process is extremely cumbersome, the one will come to be substituted for the two, and then the Temenas will disappear.

General BEM, in dwelling on the “*Etiquette*” reigning among the Turkish soldiery as contributing so largely to their

soldier-like qualities, refers of course to the habits of the *people* from whom these soldiers are drawn. It is amongst them that this etiquette prevails. But in what does it consist? It consists in nothing that we practise or know; that we can understand in them, or apply in ourselves. It consists in or is rather summed up by the *Temenas*. This term is the expression of a code of etiquette which consists in the regulations for that act. In its essence it is the kissing of the hand of the superior by the inferior.* It is the salute of the Romans—at once “grave and sublime.”

This will shock modern notions of which the great doctrine is “Equality.” Yet this equality is in words only amongst us, for no two men brought in contact act on the word. The sense of equality is not to be found in Europe since disqualifications of caste exist. It does exist in Turkey since there are none. The porter, the slave, may become *Sadrâzem*, the common soldier *Seraskier*. But as between man and man, the idea of equality does not, and cannot, present itself. Than this, no idea more monstrous, more false, or more degrading could be formed. To put it in practice would destroy all human respect. In one sense only equality would be introduced by it: that is, they would all become vulgar.

Amongst them no two human beings can be in presence of each other without the perception of such shades of distinction as to call forth the ceremonial of salutation. The difference of the intervening minutes of birth between two twins† places the one in mute observance before the other till permitted to sit down, just as much as it might be between the general and the common soldier. This etiquette it is which enables all classes

* I once had the opportunity of calling the attention of a poet to this politeness in action. It was the *Improvvisatore Regaldi*. He sat motionless and absorbed for half an hour. In the afternoon of the same day, being on a pinnacle of the Bithynian Olympus, he stretched forth his arms, and chanted an Ode on the *Temenas*. I was unsuccessful in my endeavours afterwards to get him to put it down on paper, but from my own memory I recovered the two first stanzas, which were as follows:—

“Baccio le vostre care parole
E como accese nel grembo al sole
Le depongo con dolce affetto,
Nell intelletto.

“Questo è il sublime grave saluto,
Che il Romano popol caduto,
Quando regea con forte orgoglio,
Dal Campidoglio.”

† The identity in this respect of Turkish habits with those of Sparta may be learnt from that most instructive incident given by Herodotus respecting the means taken to discover the elder of two twins, by watching the mother to see which she washed first.

freely to mingle together, and which establishes that real equality of man which their society presents. It governs all the relations of political as of social life, because it is the mould in which the character of each is formed during early and unconscious childhood. It gives to the family its affections, to the State its wonderful indestructibility, and casts over the whole that grace of life in the politeness of intimacy which charmed the gentlemen of Europe of a former age, and proves inexplicable to the reasoners of the present.

It follows that with them, *Familiarity*, in our sense, has no existence. They cannot conceive the idea of disregarding ceremony any more on the grounds of frequency of intercourse than of that of propinquity of relationship. The term "family" implies with them the highest degree of deference, instead of, as with us, its total disregard.

In the army, it is a salute of some sort that will be substituted for the *Temenas*. Not so among the people, in the extension to them of the change. They will not present arms. They will be exposed to copying the civilian salute of Europe. But the civilian salute, taking off the hat and making a bow, is incompatible with their costume. Then they will be reduced to copying the process recently introduced, and now spreading through the nations of Europe and decomposing them socially as it leavens itself into the mass, of joining and moving hands and arms. This process is, however, not a salutation, but is introduced to dispense with salutation. The effect that may be produced amongst us can bear no proportion to that which would result from its being brought at once to bear on a people not prepared for it by a previous and long course of social disintegration.

Turkey is simultaneously exposed to the infection of false opinions, infidel notions, dirty habits, and vulgar manners; each will react on the other. A change such as this once effected in the army, it will unquestionably spread to the nation, and hurry it on in that melancholy course which the English designate "free and easy," and the French applaud as "*manières sans gêne*," which is no manners at all.

It is necessary to mention cleanliness in connexion with politeness, as that word has no more an equivalent for us than the other. It is, like politeness, a religious observance; religious, in the sense of having been enjoined by all Religions. The standard of cleanliness would appear to have been the first instituted amongst men, and consists in a line drawn between the clean and the dirty, involving pollution in whatever has not been subjected to purification, and establishing rules for the

purification of the body, and for whatever comes in contact with it. It is the observance of these rules that makes the Turkish Barrack what it is, and the Turkish home what it is. The distinction, incomprehensible to a European, becomes offensive to him by the contrast to his own practice, so that it is one of the things which will be first attacked by "civilisation," "progress," and "European Opinion."*

The army created to defend the frontier may thus become the means of extinguishing the people, if through it incidentally the habits of social intercourse should be subverted.

* The Turkish Government, having had the madness to attempt to imitate the educational institutions of France, resistance has broken out upon this point. The Turks have submitted, it is said, in reference to the ablutions after meals; but they have refused to give them up as regards the impurities of nature. The character of the Europeans employed is thus displayed. Who could perceive such practices, not to revere and copy them, but to hate and destroy them? From the moment that I myself perceived the idea, I adopted the practice, and have never once intermitted it, and have established it amongst my household, family, and friends.—Note, 1868.

CHAPTER IV.

ITS FUTURE USE.

AN army without means of transport is but a gun without a carriage. What a truck is to the one a road is to the other; yet Turkey has no road from the places where her armies must assemble to that where they are to be employed.

Constantinople is the point of intersection of all land and water communication throughout the Empire. It is the link between the continents and seas, and the key to both. It is the place of rendezvous and of refuge. Thence will be given the signal of every attack, there security will be sought after every disaster. There is the manufactory of weapons, the store of grain, the station of the navy, the depôt of artillery. It is the centre of administration, it is a fastness and a dockyard, an arsenal and an emporium, a fortress and a capital. It is at once the head and heart, the sword and buckler; and, as it is the lure which draws Russia on, so is it the source of the opposition that delays her progress. Can anything be more necessary than a military road thence to the Danube? In any other state you would require for military purposes fifty roads, but here *one*, and a short one, is sufficient.

"Surely," it will be objected, "Russia can attack in the east as well as in the west. In the last war she sent her troops to scale the mountains of Koordistan, when she poured them across the Danube." This would be a reason for two roads, not an argument against the making of one; but I think I shall be able to show that the second is superfluous.

The map shows two internal seas east and west of the chain of the Caucasus, which seem made on purpose to enable Russia to reach beyond that barrier, and strike at the exposed vitals of the two eastern kingdoms, which have so long appeared to be

breaking under her pressure. Into these seas pour her rivers after traversing the vast regions where her armies are recruited and her grain is grown. No countervailing streams through Persia and Turkey carry downwards their resources so as to enable them to meet her in these basins—once closed lakes belonging to themselves. All seems calculated to render the Euxine and the Caspian the handmaids to her ambition, the carriers of the substantial implements of her conquests, and the dispensers of the blight of her menace over the south. She has either been incomprehensibly negligent of such advantages, or there are obstacles which have escaped our scrutiny.*

Her wars with Persia excited little interest. No one thought of the means she employed, or to what end, far less by what route, her forces went or came: no one doubted that these seas were made use of, or cared if they were not. In the last war (1828-9), however, Russia's movement in Asia did excite attention—perhaps astonishment. Occupying a position on the sources of the Euphrates, she was seen to menace at once Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and might have descended to the sea of Syria, or the Persian Gulf. It was, with the exception of NAPOLEON's expedition to Egypt, a movement of more spring and purpose, vivacity and aim, than had been displayed in any military operation of our times, and recalled the great events of antiquity, enacted on the same theatre. The conclusion was that no serious obstacle did oppose her in the East; and the invasion of India ceased to be considered a chimera. Let us examine the circumstances.

The Persian war of 1827-8, was then just concluded, so that she had an army ready at hand, an army which the Persians had never opposed, and the transport of which had occupied the three previous years.† This transport *had been effected entirely by land*. Her troops and provisions were sent to the mountains of Armenia by a journey of months across the steppes of Astrachan, the gorges of the Caucasus, and the unhealthy plains of Georgia, and for the following reason:—

The bight of the eastern extremity of the Black Sea is flanked by two lofty ranges—the one a continuation of the Ararat, the other the Caucasus. Through this funnel the wind constantly draws east or west; and when it gets to the eastward, which it does nine months in the year, it blows right on shore; a vessel once embayed with a strong wind from the west or north (which in shore always draws to the east) has all round a lee shore without headland or protection of any sort; a current

* South of the Caucasus she has never been able to keep together for service more than 5000 during a fortnight.

† The active preparations for war commenced in 1825, and from 1821, a rupture with Turkey was only postponed from season to season.

running between two and three knots (an eddy from the Bosphorus) sets at all times dead into the bight. With such craft, and such sailors as Russia has got, nothing can be more formidable; and casualties do not occur only because by standing orders her men-of-war are prohibited from approaching this coast in the winter months, on any pretence, and in summer can only proceed thither by special orders, and then under no pretext lie there beyond four-and-twenty hours. Steam may render the coast approachable, but that advantage in war would be contingent on her possessing the supremacy by sea, which at present as regards steam force belongs to the Turks. Steam, however, will not overcome the difficulties of the coast.

The water is shoal; vessels must in the finest weather anchor three or four miles out; the beach is low, and beyond it marshes spread for miles into the interior; these are passable only here and there by narrow stone causeways upon which two persons only can pass. During the months that the sea leaves the coast approachable the fever renders the marshes impassable. The disembarkation of a single regiment would be a matter of great uncertainty and much delay, and before it could extricate itself from the marshes it would have two or three nights to bivouac where one night would leave a Russian regiment but a skeleton, if not a corpse.

Coming further west, a descent on Asia Minor is from other causes an operation too hazardous to attempt, and has never been attempted. She would meet on landing perhaps with no resistance if she approached in force, but with no support and no supplies; her troops would be dependent on the fleet, and the coast is near the Bosphorus. The Turkish fleet, even after Navarino, held the sea, though unable to operate against the Russians when concentrated at Varna. It is quite different on the Asiatic coast. All argument is, indeed, superseded by the fact that except in the transit from Odessa to the coast of Roumelia, the Black Sea has never served Russia for the transport of a man, a cartridge, or a biscuit. This obstacle she has carefully concealed, as nothing was more calculated to destroy the prestige of her arms.

She is little better off in the Caspian. The marshes and bogs that form its north-western side reappear in the south-west to which her convoys would have to be directed, and the ague is there a scarcely less formidable opponent than on the Euxine.

The obstacles, however, to the use of the Caspian in a Turkish war, are political rather than physical.

Russia never comes to a rupture with one State, except when assured that it will be helped by no other; her whole resources have been required against each, and she has been allowed to

bring them to bear separately. For instance, in the successive years 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, and 1831, Persia, Turkey, and Poland were each in succession crushed,* and from the one to the other her whole forces were transferred by geographic stages. Indeed she used each in turn against the other. Thus Persia, abandoned by Turkey in 1826-7, was employed in 1828-9 against the Turks. Poles, to be extinguished in 1830-1 were employed against the Turks in 1828-9. The money from the Turkish subsidy was of use for the Polish war, the positions gained in Persia, for the Turkish. The experienced veteran bodies of the Caucasus were employed in each, the Circassians being too glad to be left alone.

In the present altered state of feeling, the transport of troops across the Caspian would agitate Persia and expose her to the risk of a Persian together with a Turkish war, just as PETER'S advance, when he built two vessels on the Caspian, would, but for the interposition of France, have brought a Turkish war on his hands. For these reasons neither of the two seas will serve her in the next war unless circumstances are altered: her attack if made in Asia must be conducted across the Caucasus, where she can no longer venture with the impunity she has hitherto enjoyed.†

Though pervious to the Russians only at two points, the Caucasus is to the Turks, with the disposition of the people in their favour, pervious throughout its whole line, and they would be invited thither and *beyond*. The council at Constantinople might not decide on an invasion of Russia, but with a BEM in command, orders would not be required nor contrary orders heeded. BEM is no more; but without Transylvania who would have heard of BEM? Nor in this respect would there be much difference if KOURSCHID PASHA or OMER PASHA, or half a dozen more who could be named, chanced to have an independent command of 10,000 men in that direction.

It was neither the Senate of Carthage, nor the Senate of Rome, that decided on the invasion of Italy, or of Africa, and where there are similar chances BARCAS and SCIPIOS may still be found. The readiest means of parrying a blow in Asia most assuredly would be a thrust home. Russia presents to an invading Turkish force no physical obstacles to vanquish, no passes to force, no fortresses to reduce. Neither would there be

* "But Russia, feeling that her position in Asia would be in the last degree critical, if the contest with Turkey should have commenced before that in which she had engaged with Persia should have terminated, was desirous of bringing to a conclusion the war with that country; and the success of her arms, in the autumn of 1827, enabled her to dictate terms to the Shah."—*Progress of Russia in the East*. p. 98.

† If the case is altered, it is owing to the presence of European troops, ships, and treaties in the treacherous war of the Crimea.—Note, 1868.

armies to oppose the invader, for the Russian force would be collected on the west, or shut up in Asia Minor. Down the sides of the Caucasus would pour the now united and aspiring mountaineers; the wild horsemen beyond the Caspian would break in upon the Eastern frontier. The Tartar tribes of the Crimea and of Astrachan would rise to a man; so would, in all likelihood, the religious dissidents. The Cossacks, and even the Malo Russians would be more disposed to profit by, than to oppose, the invasion. Russia would be girdled by a flame of insurrection, and the way would be open to Moscow. On the other hand, the Russian army would not, as on the last occasion, be unopposed in Asia Minor by a military force. It would no longer find allies in Dere Beys. It would have to move in small detachments, through broken and rugged ground, not with one chain of mountains to cross but a mass of mountains, extending before and around for hundreds of miles. It would look in vain for Greek religionaries, Slaav brothers; it would obtain no support from a fleet; it would draw no resources from the people, and would be contingent for support upon weekly convoys sent across the Steppes and the Caucasus, which, on our hypothesis, would be already occupied by the enemy, or in a state of insurrection.

Besides, Russia's inducement for such a movement has disappeared. The struggle of 1828-9 was, as every struggle must be, on the Danube. The Porte had but a small body of regulars, and relied chiefly upon levies from Asia. The appearance of the Russians on the Eastern frontier paralysed at once one half the Empire. With an enemy hovering on their rear, these tribes would not quit their homes and march a thousand miles to the westward. The movement on Erzerum was indeed decisive of the war, but only as checkmate may be given by a pawn. Now that the defence will be carried on by regular troops, the Porte would rejoice to see a Russian army blocked up in Kurdistan and Armenia, three months' march from the theatre of war.

Again, Russia has no army to spare for such a purpose. The echo of the first Turkish gun* would be answered from one end of Hungary to the other—perhaps from one end of Poland to the other; and so hazardous a game (and she must engage in it deliberately, or it will not be played) requires all her disposable forces in the west.

Thus against an invasion in Asia we have the removal of the inducements, the increased difficulties of the enterprise, the risk

* The gun here referred to was understood as being fired on the Pruth. Had the Turks not been held back by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the surmise of the text would now be history.—Note, 1868.

of a war with Persia, and of a counter invasion by the Turks. More, perhaps, than any one of these weighty objections is the increased range of her operations in Europe, and the augmentation there of her dangers and her cares. Russia can no longer venture on hazardous expeditions. These arguments are certainly good so far as to show that the importance of a road to the mountains of Armenia is as nothing compared with that of one to the plains of the Danube.

These questions arise only when England is on Russia's side; for if she were with Turkey, Russia would be powerless, and Turkey, conscious of a real support in England—not one prospective only, and then conditional—would never fail in courage to defend her own.

No diplomatic question was raised by the creation of the army, because no English Ambassador could venture directly to combat such a measure; and it was not of a nature to be frustrated by a counter project. It belongs to all immoral and selfish purposes to derive the energy and courage requisite for their execution, not from inherent courage, but from the weaknesses of those on whom they act. They fail when attention is directed to the disguises assumed or the arts employed. Hence the strange vacillations in the conduct of Russia, now daring, and now impotent. She is daring when she has secured the support of England, impotent when she has it not. Thus she suffers the organisation of an army, and frustrates the construction of a road.

By want of roads the Ottoman Empire, except within twenty or thirty leagues of a port, is unproductive for exportation. This has been incessantly pressed on the attention of the Turks.* Companies have proposed to undertake their construction, the Government has itself formed endless schemes. It has been proposed to employ the troops, as were those of ancient Rome, in making them. The troops are desirous to be so employed. But somehow the fatal influence is felt, reappearing at every point, occurring at every interval, and always thwarting every project of the kind. No one doubts whence it proceeds, but no one sees it, or at least is able to counteract it, on each particular occasion. Practically, indeed, there is a great obstacle. There cannot be roads without wheels, nor wheels without roads. A road cannot be kept up without traffic, and until the road is made no carriages can be constructed. The difficulty is to bring together roads and wheels in a country that has neither. The reason of this combination recently presented itself at an important point, in a practical fashion.

* So far back as 1834, the Sultan's promise was given to me for the construction of three great roads, one of which would have been to the Danube. A commencement was then made, but soon interrupted.

The merchants of Smyrna have their country houses near the bottom of the bay, and to it, for three miles, there is an incessant traffic of carriages, omnibuses, and carts. They proposed carrying the road right into the city, whence, as from a centre, roads would soon extend throughout the whole of Asia Minor. They offered to subscribe one half of the expense, if the Porte would supply the other. The Government received the communication in the most encouraging manner, but first required the approval of Sir STRATFORD CANNING, who answered the application made to him in these terms:—"I tell you frankly that "all my influence shall be exerted against it."* The explanation he offered was, that he was then urging on the Government the construction of a road of the greatest political importance, and would not have either money expended or attention directed to any other scheme. The same objection would have held equally in respect to the road to Shumla; but what other route was there of political importance? The scheme of the English Ambassador was a road from Trebizond to Erzerum!—that is to say, from the Black Sea to the interior of the Turkish provinces, or to the frontier of Persia, and from Persia (where Russia has got twice already) into Turkey and to the Black Sea.† But if the project failed, roadmaking received another blow. It has failed!

This is the way in which questions at Constantinople become diplomatic, and such are the results.

But the theatre of war could be reached by a far more rapid and easy way—a canal from the Black Sea to the Danube. Besides the military importance of this undertaking, trade and navigation would receive an impulse of which the consequences would ultimately be the depriving of Russia of all aggressive power. Well, this matter, too, became a diplomatic question.

In 1844, it was proposed by one foreign Power and opposed by another. It was not England but Austria who proposed it. Russia, by the payment of heavy bribes, succeeded in frustrating it. England did not support Austria, or counteract Russia. In 1851, the project was revived, but not by a foreign Power. Russia abstained from all interference, and took no heed of the matter; but England suggested a *counter project*—a railroad from Varna. It is needless to say that both plans were dropped.‡

* These words were addressed to myself, having been commissioned by the Smyrna merchants to negotiate the matter for them.

† The diplomacy of Pera was lost in wonder at the boldness and success of Sir Stratford Canning in carrying this measure, and in despatching the Minister of Commerce to superintend the execution. Kossuth, hearing of it, exclaimed, "The English Ambassador has become a Russian engineer!"

‡ Were even a parliamentary inquiry to be instituted into these transactions it is probable that no trace of these intrigues would be discovered in the records of the Foreign Office, and even if a Commission were sent out it could not compel the witnesses, nor, giving their testimony, would they allow it to be publicly used. So entirely is Europe in Russia's hands.

In moving troops from their remote provinces to the field of action both Empires have hitherto had to encounter like difficulties, which for both were so great that the operations of the war were subordinate matters. The introduction of steam has wholly reversed the balance.

Turkey is surrounded and bisected by the sea, every coast is indented with gulfs. By means of steamboats she passes from the condition the most unfavourable for the transport of troops to the enjoyment of facilities known (except by rail) to no other State in the world. Her forces are transported with rapidity and without loss. Her provinces are spared their passage: the difficulties of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are vanquished; and the resources of the Empire may be suddenly concentrated on the Danube, before the forces of Russia could march, even if unopposed, to that river, from the Pruth. The menace of invasion which has so long hung over Constantinople is reversed, and the Russian soldiers would be paralysed in their advance by the fear of a Turkish descent. These advantages are of course contingent upon the supremacy at sea; but Russia could not derive from steam any aid in offensive operations until she had crossed the Balkan and reached Varna, which is equivalent to saying that after victory she would possess the means of conquest. Russia can compass no insurrectionary efforts by means of a maritime descent even if she had the means. The Porte, on the other hand, can by a maritime operation, insurrectionise the whole of southern Russia.*

Russia may, indeed, recover her ground by means of railways. This will be a work of time, and it is surprising that she should so long have delayed so important a measure. From St. Petersburg to Moscow a line has been opened. A company is actually forming for carrying a line from Kharkow to the Black Sea, and it is proposed then to connect that place with Moscow.† In a country so poor, and where transport is so cheap in the winter and so rapid, such an enterprise cannot be entered on for commercial objects. It is a warlike measure—not a defensive but an offensive one.

* See the despatch of Consul Yeames of Odessa, describing the consternation produced by the Turkish declaration of war in the autumn of 1853.—Note, 1868.

† "The Russian Government had resolved to carry into execution the project of establishing a railway from Kharkoff to Theodosia, and had accepted the proposition of a private company for that purpose, with a capital of fifty millions of silver roubles (118,750,000 francs), to which the Government had consented to guaranter an interest of 3 per cent. Kharkoff is a city of the Ukraine, situated 1030 kiloe metres S.E. of St. Petersburg, and Theodosia or Kaffa is a port on the Black Sea near the straits of Kertch. It is in contemplation, also, to establish a railway from Moscow to Kharkoff, so that a direct communication will be ultimately established between St. Petersburg and the Crimea, and the capital of Russia be thus able to communicate in a few days with the Black Sea and Odessa."—*Letter from St. Petersburg.*

Russia's force in the Black Sea is insignificant. There are but thirteen sail of the line, and half of these available only as transports with their lower deck guns landed. The crews are miserable. It is a pasteboard fleet. She has a considerable number of small steamers, but even in this respect she cannot cope with the Turks who have five or six first-class steam frigates. Turkey has at this moment but five line-of-battle ships really effective; but these vessels are magnificent. It is inexplicable that they also should have thus neglected the navy, whilst they are strengthening the army, unless it be by the advice of those zealous Allies who are watching over them.

Within the last few years considerable expenditure has been devoted to batteries and guns, but the object of this care has never been the Bosphorus but the *Dardanelles*. These augmentations have regularly followed the "demonstrations" of the English and French squadrons *for Turkey's protection*. Meanwhile a Russian fleet might anchor before the Sultan's palace, with its yardarms breaking his windows, without having lost a spar, or perhaps a man in running down the Bosphorus. But this danger is only apparent, and I am far from regretting that this source of alarm should have existed. No State can recover without anxiety. Russia would rather burn St. Petersburg than Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire she can conquer only by *protection*. Such has ever been her process. When she has brought about revolution or partition there, her thirteen line-of-battle ships will serve by saving, not destroying Constantinople.

The infantry colonies round the frontiers of Austria were instituted in a defensive spirit, but the cavalry colonies of Russia, which extend from the Ukraine to the Caspian, have been formed for conquest.

It may be objected, that in the provinces occupying the space between the Russian frontier and the Danube, there is no room, and behind that river they would be too remote; but there is the Plain of the Dobroja running up to the Russian territory between Wallachia and the Black Sea. A situation more admirable for colonisation and defence is not to be found. Here no diplomatic compacts exclude Turkish occupancy; here, bounded by the Euxine, ditched by the Danube, open to communication with Constantinople, might a vast camp be formed. A gigantic Shumla carried 300 miles to the north flanking the line of the Russian advance, and whence in four-and-twenty hours 50,000 men might be deployed to line the Sereth or the Pruth. The administration is in the hands of the Porte. The land is public property, it is scarcely occupied; some 15,000 families of Tartars (remnants of those of Jyngis Khan, who crossed from Asia before the Turks), Cossacks, Arabs, Wallachians, and Transylvanians, are thinly scattered over a region

equal in extent to Yorkshire, Cumberland, Westmoreland, and Northumberland. Scanty as they are, their condition is happy.* The country is undulating and free from the marshes of Wallachia, and swept by the breezes of the Euxine; it is exposed neither to the extreme rigour of the winter, nor to the excessive heat of the summer of the adjoining provinces.

The Cossacks settled throughout Turkey live by fishing. They might be organised as Chaykists (boatmen), and a flotilla thus formed would secure the supremacy of the Danube. It is impossible to conceive a settlement more attractive for them, or to imagine a combination of circumstances more calculated to fortify the northern frontier.

Great importance will accrue to the Dobroja from the canal, if ever dug. A commercial city will soon arise, which will be the centre of trade of Bulgaria, the Danubian Provinces, and Hungary. On this spot a Highland colony must give to the SULTAN Celtic claymores to intermingle with Cossack lances.†

I have remarked on a former occasion, that it was impossible to separate the military from the diplomatic defence of the Danubian Principalities; unless I make this point clear the rest will be of no practical use. That diplomatic defence consists in the prevention of an occupation by the Russian army of these Principalities preliminary to a war. This is a point on which has been concentrated the whole mind of Russia from the mission of the first Prince MENZIKOFF to Constantinople with 300,000 ducats to purchase for Moldavia that first instalment of so-called independent privileges which have ended by excluding a Turkish garrison from a Turkish frontier, so as to constitute the advance of an army for her own protection a breach of the peace. This anomalous and monstrous position has as completely failed to be observed by Europe, or, I may rather say, is as completely misconceived by Europe, as the stipulations regarding the passage of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus; and further in misconception and illusion it is impossible to go.

When, then, Russia is preparing to invade—she being always the aggressor—the Porte is always anxious to smooth down difficulties, and to avoid a collision; and its troops not being on the frontier, it avoids movements which war alone could justify—that is, moving them up. But as Russia can attack only at one season of the year, an expedient might be devised for assembling a camp at that particular moment, periodically every year, if not behind the Pruth, at least behind the Danube, whence, on an

* "I have seen no peasantry in any part of Europe, whose condition is so prosperous and whose taxes are so light." Joanesco's Plain of the Dobroja, Constantinople, 1851.

† Austria has begun to bring Highlanders to settle in Hungary, with the view of using them against Turkey, and interesting Europe in her quarrels.

emergency, they could advance as rapidly into the Provinces from the south as Russia from the north, and by the single movement cause to Russia the loss of one campaign.

The martial predecessors of the SULTAN were in the habit of transferring their Court, with great pomp, in the spring season, to Adrianople. This was the occasion for great festivities for the resumption or preservation of the nomade Turkish character. Hunting expeditions were at times undertaken, as under MAHMOUD IV., resembling the operations of a campaign. Why should not the SULTAN resume this habit of his forefathers, and unite to this tribe festivity the important purposes of a great military review? Each of the Ordus might send its contingent. A useful emulation would be developed in the different corps, proficiency would be acquired in the handling and movement of bodies, and the troops would be formed to the exercise of marching, involving the completeness of all the other parts of the service, and constituting, in fact, the great element of success in war. Unfortunately the Turks have not considered this all essential point of the *one available season for attacking them*. This is the discovery they have yet to make, to dissipate all their fears.

If such an arrangement is clearly of importance for the improvement of the condition of the army, of what security would it not be in a political point of view? A permanent protection would be obtained without making a display or giving offence.

Within five years the Porte has had twice to assemble armies of observation, and on both occasions by doing so has protected itself from an invasion; yet so delicate was the matter, and with such difficulty did they arrive at their decision, that on the first of these events a Ministry fell from office, and on the second the majority of the Government sided against it, and the SULTAN interposed and commanded it, by an Act of Authority.

The very abundance of the resources possessed by the Ottoman Empire which I have now enumerated may appear suspicious; yet this is the natural consequence of mismanagement. For a century and a half there has been unremitting activity opposed to persevering neglect. It has been directed to disguise as well as to destroy the advantages of its opponents—to simulate as well as to create resources for itself. Where values have been taken credit for, that never were possessed, and entered on the debit side, when they could not be abstracted, it is natural that, on sifting the accounts, we should find the alleged bankrupt solvent, and the nominal creditor a debtor alike to his victim and the law.

It was originally proposed that the SULTAN's guard, in imitation of the CZAR, should be furnished by the various tribes and

provinces, and should *preserve their own costume*. It is deeply to be regretted that this idea was not carried into execution. As, four centuries ago, the mania of change seized the Turks, and yet subsided within two generations, so may again sense and dignity reappear in the calkap and dolman, or even in the turban and Benish. The rancour of the late SULTAN against the Janisseries explains, if it does not justify, this folly; now it is sustained only by fallacies.

When to this rectification of form it adds the solid advantages above stated—that is to say, a colonisation of the Dobroja, a military road to and strengthened fortress on the Danube, an irregular cavalry, and a spring review in the north of Thrace, then will the schemes of Russian ambition be indefinitely adjourned.

At the time of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, in the States of Europe the feudal system was falling into decay, and regular armies had not come into use. It organised a feudal system which flourished in youthful vigour while that of Europe was in its decline. It combined therewith a standing army composed of every race over which its sway extended, or against which its arms had been turned, and so rapidly rose from the humblest station to the highest power. It fell into disorder as the standing armies and the tactics of Europe arose; as the disorganised military bodies had struck deep root into the political system, that branch was corrupted also, and correction or suppression became alike impossible to escape from this tyranny. The sovereign had recourse to undisciplined levies, which exhausted the treasury, and fatally affected every contest with foreign Powers, so that in tracing the events of this epoch of ebb one is filled with astonishment at the continuation of existence in an Empire which seemed to have accumulated on its own head every cause of dissolution.

This sum of disasters has not to be rated by ponderable quantities. It is not a state of things to be known by the name of a country as existing at a certain date. It is in part, of course, inherent and original, but it is also in part external and derivative. It is the case of a man who, benumbed with cold, is eaten by rats. In this operation we have played our part, for we have nurtured and sustained the Power who has profited by certain internal disorders to bring, extend, and perpetuate convulsions. Russia may be said to be England's creation, for without her aid and support Russia might have existed peaceably within her own natural sphere, but never would have swallowed up her neighbours, or disturbed or alarmed the universe.

On the other hand, we have never ceased under the guise of friendship to deal deadly and perfidious blows on Turkey; so

that the cumulative results of our fostering care of the disturber and our insidious betrayal of the disturbed, have to be taken into account in the estimate of the trials through which Turkey has passed, and we have to see in those disorders and malversations, not as we are inclined to do at present, the results of Turkish misrule and Mussulman fanaticism, but also of British incapacity and Christian perfidy. Were the British nation endowed with the moral or religious attributes of an upright people so as not to do wrong, or to suffer wrong to be done, and the spirit of liberty by which to restrain their rulers from interfering in the affairs of their neighbours, there would have been little to tell historically of Europe during the last three centuries; there would neither have been great loss, standing armies, fixed debt, loads of taxes, or permanent embassies. Causes which are general include the results which are particular; Turkey, for her share in that negative well being which would have resulted from England's enormous power as the first maritime State, had she possessed active virtues, would have been spared the loss of that "village on the sea of Azof" (which the last just and vigorous councils of the British Government, after resolving to prevent in the interest of their country and the world, abandoned before a parliamentary combination and a traitorous intrigue) out of which has come, if not all, the greater portion of her recent sufferings and perils.

The matter may be put in a shape more seizable by those who have not followed the events of history, noting at each step what would have happened if any one State had been just and wise—the only course by which the study of history can serve the purposes of instruction—by saying that the partition of Poland, to which the SULTAN alone among crowned heads did not consent, and against which he protested, has amongst its other consequences brought upon the Ottoman Empire those evil and fearful days out of which it has emerged, not by one, but by a succession of miracles.

A judicious reorganization of a domineering military force, under favourable circumstances and with the necessary pecuniary resources, would do honour to any administration. The old body had to be attacked and extirpated before the new one could have existence, while a powerful enemy was carrying its victorious arms from both extremities into the centre of the Empire. One Christian insurrection having shorn the Crescent of one horn and a Mussulman revolt of the other (Greece and Egypt), a third having shaken its power to the very heart, having twice had its new army swept away (at Koniah and Nejib), its fleet once annihilated by foreign Powers, once carried off by domestic treachery. From this series of calamities it emerges

with a military organisation equal in numbers to that which it could display in its days of power, without having imposed a new tax or contracted a debt. This is one of the most extraordinary resuscitations to be found in the history of the human race.

This reorganisation having been effected during a period of humiliation caused by a Christian enemy, aided by their Christian subjects, it was to be expected that it would be imbued with fanaticism; and Turkey might have escaped dissolution from insubordination only to sink under the animosity aroused by the insolence of a new military caste. Or it might have run to the other extreme. Observers reported as a matter of fact the decay of Islam; the question to them was solely what new shape it would assume. All were agreed that the faith of Mecca was falling to the ground; some thought the fragments might fit into a Christian edifice, others that it would be a hopeless incumbrance of the spiritual field in some atrophic guise of materialism. These speculations have not been borne out as regards the army; it has avoided intolerance without falling into infidelity. The men were not marched to church or chapel once a week; but daily at the hours of prayer they voluntarily assemble for its performance. It is the most observant of any army of the practices of its faith, and it is the most religious portion of the community. Officers negligent of observances when not under the soldiers' eyes, are careful of them when in their presence. The character and demeanour of the army as a body would be creditable to an individual. Not sharing in the belief that Islam was dying out, the rock I chiefly apprehended was fanaticism; with what surprise then did I hear it announced by an eminent diplomatist, that "discipline, by destroying fanaticism, had taken from Turkey her real strength"?

A momentary impulse on the battle-field may be obtained by lust or hate; but a State cannot be consolidated by failings and vices in the men of whom it is composed. No promise of permanency can be found in passion, no trust based upon animosity. What, then, the fatuity that would call animosity directed (as in European Turkey) against two-thirds of their fellow-subjects an element of power, and deplore its being replaced by discipline and order! But, did this animosity ever exist? It appeared in the evil times of Turkey, no doubt; it was the aberration that threatened its extinction. Who can read the Ottoman history without perceiving that it owes its existence to toleration? It is because toleration—religious and political—was the rule of their society that their Government did not fall into the snare of enforcing conformity. The Turk, when he has nothing to do,

contains his hands, his tongue, and his soul, and knows how to be still.

Such interest as Europe feels in Turkey is avowedly on account of Russia; our care for Turkey's endurance is our fear of Russia's approach. The proposition I have to establish, knowing it to be true, is this—that Turkey is in no danger save from her allies, and that Russia can make no impression on Turkey save through the schemes of the Powers of Europe to oppose her.

I here conclude with enumerating the suggestions which I have made in connexion with the new military organisation. The Restoration of the native costumes in the Army, which will be their preservation amongst the people. Sedulous preservation of social manners and etiquette. The colonisation of the Dobroja. The strengthening of the fortresses of the Danube. A military road from the Capital to Silistria. The constitution or preservation of an irregular Cavalry. A Spring Review in the North of Thrace. Then will the schemes of Russian ambition be indefinitely adjourned, and that principally, because it will then no longer be possible for the Porte to shut its eyes to its own strength.

I have now closed my case as regards the Army, and I think in so far I have substantiated the proposition with which I have commenced these volumes—that what the Turks have well done has been their own doing, and neither undertaken at the suggestion of nor accomplished by the aid of their allies.

THE END.

comparing his lands, his crops, and his soil, and knows how to
be still.

Such interest as Europe feels in Turkey is altogether on
account of Russia; our only real interest in Turkey is our fear
of Russia's approach. The proposition I have to submit
knowing it to be true, is that Turkey is in no danger save
from her allies, and that Russia can make no impression on
Turkey save through the schemes of the Powers of Europe to
oppose her.

I have to conclude with commenting the suggestions which I
have made in connection with the new military organization.
The restoration of the native costumes to the Army, which
will be their preservation amongst the people, is a delicate preser-
vation of social manners and customs. The restoration of the
Dobruja. The strengthening of the fortresses of the Danube.
A military road from the Capital to Belgrade. The constitution
or preservation of an irregular Cavalry. A Spring Review in
the North of France. I need not the schemes of Russian ambi-
tion be indefinitely postponed, and that principally because it
will then no longer be possible for the State to shut its eyes to
its own strength.

I have now closed my case as regards the Army, and I think
it as far as I have submitted the proposition with which I have
commented the various schemes which I have well done
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